


International
Conflict Resolution
Role of the UN and the OIC



Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat

War is a constant of human history. Only its nature changes, i.e., from Limited Wars to Total Wars and then onto Low Intensity Conflicts. Various theories and reasons are offered like "Clash of Civilisations"; simultaneously, efforts are at hand to limit, if not totally eliminate, the causes of conflicts. League of Nations and now the UN is striving hard at it. The book comprehensively addresses this important issue being faced by the world, especially the Muslims. The role of the OIC and the participation of armed forces from the Muslim World in UN Peacekeeping Missions are well covered. It makes an interesting reading, especially for those who want to have a different perspective of Conflict Management.

Lt Gen (R) Tahir M. Qazi
Former High Commissioner of
Pakistan to Malaysia

International Conflict Resolution

Role of the UN and the OIC

International Conflict Resolution Role of the UN and the OIC

Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat



National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad

ISBN: 978-969-8535-22-3

Published by
NUST Publishing
National University of Sciences and Technology
H-12, Islamabad

**International Conflict Resolution
Role of the UN and the OIC**

Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat

Copyright © 2014, NUST Publishing

All rights reserved

No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted, in any form or by any means
(electronic or otherwise), without
the prior written permission
of the Publisher

Cover design

Mahtab Ahmad Wasil

Layout

Mahtab Ahmad & Zohaib Ali

Printed and bound in Pakistan
by
NUST Press, Islamabad

email: dnp@nust.edu.pk
www.nust.edu.pk

DEDICATION

Dedicated to the profound memories of my late father,
Muhammad Rafiq Asghar, who taught me to do the right
deeds, follow the right path and remain steadfast in the face
of odds and difficulties of life.

Contents

<i>Abbreviations</i>	<i>xv</i>
<i>Tables</i>	<i>xvii</i>
<i>Appendices</i>	<i>xix</i>
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>xxi</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xxiii</i>
<i>Comments and Views</i>	<i>xxv</i>
<i>Foreword</i>	<i>xxvii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>1</i>

1. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution	5
1.1.1 Micro Theory	7
1.1.2 Macro Theory	8
1.1.3 Theory of Protracted Social Conflict	10
1.1.4 Burton's Theory	12
1.2 Conflict and Violence	14
1.3 Instruments of Conflict Resolution	17
1.3.1 Conflict Prevention	17
1.3.2 Conflict Regulation	17
1.3.3 Conflict Settlement	17
1.3.4 Conflict Resolution	18
1.3.5 Conflict Transformation	18
1.4 Armed Conflicts among States	18
1.4.1 Primary, Secondary and Third Party	19
1.4.2 Issues	20

2. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

2.1	State Sovereignty and World Politics	21
2.2	Nature of International Cooperation	23
2.3	International Conflicts	24
2.3.1	International Armed Conflicts	25
2.3.2	Non-International Armed Conflicts	25
2.4	Internal Conflicts	26
2.5	International and Transnational Influences	27
2.6	Foreign Policy and National Interests	28
2.7	Clash of Civilizations	29
2.7.1	Hantington's Hypothesis	29
2.7.2	Critique	37

3. GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY: ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

3.1	The UN	41
3.1.1	Role of UN General Assembly	42
3.1.2	Role of UN Security Council	42
3.1.3	Role of UN Secretary General	45
3.1.4	The UN Secretariat	46
3.1.5	Obligations and Rights of Member States	46
3.2	UN Peace and Security Activities	46
3.3	Role of Regional Organizations	48
3.4	UN Peacekeeping Operations	49
3.4.1	Summary of UN Peacekeeping Operations	49
3.4.2	General Concerns	50
3.4.3	Legal Basis for Use of Force	56
3.4.4	Rules of Engagement	56
3.4.5	General Principles for Use of Forces	56
3.4.6	Islamic Teachings on Use of Force	57

3.5	International Law and the Conflict Resolution	58
3.5.1	Genesis and Growth of International Law	57
3.5.2	Conflict Resolution through International Law	58
3.6	International Humanitarian Law and Law of Armed Conflict	60
3.6.1	Protected Persons, Property and Objects under IHL	60
3.6.2	National Implementation of IHL	60
3.6.3	Application of IHL to UN Peacekeeping Forces	61
3.6.4	Exemptions for Application of IHL to US Forces	61
3.7	International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court and International Tribunals for War Crimes	61
3.7.1	The International Court of Justice	61
3.7.2	International Criminal Court	62
3.7.3	International Tribunals for War Crimes	63

4. THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC)

4.1	Muslim World—A Global Perspective	65
4.2	Genesis of the OIC	70
4.2.1	Change of Title	71
4.2.2	OIC Charter	72
4.2.3	Membership of OIC	77
4.2.4	The Organs of the OIC	77
4.2.5	Islamic Summit Conference	78
4.2.6	Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers..	78
4.2.7	OIC's Role in Fostering Cooperation	78
4.2.8	Role in Conflict Resolution	79

4.2.9	Objectives and Principles for Conflict Resolution	80
4.2.10	Peaceful Settlement of Disputes	81

5. THE OIC AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

5.1	Palestine Problem	83
5.1.1	Israeli Aggression	85
5.1.2	Arab-Israel Peace Process	86
5.1.3	UN Membership of Palestine	87
5.2	Palestine Problem and The Muslim World	95
5.2.1	Islamic Summit Conference	97
5.2.2	Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers .	103
5.2.3	Palestine—The End State	107
5.2.4	International Humanitarian Aid Workers in Pakistan	109
5.3	Kashmir Dispute	111
5.3.1	Kashmir Dispute at the United Nations	113
5.3.2	Indian Atrocities in Kashmir	114
5.3.3	Kashmir Dispute and the OIC	115
5.3.4	Kashmir—The End State	120
5.4	Conflicts Faced by OIC Member States and Muslim Minorities	120
5.4.1	Inter-State Conflicts	121
5.4.2	Intra-State Conflicts and Disputes	123
5.4.3	Problems of Muslim Communities and Minorities	126
5.4.4	Problems of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons	126

6. THE OIC—POTENTIAL AND CAPABILITIES

6.1	Dynamics of National Power	127
6.2	Power Potential of the OIC	130
6.2.1	Area and Land Possessed by the OIC Members	131
6.2.2	Geopolitical and Geostrategic Significance of the OIC Member States	135
6.2.3	Muslim Population in the World	137
6.2.4	Muslim Minorities	139
6.2.5	Muslims in Europe and Americas	140
6.2.6	Workforce	140
6.2.7	Military Capability of the OIC Member States	142
6.2.8	Economic and Natural Resources of the OIC Member States	144
6.2.9	Human Resource Development and Education Standards	148
6.3	Intangible Elements of Power	149
6.3.1	Cohesiveness and Political Will	149
6.3.2	Nature and Type of Governments	150
6.3.3	Leadership	151
6.3.4	Cooperation at the OIC Level	151
6.4	OIC and International Peacekeeping	152
6.5	Constraints of OIC and its Member States	154
6.5.1	Organizational Matters	155
6.5.2	Capacity for Proactive Response	156
6.5.3	Politico-military Capabilities	157
6.5.4	Resource Constraints	159

6.6	Survey on International Conflict Resolution:	
	Capacity and Response of the OIC.....	159
6.6.1	Parameters of Survey	160
6.6.2	Part I—OIC Member States and Conflicts.....	160
6.6.3	Part II—Potential and Capacity of Member States of OIC	162
6.6.4	Part III—Role of OIC in Conflict Resolution and Suggestions Offered by Survey Participants	162
6.6.5	Suggestions Offered by Survey Participants..	166

7. FUTURE ROLE OF THE OIC

7.1	International Conflict Resolution	169
7.1.1	Resolution of Arab-Israel Dispute	169
7.1.2	Resolution of Kashmir Dispute	170
7.1.3	Other Conflicts and Crises	170
7.2	Reforming the OIC	171
7.2.1	Collective Security and Collective Defence ..	172
7.2.2	Peace and Security Committee and Security Advisor to the Secretary General	172
7.2.3	Peacekeeping Operations	173
7.2.4	Creation of Standby Peacekeeping Force	174
7.2.5	Rapid Response and High Readiness Force ..	175
7.2.6	Commissioner for Refugees, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management	175
7.2.7	Conflict Resolution Institutions in the Muslim World	176
7.2.8	Peacekeeping Training Centers	177
7.2.9	Conflict Resolution Fund	177

7.2.10	A Comprehensive Security Concept	178
7.2.11	Commission of the Eminent Persons and Ten-Year Plan of Action	179
	Conclusion	181
	Appendices	183
	References and Notes	225
	Bibliography	257
	Index	269

Abbreviations

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
ICFM	Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
LAC	Law of Armed Conflict
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OSCE	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
ROE	Rules of Engagement
UN	United Nations
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNCIP	United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SESRIC	Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries

List of Tables

Table 1	Area of the OIC Members in the World	132
Table 2	Total Area of the OIC Members in Asia	132
Table 3	Area of the OIC Members in South and South East Asia	133
Table 4	Area of the OIC Members in West and Central Asia	133
Table 5	Area of the OIC Members in the Middle East	133
Table 6	Area of the OIC Members in Africa	134
Table 7	Area of the OIC Members in North Africa	134
Table 8	Area of the OIC Members in West Africa	134
Table 9	Area of the OIC Members in East, South and South East Africa	135
Table 10	Area of the OIC Members in Europe and America	135
Table 11	Top 20 Most Populous Muslim Countries	138
Table 12	Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims Minorities	139
Table 13	Availability of Work / Labour Force in Top 20 Muslim Countries	141
Table 14	Military Forces and Defence Expenditure of OIC Member States with More than 50,000 Armed Forces	144
Table 15	Top 50 Countries of the World with the Highest GDP (Listed by IMF - 2013)	146

Table 16	GDP of Top 25 Member States of the OIC	147
Table 17	International Community's Contribution towards UN Peacekeeping vis-à-vis the OIC	153
Table 18	The OIC Top Ten Member's Contribution towards UN Peacekeeping	154

Appendices

Appendix	Description	Page
A	Current United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	183
B	Past United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	185
C	Summary of Islamic Summit Conference of the OIC	189
D	Geo-strategic Significance of the OIC Member States	191
E	Population and Workforce of the OIC Member States	196
F	Military Capabilities of the OIC Member States	200
G	Military Capabilities—Comparison between the OIC, NATO, G-8 and P-5	204
H	Economic and Natural Resources of the OIC Member States	205
I	Literacy Standards of the OIC Member States	209
J	Global Contribution of Troops in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	212
K	Contributions of the OIC Member States' Troops in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	220
L	Participation of Top Ten Member States of the OIC in Various United Nations Peacekeeping Missions	223

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Prof Dr Lutfullah Mangi, Pro Vice Chancellor, Shah Abdul Latif University (Shikarpur Campus), former Director Area Study Center Far East and South East Asia and former Chairman Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, for his intimate guidance in completing this work, which was essentially undertaken as my PhD dissertation. I would also like to thank Brigadier (Retired) Agha Ahmad Gul, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Balochistan, for his encouragement and intellectual support to complete this study. Many other people who helped and assisted me in compiling the data, typing and composing this book deserve my sincere appreciation and profound gratitude; specifically Brigadier (Retired) Mahmud Bashir Bajwa, and Dr Safdar Ali Shah for their very valuable editorial advice.

Finally, I must acknowledge the patience and support of my wife, Shabnam Shahid, and my daughters, Mariam and Aamina. Without their encouragement and moral support, it would have been quite difficult to complete this work, especially when it was undertaken along with my hectic work routine. In particular, I owe a special thanks to my daughter Mariam who rendered many valuable suggestions during compilation of this book.

PREFACE

The study of use of force and its implications is closely related to my profession—the military service. It has been a matter of interest to me ever since I joined the Army thirty-seven years ago. However, I developed keen interest in “Conflict Resolution” in 1997 when, as a Contingent Commander in the United Nations Mission in Haiti, I led and guided my officers and soldiers in undertaking numerous peacekeeping activities. Moreover, while serving at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, New York, from 1999 to 2001, as Military Planning Officer and Officer in-charge Generic Planning Unit, I observed that international peacekeeping and international conflict resolution was an effective mechanism and a forceful tool for international diplomacy and foreign policy. It also gave me an insight into the important role played by the regional organizations in global peace and security.

I have closely watched the sufferings caused by festering conflicts like Kashmir and Palestine, and the inability of international organizations, especially the UN and the OIC, to resolve the issues for the wellbeing of the affected peoples and regional stability.

Ideally speaking, no one should suffer the horrors of a conflict or a war and the resultant destruction, especially the loss of human life. Real teachings of Islam teach Muslims to live peacefully in an environment of cooperation and cooperative co-existence with the rest of the world. With these aspects in mind, I wish to contribute towards establishment of a workable mechanism through which the OIC member states can find peaceful solutions to their disputes and conflicts. I hope my effort will contribute towards peace, prosperity and progress in the world, in general, and in the Muslim world, in particular.

Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat

Comments and Views

During May 2012, on my invitation, General Shahid Hashmat, delivered a lecture to my students at Tsinghua University on “Prospects of Peace in Afghanistan”. Afterwards, while having our dinner at huge Mongolian yurt in Beijing, we discussed about his Ph D thesis on “International Conflict Resolution” and the role of the former western colonial powers in “Arab Spring” in which numerous people were wounded, many were killed and millions of innocent people became homeless. Though we were listening to the throating-singing of the horsemen from the peaceful steppe of northern Asia, yet our hearts were saddened by the New Hot War in Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria . . . and may be next one in Iran . . . To stop the New Hot War from coming to Pakistan, China and other Asian countries, Chinese President, Xi Jinping, has proposed a grand plan for the revival of Silk Roads. General Hashmat and I believe that when the Chinese civilization and the Islamic civilization join hands in completing the economic belt of the Silk Roads and enhancing their cooperation with each other, we will realize Chinese Dream and Islamic Dream of peace, progress and prosperity together. By that time, a world peace will become a constant in our life. In my opinion, General Hashmat’s book makes extremely valuable contribution in exploring the role of the United Nations and the OIC in conflict resolution. His recommendations can help the OIC to play more effective and constructive role in international politics, in general, and in international conflict resolution, in particular.

Prof Li Xiguang,

Dean of Chinese Academy of World Agendas

Head of Tsinghua University International Center for
Communication

Head of Tsinghua University Center for Pakistan Cultural and
Communication

Member of Tsinghua University Council

Historically speaking, Conflict in human societies appears to be simply inevitable. When nation states develop a conflict, its resolution generally gets divided in three sequential tiers, diplomacy, armed contest and the people, who either capitulate

or defeat the adversary through protracted defiance and violence. Being a soldier and an experienced UN peacekeeper, the author's knowledge of war fighting and peace building has given force and strength to his approach for making diplomacy work. He recognises the power of political alliances in diplomacy and the necessity of military power lurking in distance, yet exuding strategic effects. A very interesting book, which should interest diplomats, soldiers and anyone interested in conflict resolution.

Brigadier Agha Ahmad Gul (Retd)

Former Vice Chancellor,
University of Balochistan
Quetta

A professional soldier-turned peacekeeper, having vast exposure of multicultural and multispectral international conflicts and their containment, Dr Shahid Hashmat has developed a lasting interest in UN peacekeeping and conflict resolution. I am impressed and inspired by his commitment to advancing his knowledge. He has extended the body of knowledge through his PhD dissertation, and has made a greater scholastic contribution to learning about this relatively new field.

This book will serve a great purpose within Pakistan and abroad, as Pakistan carries the distinction of the largest troops contribution in United Nations peacekeeping role. It is also a useful reference material for students in this discipline of growing social and political importance. Despite the esoteric nature of the subject, the author generates reading interest like that of bedside reading material.

Dr Gulfaraz Ahmed

Former Chairman, International Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Islamabad.
Former Chairman Oil & Gas Development Corporation, Pakistan.
Former Federal Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Govt. of Pakistan

FOREWORD

This erudite presentation, Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat's book, represents much painstaking research and a prudent and effective utilisation of his own experience in UN Peacekeeping operations.

His scholarly survey of the existing literature on conflict resolution is meticulous and equally importantly dotted with his own observations of what the various theories expounded by such distinguished thinkers as Prof Dr Edward E. Azar, Dr Pfaltzgraff (best known for his *Contending Theories of International Relations* co-authored with James E. Dougherty) mean not only for the theoretical study of the subject but also the real contribution they can make to conflict resolution if correctly understood and applied by today's politicians and statesmen.

Of particular interest in this section of the book is the discussion of the "Clash of Civilisations" first expounded by Huntington in 1993. After a detailed study of the various critiques on his thesis, that have appeared around the world, the author concludes that even while Huntington is wrong in postulating that there is a clash between the "Islamic" civilisation and "Western" civilisation, the currently dominant "Western" civilization, he is right in asserting that there are divisions within the Muslim world and an absence of credible leadership. Nothing perhaps better illustrates this than the tragic situation in Syria and its fallout in such important Muslim countries as Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey.

Dr Hashmat's survey of UN peacekeeping operations, based on his own participation in such operations and his subsequent recommendations on how they need to be conducted, reflect the lessons that he has learnt. While lauding the participation of regional organizations in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, Dr Hashmat cautions against the involvement of regional organizations in operations outside their region, citing as examples of the NATO operations in Afghanistan and more recently the imposition of the No-Fly-Zone in Libya. His recommendations on both accounts deserve more consideration

than they have received so far.

Equally important is the brief recounting of the main features of International Humanitarian Law and the need to adhere strictly to the provisions of these laws in conducting peacekeeping operations.

The most important and major part of the book is the chapter on the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Endorsing the view that “the idea of universal Islamic nationhood originates as a fundamental Islamic concept”, Dr Hashmat provides a summary of various efforts made over the years to overcome the differences in the Islamic world and to forge unity. His detailed account of various Summits and Foreign Ministers, meetings of the OIC is a useful compendium. But the main point he tries to make is that “If organized properly, the OIC has a remarkable possibility to make best use of their human and material resources and to become an effective player in the international politics, in general, and to play very positive, effective and successful role in international conflict resolution”. The statistics he has been able to gather suggest that more can be achieved if the necessary political will is brought into being.

For the general reader and for the serious student of conflict resolution and particularly to role that the OIC could play on the world stage, Dr Hashmat’s work should be useful both for provoking further thoughtful analysis and for reference.

Najamuddin Shaikh

Former Ambassador and
Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Govt. of Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

One of the significant developments in international politics, after the end of the Cold War, is the emergence of a unipolar world led by the United States of America (USA). Besides protecting US global interests, the new world order promises promotion of national interests of the US allies, especially safeguarding the vital interests of the European Union (EU). Broader coalition of the US and its allies has resulted in a visible shift in managing international conflicts across the globe. During the Cold War era, a delicate balance of power existed, which demanded mutually accepted rules for resolving international conflicts without direct confrontation and involvement of two acknowledged super powers. Although indirect involvement of major world powers through proxy wars in various regions, primarily away from North America and Western Europe, was quite evident, yet global conflicts were managed by the international community. The United Nations Organization (UNO) assumed greater responsibility for preventing, containing and resolving international disputes. Disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1991, created a vacuum in international balance of power that allowed the West, led by the US, to pursue her global expansionist goals through use of military power and superior technology. Therefore, unparalleled exploitation of world's natural resources, especially hydrocarbon energy resources, in recent years, through a variety of socio-economic, politico-military, politico-religious, ideological and psychological means has created and strengthened perceptions regarding imperialistic ambitions of the United States and its Western allies. These geo-political and geo-economic developments have divided and polarized the world into various antagonistically competitive groups. Consequently, many state and non-state actors are getting increasingly involved in local, regional and global conflicts, which threaten international peace, security, progress and prosperity.

The Muslim World has mostly remained under direct or indirect occupation and influence of foreign forces during the last two centuries. Having suffered a great deal, in all spheres of its collective life, it lacks the ability to determine and implement independent policies, which can help to protect its collective

interests. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) comprises fifty-seven countries but most of them, besides being economically poor, technologically and scientifically underdeveloped and academically backward, are politically volatile and instable. Many members of the OIC are facing serious internal conflicts within their states or they are involved in inter-state conflicts with neighbouring countries. Some of them, even at present, are under occupation by the Western countries while a few others are facing the threat of occupation in the near future. The OIC members have failed to respond effectively to overcome this situation and resolve these conflicts. The OIC has also not been able to develop an efficient conflict resolution mechanism, which can face such challenges.

This study aims at analyzing the prevailing international conflict resolution mechanism with a special reference to its relevance and importance for the Muslim world. It also evaluates the OIC's capacity, constraints, capability to manage various intra-state conflicts in the Muslim world, with a view to suggesting a Collective Response Mechanism at the OIC level.

The inter-state conflicts with neighbouring states and the intra-state conflicts within many Muslim countries have been exploited by powerful countries. Aggressive politico-military offensives orchestrated by these countries and launched through their technologically superior forces and greater control over international media and financial system always look for opportunities to be exploited. The current situation in the Middle East and the North Africa is a case in point. Lack of effective conflict resolution mechanism at the OIC level has further facilitated exploitation of the natural resources of the Muslim countries by foreign forces recently led by the US. Due to lack of unity, vision and political will amongst Muslim leadership, such situation is likely to prevail in the near future. The Muslim world faces a serious turmoil and is becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism. If corrective measures are not taken immediately, such grave challenges pose extremely dangerous threats to dignified survival, sovereignty and independence of many Muslim countries.

The UN is responsible for maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has the obligation to take appropriate steps to mitigate any threat to international peace. It is supposed to take necessary measures to restore international

peace wherever and whenever it is breached. Critical analysis shows that UN efforts in this crucially important area have fallen short of general expectations, especially regarding the conflicts involving member states of the OIC. On the other hand, despite having adequate resources and fairly good military capacity for international conflict resolution and peacekeeping, the OIC member states have not been able to play effective role in resolving intra-state conflicts amongst themselves. The OIC, as an organization, too has not played any significant role in resolution of inter-state conflicts affecting its member states. Therefore, the need to undertake an objective review of OIC's potential and capacity to manage such crises, with a view to proposing a collective conflict resolution mechanism for the Muslim world under the auspices of the OIC. Such measures will help the Muslim world live peacefully at home and develop harmonious relations with the world at large. The resultant peace will allow the Muslim world to concentrate on development of human and material resources, which is urgently needed for their economic progress, political stability, social development and general peace and prosperity.

International Conflict Resolution

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict is an inevitable reality of human life, which has been defined in different ways. It can be called a situation in which people, groups or countries are involved in a serious disagreement or argument; a violent situation or a period of fighting between two countries.¹ It has also been defined as a fight or struggle, especially a protracted one; war; sharp disagreement or opposition, as of interests or ideas; clash; emotional disturbance resulting from clash of opposing impulses or from an inability to reconcile impulses with realistic or moral considerations.²

Conflict refers to a sharp disagreement or collision as in interests or ideas and the process rather than the end.³ It can also be defined as an active disagreement between people with opposing opinions or principles; fighting between two or more groups of people or countries.⁴ In its simple form, conflict refers to the pursuits of incompatible goals by individuals or groups.⁵ According to experts of conflict and negotiations, conflict can be defined as situations in which two or more parties perceive that they have incompatible goals or interests.⁶

There would always be differences amongst individuals, groups, communities, organizations and nations / states with regard to their interests, values, preferences and needs. Hence, perpetual struggle for achievement of competing goals and objectives will lead to conflict situations. Therefore, we cannot avoid conflict(s), which could be political, politico-economic, socio-economic, politico-religious, ethno-religious, cultural or territorial. Harmonious human co-existence always requires peaceful resolution of conflicts. Otherwise, violence and force will be used as an ultimate arbiter to resolve such disputes, which would bring enormous miseries and suffering to human beings as has happened in the past.

Conflict can be at individual, group, community, national, regional and / or international level. It is a complex and multi-dimensional feature of human existence and struggle. Usually, it has negative connotation and people often consider that a conflict generally leads to destruction. Therefore, it is considered as one of the highly misunderstood phenomena of human life because its impact can be positive and constructive or negative and destructive. In case of a positive conflict, it can act as an inspiring and motivating force, which acts as a catalyst for transformation towards progress, prosperity and stability. On the contrary, if a conflict takes a negative turn, it can lead to violence causing enormous damage, destruction and instability.

Understanding the conflict theory can help us comprehend the nature and dynamics of conflict, which in return would be useful to finding solutions to international conflicts and disputes. Review of the conflict theories reveals that a large volume of literature is available on the nature and theory of conflicts / disputes, especially with regard to armed conflict and conduct of warfare. Human conflict has always attracted the attention of political science theoreticians and social scientists alike and difference of views has always existed concerning the nature of conflict. Particularly contemporary and historical views on various dimensions of human conflict. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have outlined this problem by expressing that social scientists are divided on the question whether social conflict should be regarded as something rational, constructive, and socially functional or something irrational, pathological, and socially dysfunctional.⁷ These views have significant implications on the development of strategies for conflict resolution. One also finds considerable divergence of views on many issues among academic and theoretical viewpoints.

Mainly, there are two viewpoints and schools of thought: Behaviourist and Classical. The behaviour approach pertains to micro level of analysis and focuses on the individual(s), whereas the classical approach pertains to macro level of analysis and deals with analysis of interaction amongst groups instead of the individuals. Continuous sense of competition and struggle for survival, growth and development is a natural phenomenon of human life both at individual and group / community level. When this competition endangers survival, growth and development of other individuals / groups, it turns into a conflict. If a conflict

situation is not resolved through peaceful means, it can be a serious threat to mutual co-existence. Conflict, competition, and cooperation are inherently interdependent; conflict occurs when competing groups' goals, objectives, needs or values clash and aggression, although not necessarily violence, is a result, says Schelling.⁸

1.1.1 Micro Theory

The exponents of Behaviourist School believe that the root-causes of a conflict, aggression and war lie in human nature. They also tend to accept that an intrapersonal conflict is related to the conflict that prevails in the society. This approach inquires into likely relationship between human biological or psychological characteristics and tendencies of aggressive behaviour and the resultant conflict. Therefore, the Behaviourists search for establishing connection between the individual and his environment. Through inductive reasoning, by analyzing various variables pertaining to intrapersonal conflict, they try to establish a generalization relating to a group and an international conflict.

Some biologists and psychologists, belonging to Behaviourist School of thought, have also studied animal behaviour to examine similarities to human behaviour. It has been observed that animals do resort to a wide range of aggression, in order to express their dislike, disapproval and disagreement. Many humans also do the same. However, the motivation and manner of expressing such feelings and the intensity for doing so may differ greatly as compared to animals.

Although the animal behaviour does offer some explanation, however, it must be understood that human behaviour is too complex in the context of human conflict. Many psychologists claim that there is a naturally instinctive or biological mechanism, which predisposes human beings towards aggressive and violent behaviour. These theories are generally known as "Instinct Theories of Aggression". The theory initially pioneered by Sigmund Freud has been upheld by many renowned psychologists including Konard Lorenz. Psychological studies such as Freud's "Death Instinct" (Thanatos) or Darwin's theory regarding "Fight for Survival," are part of the same stream of thoughts. Sociobiology is the modern version of instinct theory⁹, which was subsequently challenged by the biologists who believed that no such mechanism existed to prove such claims. Many later studies

have also proved that there are no scientific reasons for considering human beings instinctively aggressive and inclined to aggressive attitude because of their biological composition. On the contrary, it is assumed that expression of aggression, recourse to violence and use of force in interpersonal relations is essentially a result of interplay of social interaction and conflicting interests. Such explanation provides many possibilities for resolution of human conflict. Human history is filled with a variety of conflicts, which are driven by number of motivating factors. Amongst many such factors, material aspect is a defining element of human conflict.

1.1.2 Macro Theory

The Macro Theory deals with groups. The acquisition and use of power, i.e., economic, political, military, technological, social and cultural power, is a central concept of macro theory of conflict. Some political philosophers, such as Sun Tzu, Chanakya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Fuller, have deliberated upon the role of power and violence in inter-group relations. It is, generally, assumed that the genesis of conflict rests in the competitive nature of the groups and their pursuit for acquiring and accumulating resources, in order to gain more and more power. Therefore, the use and exercise of power is the central concept of macro theory of conflict.¹⁰ The principal methodology used to study the inter-group relationship is historical evaluation or case study approach. Schelling developed a sophisticated “game theory” to understand the conflict and to prepare responses. He emphasized on the interdependency of conflict, competition and cooperation among actors.¹¹

The balance of power, preponderance of power, deterrence and pre-emptive doctrine are considered main concerns of the classical theorists. During the 19th Century, the concept of “Balance of Power” gained prominence among European nations. Some scholars have suggested that this system was common even in medieval and ancient times.¹² It is believed that national security can be assured when power of the dominant states is essentially considered to be in equilibrium. Accordingly, balance, not superiority, is the key to a stable international community of states.¹³ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have identified eleven techniques by which states maintain a balance of power: (1) the policy of divide and conquer, (2) territorial adjustment following war, (3) creation of buffer states, (4) establishment of

alliances, (5) maintenance of regional spheres of influence, (6) military intervention, (7) diplomatic bargaining, (8) peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations, mediations, or arbitration, (9) reduction of armaments, (10) arms race, and (11) war itself.¹⁴ It is assumed that, since power continuously keeps shifting among nations / states, the process of maintaining the balance of power is always very dynamic, vibrant and equally never-ending. In Waltz's opinion states seek order and stability by attempting to institute a durable balance of power in which equal blocs of alliances maintain peace through a combination of satisfying the security concern of other members and intimidating potentially recalcitrant non-member.¹⁵ The emergence of single hegemon or hegemonic bloc is considered dangerous to the notion of balanced international order.¹⁶ Jacoby, while discussing whether reduction in a state's level of preparedness is the most effective way to minimize the possibility of large-scale conflict concludes that gravest danger of war emerges not from an aggressive assertion of sovereignty but from misperception and imbalance in distribution of power between two states.¹⁷

The emergence of the United States and erstwhile Soviet Union, after World War II gave rise to bipolarity and the Cold War in world politics and the most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is the . . . uni-polarity.¹⁸ Contrary to the balance of power theory, the exponents of the Hegemonic Stability Theory of Preponderance of Power believe that stability in the world is caused and maintained through global dominance of a leading power. Generally, the example of world dominance by Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, former Soviet Union and the United States is quoted in this regard. Another concept pertaining to the preponderance of power assumes collective dominance rather than the individual power of a state / nation. This concept is called collective security, which seeks to deter aggression by promising collective retaliation against any community member committing aggression.¹⁹ Collective security is not based on the permanent superiority of power of some members; rather, the predominance of power is achieved only temporarily in order to punish unacceptable behaviour.²⁰

Theory of Deterrence, which is generally considered to be closely related to the nuclear age, envisages the use of explicit or implicit threat of coercion in order to inhibit unwanted behaviour.²¹ The essence of the deterrence is the making of

a military threat in order to prevent another actor from taking aggressive actions. Deterrence is about stopping unwanted actions before they occur.²² Though, the idea that strong defensive forces would prevent opponents from attacking has always been a central element in strategic thinking,²³ yet the genesis of modern concept of deterrence can be related to the development of long-range aircraft armed with chemical and high explosive bombs during 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ It would be more appropriate to say that deterrence theory, as understood today, was evolved from 1945 onwards. Initially, the US had monopoly in nuclear technology and nuclear weapons but it was later on challenged by former Soviet Union, which neutralized the advantage of possessing superior destructive power.

1.1.3 Theory of Protracted Social Conflict

The profound contribution of Professor Edward E. Azar to the modern literature of conflict studies is the theory of "Protracted Social Conflict". When the group identity is threatened or frustrated, intractable conflict is almost inevitable.²⁵ Azar terms this situation as "Protracted Social Conflict", which denotes hostile interaction between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatred, and which persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence.²⁶ These situations are characterized by a prolonged and violent struggle by communal groups for their basic needs, such as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. The communal groups facing a protracted social conflict may experience deep-rooted divisions caused by frustration and insecurity. These situations are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, and religious tensions that combined with structural divisions within societies and political oppression result in the victimization of one or more groups.²⁷ In a society where state power is dominated or monopolized by a single group or ruling elite, basic human rights and needs are denied to the majority of the population, which gives rise to protracted social conflict. According to Azar, denial of basic human needs to a large portion of the population causes protracted social violence. In his opinion, there are four major causes of protracted social conflict; communal discontent, deprivation of basic human needs, poor governance, and international linkages. Azar's theory considers that the deprivation of human needs is the underlying

source of protracted social conflict.²⁸

Due to communal discontent, people involved in protracted social conflicts create their own identity groups. According to Azar, it is the relationship between identity groups and the states, which is at the core of the problem.²⁹ In developing countries, most of the governments are incapable and corrupt. They also lack ability and resources to provide basic human necessities to their population. Therefore, many people are forced to increase their reliance on their social groups for help and protection. In many countries, prevailing disconnect between society and the state is linked to their colonial legacy.

Azar considers that “underdevelopment” is responsible for protracted social violence, which eventually leads to the conflict. In his opinion, needs of security, development, participation in political process and group identity are extremely important. He calls these needs “non-negotiable” and emphasizes that failure of the state to provide such “non-negotiable needs” would force the people to start a struggle for structural change. Such structural change, eventually, will result into a violent conflict. Therefore, Azar argues that if such conflict is to be avoided, the government must provide security and take appropriate steps to ensure that all perceived or real needs, which may be considered as non-negotiable, are fulfilled in order to alleviate the sense of deprivation amongst the aggrieved group(s).

Any government’s primary responsibility is to provide necessary security and protection to its citizens, besides ensuring easy provision of all necessities of life. According to Azar, the states that suffer from protracted social conflicts are characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs.³⁰ When governments fail to provide required security to one or more social / racial group(s), or fail to ensure their rightful participation in running the affairs of the state, or deny basic rights and privileges to its people, they suffer from “crisis of legitimacy”³¹ to govern their countries.

Almost all countries have diplomatic, politico-economic and politico-military relations with other states. Such relations include economic dependency within the international economic system and an elaborate network of politico-military linkages at bilateral, multi-lateral, regional and international level. The states that are politically, economically and militarily weak often become breeding ground for protracted social conflict. They are

easily influenced by outside connections due to their economic and military dependence on powerful states and international political and economic institutions.

After his in-depth research on Protracted Social Conflict, Azar has concluded:

Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups, which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict, are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term.³²

1.1.4 Burton's Theory

John Burton's outstanding contribution to modern literature on conflict studies is the identification of the conceptual difference between disputes and conflicts and the distinction between dispute settlement and conflict resolution. Such a distinction has profound impact on various strategies dealing with management and resolution of disputes and conflicts. Simultaneously, his emphasis on "Conflict Prevention" and "Conflict Resolution", which deals with removal of causes and source of conflict, in order to achieve longer peace, is extremely important. Equally important is Burton's emphasis on human dimension for formulating conflict resolution strategies. According to him while a "dispute" revolves around conflicting but negotiable interests, "conflict" develops around nonnegotiable issues of basic human needs deprivation.³³

Moreover, Burton says that "settlement" implies negotiated or arbitrated solutions; while "resolution" is concerned with satisfaction of basic human needs of all parties involved.³⁴ Many a time, due to their importance, all contentious situations, having international implications, are called conflicts but according to Burton, in reality, this has led to serious policy mistakes.³⁵ Mostly, internal conflicts, within a state are called disputes that can be settled by use of forces or otherwise by the established state authority but many "recent ethnic wars have proved that many global conflicts are the results of the spilling over of internal conflicts."³⁶

Burton supports adoption of a problem-solving conflict resolution approach, which includes the following steps:

analysis of the parties and issues; bringing the parties at the negotiation table to discuss their relationships; establishing an agreement about what the problems are and acknowledging the costs of the former conduct (human needs violation); and an examination of possible options.³⁷ The goal of a problem-solving conflict resolution is not to merely remove the causes of the discord (conflict prevention) but to create conditions for cooperative relationships (conflict prevention).

Burton advocates that conflict resolution cannot take place without giving due importance to human dimension while analyzing the sources of conflict. He observes if social conditions are the problem, then conflict resolution and prevention would be possible by removing the sources of conflict: institutions and social norms would be adjusted to the needs of persons.³⁸ Therefore, he suggests, societies must adjust to the needs of people, and not the other way around.³⁹ Regarding human desire and endeavour for independence, he opines:

No threat can deter when there are human behavioural needs at stake. Great powers can be defeated by small nations in their struggle for independence, ethnic violence cannot be contained, domestic violence persists despite legal consequences.⁴⁰

Burton declares that the struggle to satisfy non-material human needs is the prime source of conflict.⁴¹ He observes that in modern world, where state boundaries are drawn as the result of colonial aggression and cut across ethnic and tribal territories, implication of large scale migration are very serious. He declares that democracy has no prospect of achievement in a society that contains major income differences, and where minorities are unrepresented.⁴² He also observes that democracy has built into it the seeds of conflict.⁴³ Based on this opinion, Burton raises a question whether the nation-state is any longer the appropriate unit within the world society.⁴⁴

Burton also supports institutionalization of "alternative dispute resolution (ADR)", which is not merely aimed at resolving disputes through application of law but where institutions function in a manner that human needs are satisfied. He even suggests that current judicial systems and procedures should be reviewed and changed if effective ADR system has to work for the satisfaction of human needs.

In Burton's opinion, conflict resolution processes and conflict prevention policies could be the means for peaceful change.⁴⁵ He argues that "conflict prevention" and "conflict prevention" should aim at and contribute towards peaceful transformation of societies from conflict situations to socio-political harmonious co-existence.

In order to formulate correct conflict resolution strategies, a brief mention of the analytical distinction developed by John Burton between argument, dispute and conflict, is quite appropriate.

Arguments occur when parties share similar interests and goals but disagree over the means to realize them; they differ in choices of alternatives. In these cases, effective management processes, such as improved communication and problem solving are often the appropriate means to address the problem.⁴⁶

Disputes are situations in which parties have incompatible goals or interests but because these pertain to issues of gain or loss, they are liable to be negotiated.⁴⁷

Conflicts involve situations of non-negotiable needs, such as perceptions that the basic identity or survival of the party is jeopardized by other party. These situations require some form of analytical problem solving and / or reconciliation between parties to resolve these differences. While the basic need cannot be negotiated away, parties can negotiate over how the needs will be satisfied (such as the terms of recognition). Until steps are taken to satisfy these deeper needs, it will be difficult for the parties to reach an agreement on other, more functional interests.⁴⁸

1.2 CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Conflict does not necessarily have to be violent. However, violence is intrinsically linked to an armed conflict. Tim Jacoby has analyzed the relationship of violence and conflict in his scholarly work-*Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and Interdisciplinary Approach*. Having evaluated the use of violence throughout human history into three periods, namely; muscle power, industrial production and mass destruction weaponry, Jacoby divides this matrix into three broad and overlapping categories: strategic studies, conflict research, and peace research.⁴⁹ Strategic Studies is concerned with the manipulation, and application of threats either to preserve or to change the status quo.⁵⁰ Conflict Research proceeds from the premise that violence and warfare

are a consequence not of intent per se but an unwelcome result of pursuing goals that are incompatible with others.⁵¹ Peace Research rejects emphasis upon actors and their performance in favour of a broader concern with structure and values. Peace researchers, therefore, work towards “the presentation of proposals, even whole blueprints that bring about a new world.”⁵²

Jacoby suggests that for an analytical categorization all examples of conflicts can be generalized “regardless of whether they evoke violent behaviour.”⁵³ In Mitchell’s words, any situation in which two or more social entities or “parties” (however defined or structured) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals⁵⁴ is a conflictive situation. Louis Kriesberg defines a conflict as an occurring when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have an incompatible objective.⁵⁵ Jacoby also emphasizes that in all these circumstances, a crucial component is *incompatibility*.⁵⁶ Commenting upon conflictive behaviour, he writes that it can be a combination of three strategies. First, threatening or imposing an unacceptable level of costs upon another actor will succeed if the intimidation is credible, if something of value is imperilled and if there is no obvious way of ignoring, or circumventing the pressure. The overwhelming form that this strategy takes is coercion – either verbal or physical. A second form of conflictive behaviour involves offering or proposing alternative courses of action. This typically entails the use of persuasion: pointing out, in other words, favourable outcomes to a certain course of action that the opponent may not have considered or, alternatively, showing that agreement is to their advantage. A third type of conflictive behaviour is the abandonment of some or all of the actor’s own goals – often through the involvement of bilateral or third-party brokered negotiations.⁵⁷ Regarding levels of analysis, he agrees with Waltz’s suggestion that the causes of conflict could be found within three different, but interlinked, social strata—the individual, the state, and the international system.⁵⁸ However, he thinks that it is not necessary to include all levels in an analysis and, more often, conflicts are examined as an interaction of a number of different levels.⁵⁹

While analyzing the structural relationship between conflict and violence, Jacoby refers to economic inequalities at the global level and the dependency theories. He writes that dependency is enhanced by the international legal regimes and its capacity to

facilitate penetration of developing economies through purchase of lands, military bases, World Trade Organization rulings, and United Nations missions and so on.⁶⁰ He differentiates between behavioural violence and structural violence. He also asserts, structural violence kills over 1,000 times more people than behavioural violence every year⁶¹ and concludes that structural violence thus represents one of the key conceptual advances in the study of conflict.⁶²

A conflict can be evaluated in different ways. It can be regarded either functional or dysfunctional. Conflicts are considered as functional if their benefits outweighed their cost and dysfunctional if the cost outweighed their benefits.⁶³ Conflicts not necessarily will always have negative outcome. These can be useful and beneficial for various competing groups and a society may benefit from it. Jacoby opines that the new world order that emerged from the Second World War replaced the polarization of the inter-war period and helped to establish multilateral regimes.

Jacoby, having compared the theories claiming human biology as main source and cause of conflict with those who consider that human interaction between groups becomes a source of conflict concludes that the tendency to behave aggressively is acquired from individual's socialization experience and deployed selectively as part of a range of possible responses to given stimuli.⁶⁴ While commenting on grievances, deprivation, and frustration theory, he argues that problems in measuring human needs, deprivation and frustration (at the level of individual, the group and state), coupled with the more fundamental problem of objectivism, have produced a contradictory body of inconclusive findings that are difficult to link together longitudinally.⁶⁵ He also highlights that correct understanding of "mobilization" which refers to process through which individual group member's resources are surrendered, assembled and committed for obtaining common goals, for defending group interest, and for challenging existing structure of domination is very important.⁶⁶ His perspective on conflict's culmination by the leadership and common participants of a conflict is really thought provoking. He writes, elite may seek political objectives and positions of power, whereas foot-soldiers are seen more likely to be concerned with short term material gains and remunerations.⁶⁷

Jacoby has correctly observed that crises are normally triggered

by combination of four forms of interaction experienced by the actors themselves or their allies: verbal acts (threats, accusations, demands and so on), economic sanctions (the withholding of trade or aid), political measures (such as covert support of sedition), and military coercion (border clashes, training manoeuvres, assassination and the like).⁶⁸ Crises turn into conflicts and clashes if these are not handled properly at initial stages.

1.3 INSTRUMENTS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict resolution is a process, which involves identification, prevention, containment, management and resolution of conflict through various means. Conflict resolution, therefore, aims to provide the space and skills to manage a conflict in non-violent ways.⁶⁹ The aim of conflict resolution is to transform actual or potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) process of social and political change.⁷⁰ Some important methods are: conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. These terminologies are quite often used interchangeably in the contexts of conflict resolution.

1.3.1 Conflict Prevention

It involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into a violent conflict.

1.3.2 Conflict Regulation

Known as conflict management as well, it refers to limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict, rather than the durable elimination of the causes of conflict.⁷¹

1.3.3 Conflict Settlement

It refers to an outcome that is built on the agreement reached by the conflicting parties through negotiation and bargain.⁷² All such settlements would involve some compromise and concessions by both sides and mutual accommodation of each other's demands. Such a settlement is generally facilitated by a third party, which is considered neutral and impartial by the conflicting parties, groups or states.

1.3.4 Conflict Resolution

It is relatively a more comprehensive process which aims at addressing the cause and sources of conflict, change of behaviour from violent to peaceful, and creation and development of a structure that is non-hostile, non-violent and non-exploitative.

1.3.5 Conflict Transformation

It is an evolving concept, which has gained more attention in recent years. It refers to the long term and deeper structural, relational, and cultural dimensions of conflict resolution.⁷³

1.4 ARMED CONFLICTS AMONG STATES

Armed conflict among states could lead to great destruction or may end up at a mutual agreement for joint survival. The conflict can be fundamental or accidental. Similarly, these can be managed or unmanaged conflicts.

In case of an Armed Conflict between two states or alliances of states, one of the two contending actors would prevail and succeed. The result would be destruction or complete surrender of the other. The other option is a joint survival. In such case both conflicting actors would (are likely to) survive and will have the option to continue living in a state of perpetual conflict or might agree to cooperate with each other. The Second World War was a classic example of the complete surrender of Germany, Italy and Japan, though later on in the post World War period, West Germany, Italy and Japan decided (or were persuaded to decide) to cooperate with their erstwhile adversary.

Conflict between states can be fundamental or accidental. If the conflict is fundamental, that is, rooted in some permanent basic structure of one or both of the contending parties; it is likely to recur again and again: if, on the other hand it is accidental or transitory, that is based on fortuitous and passing circumstances, it may not happen again and again.⁷⁴ The conflict between Palestine and Israel is a fundamental conflict. However, within the broader scope of the Arab-Israel conflict, the dispute between Israel and Egypt may be considered accidental.

If the escalation of a conflict remains under the control of the antagonistic parties and the conflict stops short of unacceptable destruction, it will be considered as a manageable conflict. Whereas, if it leads to uncontrolled devastation, the same will

be considered as an unmanageable conflict. World War II is a clear example of an unmanageable conflict. Post-World War II relations among the United State and Western Europe, erstwhile Soviet Union (currently Russia) and China, notwithstanding fundamental differences in their political and economic systems, reflect a manageable conflict at international level.

All conflicting parties have reasons to be a part of or getting involved in a conflict. Identifying these reasons is one of the most important aspects of conflict analysis,⁷⁵ whereas in complex conflict situations, involving many individuals and groups, identifying the parties can become a challenging task.⁷⁶ Conflict behaviours are actions taken by parties to influence an adversary to abandon or modify their goals.⁷⁷ Conflict behaviour can be divided into four general categories: contending, yielding, withdrawal or inaction and problem solving.⁷⁸ Nature of relationship amongst various conflicting parties and their types, i.e. primary, secondary and third parties, are briefly described as:

- *Contending* is when one party seeks to achieve its own goals without regard for the other party's interests, usually by getting the other party to yield.
- *Yielding* is when one party concedes to another party, usually after aspirations have been lowered. Sometimes yielding is used to buy time while a party develops a new strategy.
- *Withdrawal or Inaction* involves terminating the conflict without settling the controversial issues that caused the conflict. Withdrawal refers to a permanent situation. Inaction is often a temporary move, usually with the intention of gaining time to develop a stronger position.
- *Problem Solving* involves identifying the issues dividing the parties in order to develop and implement a solution that is acceptable to all the primary parties.⁷⁹

1.4.1 Primary, Secondary and Third Party(ies)

- *Primary Parties* have a direct interest in a conflict and actively pursue goals designated to promote their own interests.

International Conflict Resolution

- *Secondary Parties* have a stake in the outcome of the situation but may or may not perceive that there is a conflict and may or may not decide to play an active role or may be represented in any decision-making process. Sometimes secondary parties are key to facilitating, spoiling or enforcing an agreement.
- *Third Parties or Intermediaries* generally intervene to help facilitate the resolution of a conflict issue. They may be impartial and have no stake in any particular outcome; or they may take a side but are viewed as legitimate facilitators by the primary and secondary parties.⁸⁰

1.4.2 Issues

Issues are the basic topics with which parties to a conflict are concerned (e.g., land re-distribution, border dispute, political autonomy control equitable share in national income / resources etc.). They are often quite apparent, but in some situations defining the issues is the main challenge faced by conflict resolvers. Sometimes, the “real” issues are hidden while parties fight over peripheral concerns because they are either bogged down or feel too vulnerable to raise their most important concern.⁸¹ Goals can be defined as “consciously desired future outcomes, conditions or end states”.⁸² Clear understanding of a desired end state and an equally correct perception about one’s adversary’s goal is essential to avoid any miscalculation. Parties frame their goals in two basic ways, positively and negatively. Positive goals reflect tangible future outcomes, such as “secure borders” or “an independent state”. Negative goals reflect a desire to avoid an unwanted outcome⁸³

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION

2.1 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND WORLD POLITICS

The contemporary international system is considered to have its roots in development of the nation states, which were established in the mid-seventeenth Century. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended thirty years religious war among European states, codified the principle of state sovereignty by recognizing the undisputed authority of secular rulers within designated territory, thereby establishing the foundation of the modern state-based global order.¹

Sovereignty of the state is one of the key features of the Westphalian order. Sovereignty is the supreme legitimate authority within the territorial boundaries of the state.² From an international legal perspective, sovereignty has two key dimensions: political independence and equality. If a state is to have ultimate control over political affairs within its territorial boundaries, it must possess governmental institutions that are not subject to foreign control.³ Sovereignty in its real sense is enjoyed only by major powers of the world. The other states have to compromise, to a varying degree, depending upon their dependence on other states. Indeed, a state's ability to pursue its national interests in the world will depend on its relative power.⁴ Equality is the second legal pillar of sovereignty. Although states differ in their sizes and capabilities, they are fundamentally equal in their legal position in the world community. The doctrine of equality is enshrined in the United Nations system and is expressed in the shared rights and obligations of member states. Although the notion of juridical equality serves as a cornerstone of contemporary international order, it remains more fiction than reality.⁵

The global system has undergone a number of changes

in the last three centuries but the international community's basic structure has remained largely intact. However, since the end of World War II, and especially since the 1970s and 1980s, the global community has witnessed many structural changes that have resulted in a reformed or post-Westphalian system. While commenting on the post-Westphalian System, Amstutz, a renowned scholar of International Relations, has examined various aspects that distinguish the modern global political system from the Westphalian system.⁶ A few important features are:

- **Growing Influence of Non-state Actors:** Westphalian system considered the states as major international actors but the growth of many powerful International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and increased interdependence of states have added many new dimensions to international politics. Moreover, many other non-state actors have emerged, which are capable of undermining or marginalizing the authority of the state.
- **Decline of State Sovereignty:** Loss of strict control over various events, within a state, and increase in foreign influence and interference in internal matters of a state have caused considerable decline in state sovereignty.
- **Rise of Weak / Instable States:** Since the end of World War II, many states have emerged because of de-colonization by erstwhile colonial powers or as a result of freedom struggles. Most of these states are weak in their economy, political harmony / unity and functionality of government institutions. Therefore, the rise of weak states has led to increased domestic instability and increasing civil wars.⁷
- **Role of International Institutions:** The Twentieth Century has witnessed the growth of many international institutions and organizations. These institutions exercise significant influence and power in economic, political and security related areas. Many international institutions have contributed to the management and resolution of conflicts.

The nature of the global society has been defined in different ways. Most important perceptive(s) are those of Realists, the Idealists and Internationalist:

- *Realism* is a political approach that emphasizes on the conflictual nature of global politics, the priority of national security, a pessimistic assessment of human nature and a consequentialist moral perspective. Realism denies the existence of a global society. It views the international community as a disparate collection of independent political societies.⁸
- *Idealism*, on the other hand, affirms the existence of the global society. This approach to politics assumes that law, institutions, and morality can contribute to peaceful and just international relations. It is an optimistic perspective towards world politics.⁹
- *Internationalism*, which is located between the extremes of idealism and realism, provides an intermediary conception of global society. Internationalists assume that peace and justice are possible in global society when states fulfil their respective legal and moral obligations.¹⁰

2.2 NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Human life is characterized by continuous competitiveness. The relations between sovereign states assume three different forms: cooperation, conflict and indifference.¹¹ Despite the significant coordination and cooperation within global society, disagreements, tensions, and disputes are inescapable realities of all communities because states pursue their national interests in disregard for, and even at the expense of the interests of the others. Therefore, conflict is inevitable in global society. Wars are the most extreme expression of global conflict but the majority of international disputes are non-violent, involving competition for scarce tangible and intangible resources.¹²

International cooperation has been defined as the voluntary adjustment by states of their policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome.¹³ In

International Conflict Resolution

global politics, international cooperation is normally characterized by three features:

- The actions of states (and other non-state actors) are voluntary;
- Cooperation involves the identification of, and commitment to shared goals; and
- Cooperation results in beneficial outcome to the participants.¹⁴

International cooperation can be “self-generating” or attained through negotiations. Self-generating cooperation is achieved when parties share common interests resulting in mutually reinforcing behaviours.¹⁵ Whereas, foundation of voluntary cooperation lies in reciprocity.¹⁶ Cooperation on the other hand can also be attained or managed through negotiations. States can initiate and institutionalize cooperation through bilateral and multi lateral accords established through bargaining.¹⁷

With increased interdependence, states are cooperating with each other in numerous areas of mutual interests. However, some important areas of cooperation at international level are:

- National security.
- Arms control.
- International peace and security.
- Economic development and promotion of commerce and trade.
- Development and enforcement of international law.
- Protection and preservation of environment and world heritage.
- Disaster management.
- Counter-terrorism.

2.3 INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

Conflict occurs when a real or perceived incompatibility of goals and objectives exists or prevails amongst states and other

interested actors. Therefore, each conflict must have two or more actors, competing or incompatible goals and objectives, and undertake actions to pursue such goals, which are considered detrimental to each other's interest. Conflict can be at various levels: national, regional and international. Similarly, conflicts can be violent or non-violent. In case of violent conflicts, which are called armed (deadly) conflicts as well, parties on both sides resort to use of force. Whereas, non-violent conflicts mainly prevail in the social, political and economic fields. Depending upon their nature, scope, intensity and effects on international peace and stability, different terms are being used, presently, to describe various forms of conflicts. Some of these include; internal conflict, new wars, small wars, insurgency, civil war, ethnic conflict, intra-state conflict and inter-state conflict etc. Internal conflicts or intra-state conflicts generally have outside interests as well. Through external support, in many cases, such conflicts have paved way for foreign intervention.

These terminologies are used in the context of application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to the victims of Armed Conflict. In an armed conflict, both parties resort to use of violence to find a solution to the conflict. International armed conflict has been clearly defined in international treaties (e.g. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 of 1997).¹⁸

2.3.1 International Armed Conflicts

All cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties^{1*}, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.¹⁹

2.3.2 Non-International Armed Conflicts

Situations in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a single state. Insurgent fighting against the established order would normally seek to overthrow the government in power or alternatively to bring about a secession so as to set up a new state.²⁰ Such conflicts are generally referred as Civil War. However, it must be kept in mind that legitimate wars of liberation are considered international armed conflicts according to Article 1.4 of Additional Protocol 1 of

1 * All members of the UN / all signatory of Geneva Conventions.

2.4 INTERNAL CONFLICT

Internal conflict in any society (state) has generally been associated with “Protracted Social Conflict”.²¹ Such conflicts take place within rather than between states and reflect prolonged violent struggles by various social and communal groups regarding their basic needs such as recognition (acceptance) of identity, due representation and participation in national institutions and political decision-making process, access to national economic and recourses, cultural and religious freedom and communal security. Most of the causes of internal conflicts can be grouped into four major groups:

- **Social and Communal Factor:** All issues relating to group identity, recognition, and collective social survival, such as racial, religious, ethnic and cultural considerations, generally, cause friction between contending communal groups. Chances of conflict become more pronounced, if any single communal group or few groups combined together start social exploitation of others.
- **Economic Factor:** Besides social needs, economic deprivation, unjust distribution of national wealth and unequal economic development amongst various regions, inadequate and disproportionate economic opportunities always lead to serious and violent conflicts in any vibrant society.
- **Political and Governance Factor:** Political needs such as authority, control, sense of participation in national decision-making, freedom of expression and right to choose the rulers are essential requirement of modern society. Any attempt to deprive or deny this need will lead to political turmoil, which will foster political conflict. Any recourse to violence in politics can convert the same to an armed conflict. Mostly, the states, which are governed through authoritarian and non-participatory systems, are more prone to such conflicts. Therefore, it has been observed that more internal conflicts emerge in developing countries

where political institutions are weak and one dominant group tends to exploit other weaker groups. Another important question is the legitimacy and popular acceptance of right to govern. Weak and questionable legitimacy, coupled with non-acceptance by majority of masses, may end up in violent clashes, which can promote a conflict situation.

2.5 INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCES

We live in an interdependent world. Revolutionary changes in communication, facilitating easier and faster movement of men, material, ideas, concepts, ideologies and financial resources, provide enormous potential to the outside world (other countries and groups) to influence and interfere in internal matters of other states. Economically weak, socially and culturally less cohesive and politically instable states are more vulnerable to such influences. A very large network of socio-economic, ethno-religious and politico-military linkages and connections allow various states and rebelling groups to look for regional and global sources of support and assistance.

A comprehensive analysis of local and regional conflicts indicates that many conflicts are an expression of ongoing globalization, its impact on states and societies and international community's inability to address the genuine concern of weak and developing states regarding their security and development needs. Some important issues are:

- ✓ Serious inequalities in distribution of global wealth and access to economic resources and modern technology leading to an ever-increasing imbalance between military and economic power of different states.
- ✓ Wide gap of development and progress between the developed and developing (in fact under-developed) world.
- ✓ Militarization of societies due to easy access to weapons and explosives facilitated by over production and un-controlled proliferation of lethal weapons.
- ✓ Lust and greed of imperialist and neo-imperialist states

and alliances of states to invade and occupy poor, weak and vulnerable states to gain illegitimate control and exploitation of natural resources.

- ✓ Disregard, contempt and violation of international law, agreements and protocols by powerful states with total impunity, and international community's inability to react rather connivance for such adventures.

2.6 FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

World power politics revolves around protecting and promoting a state's own national interests. Scholars define foreign policy as actions taken by the government officials to promote national interests beyond boundaries of the state.²² Therefore, foreign policy and national security of a state is intrinsically linked to its national interests. National interests can be divided into the following categories:²³

- **Vital Interests:** Known as "core" or "strategic" interests, these interests include the fundamental, long-term state goals such as national security.
- **Non-vital Interests:** These are secondary interests on which a state may be willing to compromise.
- **General Interests:** The diffused global concerns of the state, such as maintenance of regional peace and promotion of economic wellbeing.
- **Specific Interests:** The limited clearly defined objectives of the state.
- **Permanent Interests:** The unchanging goals of the states such as protection of territorial boundaries.
- **Variable Interests:** The changing interests of the state that arise in response to a particular geographic or political development.

Historical, ideological and geopolitical factors, and defence, security and economic concerns play a very important role in

formulating foreign policy of any state, yet a single most important factor is protection and promotion of vital national interests. Therefore, foreign policy, indeed, is one of the major means to accomplish national objectives and to protect national interests. Therefore, when national interests coincide or at least do not clash with each other, states tend to cooperate with one another and amongst themselves. On the contrary, when national interests do not coincide or there is clash of interests, state's policies tend to come in conflict with each other.

2.7 CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

2.7.1 Huntington's Hypothesis

The theory of "Clash of Civilizations" is generally attributed to Professor Samuel Paul Huntington, an American strategist, who gained much fame by expounding his thesis about "the Clash of Civilizations" initially published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. It was expanded three years later and published in the form of a book with the title of *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order* in 1996. However, many critics have observed, the theory has been progressively devised since 1990 in order to provide the military industrial complex with a spare ideology after the collapse of the Soviet Union.²⁴ The "clash of civilizations" expression stemmed out in 1990 for the first time by a Middle East expert, Bernard Lewis, in his article *The Roots of Muslim Rage*.²⁵ Nonetheless, the current meaning and understanding of "the Clash of Civilizations" is referred to Professor Samuel Huntington who was neither a sociologist nor a historian but a strategist. Huntington developed this theory in two articles- "The Clash of Civilizations?" and "The West Unique, Not Universal"- and a book originally entitled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.²⁶

Huntington wrote that his book was not intended to be a work of social science. It is instead meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War.²⁷ According to him, the central theme of this book is that cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world.²⁸ Huntington's views, on various aspects covered in his book are summarized below:

While describing "New Era in World Politics", he says that in the post-Cold War world, for the first time in the history,

global politics has become multi-polar and multicivilizational.²⁹ Explaining the relationship of people and civilizations, he thinks, people define themselves in terms of ancestry, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level civilizations.³⁰ In the post-Cold War era, he says, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the super powers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.³¹ Regarding Western Civilization, he maintains, the West is and will remain the most powerful civilization. Yet its power relative to that of other civilizations is declining.³² Commenting on conflict between rich (modern, developed) and poor (traditional, underdeveloped and developing) countries, he asserts that at a more general level, conflict between rich and poor is unlikely, except in special circumstances, because the poor countries lack the political unity, economic power, and military capability to challenge the rich countries.³³

Huntington considers that civilization and culture both refer to an overall way of people and civilization is a culture writ large.³⁴ He says, blood, language, religion, way of life, were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non-Greeks.³⁵ He further emphasizes, Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilization.³⁶ In order to establish the linkage between Christianity and the Western Civilization, he acknowledges, the term “the West”, is now universally used to refer to what used to be called Western Christendom.³⁷

While discussing “Relations among Civilizations” and “Rise of the West”, Huntington recounts achievements of the Western Colonial powers. He says, in the later part of the 19th Century, however, renewed Western imperialism extended Western rule over almost all of Africa, consolidated Western control in the Sub-continent and elsewhere in Asia, and by the early 20th Century subjected virtually the entire Middle East except for Turkey to direct or indirect Western control . . . In 1800, the British Empire consisted of 1.5 million square miles and 20 million people. By 1900, the Victorian empire upon which the sun never set included 11 million square miles and 390 million people.³⁸ Highlighting the reasons for Western countries, domination and expansion, Huntington writes that the immediate source of Western

expansion, however, was technological: the invention of the means of ocean navigation for reaching distant people and the development of the military capabilities for conquering those people.³⁹ Mentioning about use of violence during the process of colonization and forced occupation by Western armies (and mercenaries), he acknowledges the harsh fact that the West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas, values or religion ... but rather by its superiority of applying organized violence.⁴⁰ He further emphasizes that Westerns often forget this; non-Westerns never do.⁴¹ He also quotes Geoffrey Parker that the rise of the West depended upon the exercise of force.⁴² Explaining the role of military forces in the European colonial occupation and perpetuation of the colonial rule over major part of the world, he explains, the expansion of the West was also facilitated by the superiority in organization, discipline, and training of its troops and subsequently by the superior weapons, transport, logistics, and medical services resulting from its leadership in the industrial revolution.⁴³

According to Huntington, the concept of universal civilization is a distinct product of Western civilization⁴⁴ and universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontation with non-Western cultures.⁴⁵ He also believed that, in the 19th Century, the idea of "the white man's burden" helped to justify the extension of Western political and economic domination over non-Western societies and at the end of 20th Century the concept of universal civilization helped to justify Western cultural dominance of other societies.⁴⁶ Establishing a relationship between "the West and modernization", he writes, modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization and more complex and diversified occupational structures.⁴⁷ However, he disagrees with the assumption that modern civilization is Western Civilization and that Western civilization is modern civilization.⁴⁸ Hence, his assertion that West was the West long before it was modern.⁴⁹ Huntington repeatedly mentions about his perceived relationship between Western civilization and Christianity. He says, Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important characteristic of Western civilization.⁵⁰ He also acknowledges, the expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization and the Westernization on non-Western societies.⁵¹ About response by

Chinese civilization, he writes, Chinese have to date consistently defeated intense western efforts to Christianize them⁵² and concludes his discussion on universal civilization, modernization and Westernization with following remarks:

Modernization in short does not necessarily mean Westernization. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesome Western values, institutions, and practices.⁵³

While describing “the Shifting Balance of Civilizations”, Huntington explicates that as a result of decline in Western Powers’ dominance, resurgence of Non-Western Cultures was taking [has taken] place. He considered that this change was a challenge to the supremacy of the Western Civilization. The economic development and demographic changes in various parts of the world are cited as examples of such an evolutionary transformation. In particular, such changes in Asia and in the Muslim world, called by Huntington as “Asian Affirmation” and “Islamic Resurgence” respectively are of greater concern to him. He states that, after the disintegration of Soviet Russia, as the one remaining super power, the United States together with Britain and France makes the crucial decision on political and security issues; the United States together with Germany and Japan make crucial decisions on economic issues.⁵⁴ He refers to the gradual decline of the West as “The Fading of the West”.

Huntington concludes that relative power of the United States will decline at an accelerated pace and its economic capabilities in relation to Japan and China will erode further and balance of power will shift from centre to periphery.⁵⁵ However, he believes that West is overwhelmingly dominant now and will remain number one in terms of power and influence well into twenty-first century.⁵⁶ However, he expresses his concern on phenomenon of “gradual, inexorable and fundamental change” by saying: as the West’s primacy erodes, much of its power will simply evaporate and the rest will be diffused on the regional basis among the several major civilizations and their core states.⁵⁷

Whereas Huntington talks about “resurgence of non-Western culture” in an elaborate manner, his special emphasis on resurgence in the Muslim World is very conspicuous. He does

not mention that once the Islamic world was the largest, in terms of its control over the geographic area, and the most developed for many centuries. Without mentioning the fact that most of the Muslim world had been subjugated and colonized by the Western powers, through cruel and indiscriminate use of force in the last three centuries, he writes, the territory of independent Islamic societies, in contrast, rose from 1.8 million square miles in 1920 to over 11 million square miles in 1933.⁵⁸ He also observes that the resurgence of Islam and “re-Islamization” are central themes in Muslim societies.⁵⁹ Referring to Bernard Lewis and Gilles Kepel, Huntington considers that re-Islamization and loyalty to religious community by Muslims is in fact an effort of the Islamic world for collective identity.⁶⁰ While concluding this discussion on “the Shifting Balance of the Civilizations” Huntington argues as a result, the early years of the twenty-first century are likely to see an ongoing resurgence of non-Western power and culture and clash of the people of non-western civilizations with the West and with each other.⁶¹

The above analysis leads Huntington to the issue of “the Emerging Order of Civilizations”. In his original article, published in 1993, he declared, World politics is entering a new phase in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural.⁶² Expressing his views on nature of global conflicts in the future, he said, the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.⁶³ Later, in his book, he elaborated People and countries with similar cultures are coming together. People and countries with different cultures are coming apart.⁶⁴ He argued that with the demise of ideological alignment of the Cold War, the countries would look for cultural similarities and identities for new alliances and people would rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values and institutions.⁶⁵ He also concludes that the civilizations are the broadest cultural entities; hence conflict between groups from different civilizations becomes central to global politics.⁶⁶

Having dilated upon the “Cultural Reconfiguration of the Global Politics”, he divides the contemporary human race into seven, possibly eight, “Civilizations”, namely; Western, Latin American, Islamic, Sinic (Chinese), Hindu, Orthodox, Japanese, and the African. Similarly, he indicates various states, which are [or can be called] the “Core States”—the custodian of these

civilizations. In his opinion, there could be more than one core state for one civilization. Therefore, he considers United States, Britain, France and Germany as core states of the Western civilization, Russia for Orthodox, obviously China, India and Japan for Sinic (Chinese), Hindu and Japanese civilizations respectively. He thought that Islam, Latin America and Africa lacked core states⁶⁷ and observed that this was in part due to the imperialism of Western powers, which divided among themselves Africa, the Middle East and in earlier centuries and less decisively, Latin America.⁶⁸

Interestingly, resurgence of Islam and revival of the Islamic civilization figures out time and again and quite prominently throughout his book. He emphasized that despite having potential, no one state can be named as a Core State in the Islamic World due to lack of cohesion. He also asserts that the idea of a sovereign nation state is incompatible with belief in sovereignty of Allah and primacy of *Ummah*. His observation regarding division within Muslim world and absence of credible leadership is absolutely correct. However, his observation regarding absence of core state in Islam needs serious deliberation. He writes, the absence of Islamic core state is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam. Consciousness without cohesion is source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civilizations.⁶⁹

After a detailed discourse, Huntington concluded that future global conflict would be “clash of civilizations”—a clash between “West and the Rest”. He wrote that in the emerging world, the relations between states and groups from different civilizations would not be close but often be antagonistic.⁷⁰ Without commenting on colonial and imperial mindset of the West, he acknowledged that what was universalism to the West was imperialism to the rest. He also admitted that the West would continue to defend its interests by defining the same as interests of the “world community” to give global legitimacy to its actions. To this end, the West would use international institutions, including IMF, for protecting and promoting these interests.⁷¹ He also pointed out that having achieved political independence, non-Western societies wish to free themselves from Western economic, military, and cultural domination.⁷² Gradually, he combines Islam and China into a block that would resist Western domination. According to him with the challenger civilizations,

Islam and China, the West is likely to have consistently strained and often highly antagonistic relations.⁷³ He observed that Islam and Sinic societies see the West as their antagonist thus have reasons to cooperate with each other against the West . . .⁷⁴ Based on this conclusion; he tried to establish a connection between Confucian- Islamic weapons proliferation. Hence, his observation that the West's antagonists are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the West is attempting to prevent them from doing so.⁷⁵ While commenting on global politics of civilization, Huntington finally concluded, civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on global scale.⁷⁶ His main focus on "Islam and the West", and "Islam and the Rest", and his prejudice about Islam is conspicuously visible throughout his repeated comments and observation about Islam and the Islamic world.

He describes that "Fault Line Conflicts" are a situation where conflicts are more likely to happen due to demographic factor and historical heritage. He writes, Fault line wars are by definition local wars between local groups with wider connection and hence promote civilizational identities among their participants.⁷⁷ While discussing "Core States" and "Fault Line States" his main focus is on Asia, China and the Islamic World. His expression "Islam's bloody borders" has drawn serious criticism from Islamic scholars and neutral analysts all over the world. He proposes that in order to preserve Western civilization in the face of declining Western power, it is in the interest of the United States and European countries to [*inter alia*] restrain the development of conventional and unconventional military powers of Islamic and Sinic countries.⁷⁸

Whereas some Western scholars have supported Huntington's views many have strongly disagreed with him disapproving the very concept of clash of civilizations. Neutral analysts feel that Huntington's work is not a quality intellectual work. It is neither balanced and objective nor impartial and unbiased. Thorough analysis indicates that Huntington was over obsessed with following presumptions.

- Superiority of Western civilization.
- Western civilization is the custodian of "Free World", and therefore it has inherent right to become a universal civilization.

International Conflict Resolution

- Growth of other civilizations, especially their resistance to colonial and imperial past and prevailing exploitation of poor countries' economic and natural resources, is an expression of anti-West resentment.
- Islam and the West are intrinsically opposed to each other. Hence, clash between Islam and the West is inevitable.
- Any cooperation between Islamic Civilization and any other civilization or an alliance between Muslim countries and other countries is basically an alliance against the West.

Through repeated discussion, he keeps attempting to prove them correct, in order to lay a foundation for his projected "clash of civilizations" primarily a clash of Islamic and Sinic civilizations with Western civilization.

Worried about cultural assertiveness and challenges posed by Asia and Islam to the Western civilization, he wrote, Asian assertiveness is rooted in economic growth; Muslim assertiveness stems, in considerable measure, from social mobilization and population growth. Each of these challenges is having, and will continue to have, into twenty-first Century, a highly destabilizing impact on global politics.⁷⁹ He acknowledges, successful economic development generates self-confidence and assertiveness on the part of those who produce it and benefit from it. As they have become more successful economically, East Asian have not hesitated to emphasize the distinctiveness of their culture and to trumpet the superiority of their values and way of life compared to those of the West and other societies. Asian societies are decreasingly responsive to US demands and interests and increasingly able to resist pressure from the United States and other Western countries.⁸⁰ He is so obsessed about American or Western superiority that quoting Ambassador Tommy Kohl, he writes that a cultural renaissance is sweeping across Asia. It involves a growing self-confidence, which means Asians no longer regard everything Western and American as necessarily the best.⁸¹

2.7.2 Critique

Professor Seizauro Sato of Tokyo University, who carried out a critical analysis of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, finds lack of consistency [*in Huntington's*] analysis.⁸² He writes, Huntington is not only inaccurate or wrong in some of the historical facts he presents in his analysis, but his thesis has potential to be extremely dangerous if taken as a prescription for making policy.⁸³ Observing that Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam have served as force to integrate various people living in vast geographical regions through common values and social orders, he points out that while different civilizations that come into contact may clash with each other, they can also learn from each other, and may thereby revitalize themselves.⁸⁴ Whereas Huntington totally ignores the contribution made by Islamic teachings for development of human race, and sees nothing but seeds of animosity between Islam and the West. Sato reminds, in the West, the Renaissance, which was initial spark for the development of modern Western civilization, would not have occurred had it not been for the West's contact with Islamic civilization.⁸⁵ Therefore, he concludes: it cannot be said that encounter between different cultures inevitably results in a head-on clash.⁸⁶ He observes, in non-Western regions which faced the threat of Western colonial aggression, there naturally arose a nationalist response against the inroads of alien intruders⁸⁷. He also points out that it is perhaps due to confusion and lack of correct understanding of the relationship between competition, confrontation and outburst of radical criticism against the affluent developed nations that Huntington presents Islamic civilization, along with Chinese civilization as posing the greatest threats to Western civilization.⁸⁸ Therefore, Sato concludes that in his opinion: Huntington's assertion that the post-Cold War world will be the stage for confrontations among civilizations is concept fundamentally in error.⁸⁹

Professor Edward W. Said, while analyzing Huntington's 1993 article, observes that it was intended to supply Americans with an original thesis about "a new phase" in world politics after the end of the Cold War.⁹⁰ Considering this theory as the "Clash of Ignorance", he writes that history is ignored in the rush

to highlight the ludicrously compressed and constricted warfare that “the clash of civilizations” argues is the reality.⁹¹

Thierry Meyssan writes: The Islamic complot and clash of civilizations theory has been progressively devised since 1990, in order to provide the military industrial complex with a spare ideology after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bernard Lewis, a British Middle East specialist, Samuel Huntington, an American strategist, and Laurent Murawiec, a French consultant, were the main creators of this theory which justifies, not always in a logical way, the US crusade for oil.⁹²

Hisham Bustani having opined that the rhetoric about a “clash of civilizations” and a “war on Islam” . . . and the term like “terrorism” was manufactured in imperialist centers, has asked, is the “clash of civilizations” an independent topic or is it a camouflage term for a struggle that actually embodies something else?⁹³

Muhammad Asadi, quoting Edward Said’s critique, states that this [Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”] thesis is a fictional gimmick, something like the “War of the Worlds”.⁹⁴ In his opinion the motivation behind generating such “official mythology”, by the US elite, and the multiple think tanks that push their agenda, is primarily “prepping” the domestic public for massive funds and manpower. In other words, legitimation is achieved by generating an “us versus them” climate of fear and paranoia, or as the ex-US senator, Vanderbilt put it, by scaring “the hell out of the American people”.⁹⁵ Considering it as a flawed thesis, he asserts, the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis is part of an attempt to justify to the masses this “continual war” that has become part of the US political economy.⁹⁶

Scott Thompson and Jeffrey Steinberg consider: It was Bernard Lewis who launched the hoax of the “Clash of Civilizations” — in a September 1990 *Atlantic Monthly* article on “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, which appeared three years before Brzezinski clone Samuel Huntington’s publication of his *Foreign Affairs* diatribe, “The Clash of Civilizations.” Huntington’s article, and his subsequent book-length treatment of the same subject, was caricatures of Lewis” more sophisticated British Orientalist historical fraud, which painted Islam as engaged in a 14-century-long war against Christianity.⁹⁷

Elif Shafak says that there is no Clash of Civilizations between Europe and Turkey; rather there is clash of opinion within Turkey

itself,⁹⁸

Pierr Tristram thinks that Huntington saw conflict everywhere. He drew a new iron curtain between Russia and Europe, between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam. He predicted increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States, thus confusing a mild clash of economies and jealousies with a civilizational clash. There's nothing new about seeing the world this way as Crusaders did it.⁹⁹

Above views of various scholars (though only few out of many more having similar views) indicate that most of the unbiased and unprejudiced scholars do not accept Huntington's thesis of "Clash of Civilizations". They rather believe that such concepts and ideas are a creation of a typical mindset of those neoconservatives who try to over blow and twist security concerns of the United States and the West, and want to promote perpetual conflict between the West and the rest of the world. After Cold War, there was no universally accepted enemy of the West and it was necessary to create an antagonistic atmosphere charged with emotions of "Us and They" to provide some kind of legitimacy (or acceptability) to West's illegal and illegitimate occupation of other countries for want of cheap access to world's natural resources. Therefore, Islamic Civilization and Sinic (Chinese) Civilization are projected as strategic threat to Western Civilization.

Last decade of the Twentieth Century and first decade of the Twenty-first Century have witnessed physical manifestation of this narrative. Some Muslim countries have been occupied by US led Western forces on the pretext of global war on terrorism. Some other Muslim countries have experienced blatant foreign military intervention in their internal politics or domestic affairs under the disguise of support for democracy and freedom, humanitarian assistance and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, etc. Many others are under constant threat of similar political and economic coercion and military aggression.

GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY: ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

3.1 THE UN

Since 1945, international community has evolved reasonably credible and universally accepted mechanism for resolution of international conflicts. This mechanism works both through formal and informal channels. Different elements of this mechanism include the United Nations, regional organizations, international law, and international legal institutions.

The UNO came into being at the end of the Second World War. The Charter of the UN was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. Initially, the UN Charter was signed by 50 member states. It is worth noting that, at present, 193 states are members of the United Nations.

International community's collective desire for peaceful co-existence is clearly expressed in UN Charter's preamble, which states:

We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in . . . and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.¹

The United Nations claims its commitment for maintaining international peace and security, as explicitly stated in its Purposes and Principles contained in Chapter 1 of the UN Charter.² According to Article 1.1, first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. To that end, UN has to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to

international peace, and for suppression of act of aggression or other breaches of peace, and bring about peaceful means, and, in conformity with principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations, which might lead to a breach of the peace.³ Collective will of the international community provides necessary authority and legitimate right to the UN to act on behalf of the international community, in order to play its effective role in international conflict resolution. This task is carried by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretary General and the Secretariat.

3.1.1 Role of UN General Assembly

The UN General Assembly (UNGA), which consists of all members of the UN, may discuss any questions relating to maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council or . . . may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state and states concerned or to the Security Council or to both.⁴ The General Assembly does not take any action on international peace and security issues; however, any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion⁵. The Secretary General is responsible to inform the General Assembly about any matter pertaining to maintenance of international peace and security, which is being dealt with by the Security Council. In fact, General Assembly's role vis-à-vis conflict resolution is more of symbolic and representational rather than an executive authority. Nonetheless, pursuant to "Uniting for Peace" resolution of November 1950 [resolution 377(V)], the [General] Assembly may take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to negative veto of a permanent member, in case where there appears to be threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.⁶ However, the General Assembly plays an important role in controlling the functioning of Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) through relevant Committees. It also controls and approves routine and special budget for these departments.

3.1.2 Role of the UN Security Council

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter, for maintenance of international peace and security.⁷ The

Council is composed of five permanent—China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States—and ten non-permanent members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring vote of all five permanent members. This is the rule of “great Power unanimity”, often referred to as the “veto” power.⁸ Under the Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out all the decisions of the Security Council. While all other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to governments, the [Security] Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out.⁹ The Security Council draws its responsibility and corresponding authority for necessary action from different articles of the UN Charter covered in Chapters V to VIII. Functions and powers of the Security Council are summarized below:

- **To Call upon Parties to Settle their Dispute through Peaceful Means**¹⁰: Article 33 of the UN Charter demands that party to any dispute should seek solution by negotiations, inquiry, moderation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice. If the parties fail to resolve their disputes themselves through peaceful means, the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.¹¹
- **To Investigate any Dispute or Situation which might lead to International Friction**¹²: Article 34 of the UN Charter authorizes that the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to dispute, in order to determine whether the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.¹³
- **To Recommend Appropriate Procedure of Adjustment of Dispute**: For purpose of “Pacific Settlements of Disputes”, under Article 36 (Chapter 5), the Security Council may, at any stage of dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature

recommend appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment. In making recommendations under this Article, the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provision of Statute of the Court¹⁴ [Article 36.1 and 36.3].

- **To Determine the Existence of Threat to the Peace or Act of Aggression and to Recommend what Actions should be taken¹⁵:** Article 39 of the UN Charter demands that in case of failure of pacific settlement of the dispute, the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹⁶
- **To Call upon the Parties of Dispute to Comply with Provisional Measures as decided by the Council:** Under Article 40 of the UN Charter, in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.¹⁷
- **To Decide Measures, other than Use of Force, in support of its Decisions:** Under the provisions of Article 41, the Security Council may decide what measures, not involving the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.¹⁸
- **To Call on Members to Apply Economic Sanctions to Prevent or Stop Aggression¹⁹:** Measures not involving

use of force may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.²⁰

- **To Take Military Action against an Aggressor²¹:** If all efforts for pacific settlement of dispute fail, and economic and diplomatic sanctions also do not lead to termination of aggression, and should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.²² [Article 42].

3.1.3 Role of the UN Secretary General

The UN Secretary General is the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the Organization.²³ With regard to international peace, security, and conflict resolution, he acts in accordance with Article 99, which reads that, the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.²⁴ One of the most vital roles played by the Secretary General is the use of his “good offices”... steps taken publicly or in private, drawing upon his independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.²⁵ For doing so, the Secretary General has to display moral ascendancy through very high standards of neutrality and impartiality. Mr Kofi Anan writes that Secretary General’s office will have the potential to advocate the interests of any one state or group of states. This is the precarious balance to which any Secretary General owes his office, his strength, his effectiveness, and his moral authority.²⁶ Regarding his efforts for international conflict resolution, he said, I have used my office as a bridge between two or more parties where I believed an opportunity for the peaceful resolution of dispute existed. To do so, I have embarked upon many missions, confronting not only the doubts of others but my own as well.²⁷

3.1.4 The UN Secretariat

UN Secretariat is established under the provisions of Chapter XV, Articles 97 to 101. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) plays the pivotal role in resolution of international armed conflicts. Department of Political Affairs, Department of Field Support, Department of Law, Department of Information and the Office of Coordinator for the Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) also play a very important role in UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. Besides these departments, many UN agencies, such as; United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Food Programme (WFP) also play very important role in this regard. Department of Peacekeeping Operations takes the lead and carries out necessary coordination and liaison with all other departments, agencies, offices and organizations, including various regional organizations, working for global peace and security and international conflict resolution.

3.1.5 Obligations and Right of Member States

All members of the UN are under obligation to extend all possible assistance to UN, including their military forces, as and when requested by the Security Council. Article 43 (1) of the Charter reads: all Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.²⁸ This article forms the basis of providing peacekeeping forces for various UN peacekeeping missions.

Article 51 of the Charter protects every Member State's inherent right for self-defence in case of attack by any aggressor.

3.2 UN PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

UN Peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace.²⁹ It is interesting to note that the term peacekeeping is not found in the UN Charter.³⁰ Peacekeeping Operations have been referred by Mr Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary General, as

“Chapter Six and Half initiatives” placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully and more forceful actions as authorized under Chapter VII.³¹ Over the years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a challenging political landscape.³² These concepts are briefly mentioned here, as they form the foundation stone of contemporary UN peacekeeping activities.

- *“Preventive diplomacy* is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”³³
- *“Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”³⁴
- *Peacekeeping* is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model to incorporate a complex model of many elements—military, police, and civilian, such as humanitarian assistance, working together.
- *Peace enforcement* involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force to restore international peace and security. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
- *Peace-building* involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peace building is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.

- *Peace Support Operations*, a term introduced by the United Kingdom; is now used in NATO doctrine to cover peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The United States and some other nations prefer to use peace operations as generic term for missions mandated by the United Nations.³⁵
- *Peacekeeping operations* are carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties whereas Peace-enforcement is carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not give consent to intervention and they may be engaged in combat activities.
- **Basic Principles of UN for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping:**
 - ✓ Consent of the parties.
 - ✓ Impartiality.
 - ✓ Non-use of force. Use of force in self-defence and in defence of the mandate only.
 - ✓ Legitimacy and credibility.

3.3 ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Some regional organizations are also playing very significant and assertive role in conflict resolution in their respective regions and beyond. Many other organizations, depending up their capacity, resources, political will, objectives and respective Charters are desirous of doing the same. All such activities are supposed to be regulated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII, Articles 52 to 54. Salient aspects of these articles are highlighted below.

Article 52: Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and Principles of the United Nations.³⁶

Article 53: No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.³⁷

Following regional organizations are effectively engaged in conflict resolution:

- ✓ African Union (AU).
- ✓ European Union (EU).
- ✓ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- ✓ Organization of American States (OAS).
- ✓ Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Following regional organizations are also partially playing their role in conflict resolution:

- ✓ Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- ✓ Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
- ✓ Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
- ✓ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
- ✓ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
- ✓ Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
- ✓ Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
- ✓ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

3.4 UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

3.4.1 Summary of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

The United Nations, until January 2014, has launched sixty-nine peacekeeping operations (missions), including more than one peacekeeping operation (missions) in one country. As beginning of 2014, fifty-four operations have completed their mandate³⁸ and fifteen operations are being conducted at present.³⁹ A region-wise summary of these operations, prepared from the information available at the UN website, is appended below in Table-1. A summary of current and past peacekeeping operations is attached at Appendices A and B respectively.

Table – 1: Summary of Past and Current UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (up till January 2014)

S / No	Region	Past PKO	Current PKO	Total
1	Africa	22	7	29
2	Americas	8	1	9
3	Asia and the Pacific	9	2	11
4	Europe	8	2	10
5	Middle East	7	3	10
6	Total	54	15	69

3.4.2 General Concerns

Maximum peacekeeping operations have been (and are still being) conducted in Africa followed by Asia and the Middle East. Whereas, UN peacekeeping operations are mostly supported by the member states of the UN, experts of international relations and international conflict resolution have observed that many missions did not meet the expected standards of neutrality and impartiality. Global concerns about UN peacekeeping activities are summarized in subsequent paragraphs.

- **Legitimacy:** Legitimacy is the basic foundation of a successful peacekeeping operation. Legal authority and legitimacy come from UN Security Council's decision, which is expressed through relevant resolution(s) authorized by the Security Council. It is extremely important that this decision must be considered as a just and fair decision by all member states and more so by the affected parties of a conflict. Questionable legitimacy will never help find fair, just and long lasting solution of international disputes and conflicts.
- **Credibility:** The Security Council while authorizing a mission must take cognizance of the ground realities. Appropriate level of Force, with desired capability, must be authorized, in order to accomplish the envisaged mission. Similarly, Department of Peacekeeping Operations should develop appropriately robust

rules of engagement (ROE) to equip the Force with desired legal authority and capability to accomplish the task assigned to military and police components of the mission. The Force deployed must be credible and effective. Ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeeping force in some missions, such as UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been widely criticized due to lack of credibility or lack of willingness of participating member states to undertake assigned tasks.

- **Ambiguous Mandates:** Leadership of any peacekeeping mission derives inspiration and guidance from the mandate authorized by the Security Council. Unambiguous mandate has always provided clear direction and correct course of action to senior leadership of the peacekeeping operation. However, in many cases, due to international political considerations or lack of consensus by permanent members of the Security Council, the Council has authorized somewhat vague or unclear mandate, which does not help the mission leadership to accomplish mandated task. UN Security Council resolution 1244, for establishment of UN Mission in Kosovo, is particularly cited as an example of such ambiguity. The issue of substantive autonomy was too vague to be interpreted in practical terms. Therefore, the issue has not been resolved till today.
- **Interests of Powerful Nations in Conflict Zone:** The issue of neutrality is linked with more powerful nations interest in various conflict zones. All such nations try to influence the decision-making at the Security Council, in order to protect and promote their interests. They continue to do so even at execution level through their (and / or their allies) presence in the mission areas. Selection of contingents for a particular mission, from the willing troop contributors, award of contracts for UN owned equipment and other logistic support are generally cited as examples of such influences. Such influence must be minimized or mitigated to lowest level, in order to improve general perception about

UN's neutrality.

- **Use of Force—Collateral Damage:** Though, UN rules of engagement (ROE) emphasize on use of minimum and proportionate force to accomplish the mandated task with minimum collateral damage, yet in many cases UN peacekeepers have been accused of using excessive force, in violation of above mentioned principle of proportionality. At times, excessive use of force has been justified under “self defence” but the fact remains that many violations of authorized ROE have taken place. Whereas it is essential to equip the force according to mandated tasks and to authorize effective ROE to perform their tasks and to ensure their protection from all sorts of threats, challenges and vulnerabilities, it is extremely important to ensure that no excessive force is used, which is more than minimum and essentially required. Any violation in this regard should neither be condoned nor overlooked.
- **Perception about the UN as an Instrument of Neo-colonization:** Another serious concern, especially of the developing nations, pertains to growing perception about UN being indirectly used as an instrument of neo-colonization, in order to exploit the natural resources of the conflict-affected areas. There are reports regarding growth of illegal trade of diamonds, ivory and precious minerals in Africa and about exploitation of Iraqi oil resources. Attempts to control the Central Asian energy resources through foreign forces' presence in Afghanistan are also cited as a recent example in this regard. The UN Security Council must do their best to dispel all such impressions of UN being used for protection and promotion of the national interests of few developed nations.
- **Democratic Decision-making by the Security Council:** The Security Council makes all major decisions regarding authorization and termination of peacekeeping missions but the fact remains that all such

decisions are made essentially with the mutual consent of five permanent members of the Council. In many cases, permanent members have used their right of veto to block and obstruct various resolutions, which they did not wish to support. Similarly, powerful nations also use their diplomatic influence (at times coercion) to force the non-permanent Members of the Council to support or oppose a particular resolution. Hence, a very strong worldwide move for expansion and restructuring of the Security Council and introduction of more democratic and more representative decision making by the Council, including elimination of right of veto by any member of the Council.

- **Uniform Applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Law of Armed Conflict (LAC) to UN Peacekeeping Forces:** The Secretary General of the UN has issued very clear instructions about applicability of IHL to UN peacekeepers but a few exemptions were also allowed by the Council. Such exemptions breed a sense of discrimination and encourage violation by others. Application of IHL to all UN peacekeeping forces, or multinational forces (MNF), operating in support of UN mandate must be ensured. UN, in addition, should evolve credible mechanism to monitor such violation by any party to conflict or even by military forces of any Member State. Any violation of IHL by such forces, for example many excesses by Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, should be reported to the UN Security Council and International Criminal Court (ICC). All such complaints must be inquired and investigated by representatives and observers of an independent international body / organization, such as International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent (ICRC) and necessary remedies made.
- **Participation in Policy and Decision Making by Troop Contributing Nations:** Some countries are making massive contributions to the UN peacekeeping missions by providing military forces, police and other resources

but they have hardly any role in policy making at strategic level. The general perception prevails that international peacekeeping policies, though officially made at UN Secretariat, are governed by a few powerful nations, in order to promote their national interests. Participation of other member states in various Committees at General Assembly is considered more of a routine ritual. Therefore, it is extremely important to establish an institutionalized forum for policy and decision making input with meaningful representation of major troop contributing countries.

- **More Emphasis on Conflict Prevention and Preventive Deployment:** Undoubtedly, conflict prevention plays more important role than conflict resolution in ensuring that a conflict does not escalate beyond manageable limits. Many conflicts can be saved from unwanted escalation at initial stage if appropriate strategy is adopted. Deployment of much smaller forces at an earlier stage of conflict can be helpful in resolving the dispute. Therefore, UN should enhance its conflict prevention efforts, including preventive deployment, which will reduce the current pressure on deployment of large peacekeeping forces.
- **Making Regional Organizations More Effective:** Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisages very important role to be played by regional organizations in maintenance of international peace and security. Some organizations such as NATO, EU, AU, OAS and OSCE etc., have actively participated in conducting variety of peacekeeping operations in various regional and global conflicts but their objectives may not always coincide with the UN. NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan are clear examples of such divergences of policies and views. On the contrary, AU has played quite effective role in peacekeeping operations in Africa. However, all operational activities by regional organizations, outside their own geographical areas, will always be viewed with rightful skepticism, raising many questions about intentions, aim and long-term

objectives of such organizations. The UN Security Council should restrict activities and operations of all such organizations to their geographical boundaries or to their member states only. Simultaneously, the capacities and capabilities of the regional organizations to play such role should also be built, supported and enhanced by the UN.

- **Making UN Peacekeeping Operations more Effective:** In order to ensure that an armed conflict does not escalate beyond its immediate geographic area of conflict, international community has to take appropriate steps for pro-active conflict management. The Security Council must maintain neutrality and remain uncontroversial while deciding various actions. The UN Peacekeeping forces should be capable of managing and resolving international disputes with minimum use of force, avoiding any collateral damage. The peacekeeping missions should be completed within minimum possible time and UN peacekeeping force should be employed on explicit request of the host country or on the request of the regional organization for their member states only. Similarly due care must be exercised by the UN Security Council while authorizing any mission based on “humanitarian assistance or responsibility to protect civilians”. Recent example is the UNSC resolution 1973 authorizing “No Fly Zone”, which has resulted in use of air power by US and European countries against Libyan Forces loyal to President Qadhafi. Many members of the UNSC, including two permanent members – China and Russia, which had abstained during voting on the resolution, criticized the bombing by NATO forces declaring this action against the real spirit of the resolution. Similarly, a visible difference of the opinion has been expressed by Russia and China on the Syrian issue as well.

3.4.3 Legal Basis for Use of Force

As explained earlier, United Nations Peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council in accordance with provisions of United Nations Charter, under its Chapter VI (Articles 33 to

38) “Pacific Settlement of Dispute” and Chapter VII (Article 39 to 51) “Actions with Respect to Threat to the Peace, Breach of Peace, and Acts of Aggression”,⁴⁰ Whereas, Chapter VIII “Regional Agreements” deals with UN cooperation, support and encouragement for various international regional organizations in settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or such regional agencies.⁴¹

3.4.4 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

ROE are directions to operational commanders, which define perimeters within which military force and / or civil armed forces (including Police) may be used by designated force commander and personnel during their employment in various operations. Therefore, ROE provide legal authority for use of force. ROE are generally founded on following factors:

- National laws and legislation in case of domestic operations.
- International laws, protocols and agreements, including International Humanitarian Law and Law of Armed Conflict.
- Mission specific operational considerations.
- UN Security Council Resolution in case of UN Peacekeeping Operations.
- In case of multinational force, operating under a joint command, ROE are mutually agreed upon by the participating nations. However, certain variations are accepted in accordance with respective national laws and legislation.

3.4.5 General Principles for Use of Force⁴²

- Armed force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort.
- The force must be used against a real threat. Mere speculation does not constitute reasonable belief.
- Military and Civil Armed Forces personnel (including Police) must never use more force than minimum necessary to accomplish their assigned mission and to ensure their self-defence.
- The force used must be proportionate to the level of

threat and must be limited to the degree, intensity and duration, which is necessary and proportionate to achieve the aim for using the force, and no more at all.

- When the hostile act ceases to exist the force must also cease to be used.
- Negotiation and warnings must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated.
- The use of force in retaliation or reprisal must not be permitted.
- Collateral damage must be avoided or at least minimized.

3.4.6 Islamic Teachings on Use of Force

The Muslim military history, following the noble teachings of our beloved Prophet, Muhammad (peace be upon him), is full of elaborate instructions pertaining to strict restraints with regard to use of force. Such instructions were issued by the Prophet (peace be upon him) himself and the Caliphs and *Ameer-ul-Mo'mineen* thereafter to their military commanders. These instructions included orders regarding prohibitions imposed on using force against women, children, elderly and defenceless people. Punishments for any violation are very harsh. The treatment extended by *Salahuddin Ayubi* (the Saladin) to his opponents during Crusades had attained a great fame amongst his European Christian adversaries. Unfortunately, many Muslims failed to practice such great magnanimity in later wars. Muslim scholars have also not emphasized much on such important part of Islamic teachings in an appropriate manner. Islam does not allow use of more than minimum required force, that too for a just cause only. Moreover, no force is permitted against situations of intimidation or in retaliation except for using minimum force in self-defence. Especially, when an opponent seeks a truce or offers to surrender, no force can be used on any pretext, even in self-defence unless a violation of truce is committed by the adversary.

3.5 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION

3.5.1 Genesis and Growth of International Law

Over the centuries, international laws and rules have grown gradually through mutual consultation and acceptance. The rules

that govern most interactions in International Relations are rooted in moral norms. International norms are the expectations held by the national leaders about normal international relations.⁴³ States have been interacting with each other on variety of issues pertaining to war and peace since ages. Be it conduct of war, treatment of prisoners, administration of occupied territories or negotiated settlement of disputes, or issues relating to commerce and trade and privileges offered to their diplomats etc, states have been managing all such matters with other states according to norms in vogue or on the basis of new agreements. Traditionally, international law consisted of rules and principles governing the relations and dealings of nations with each other, though recently, the scope of international law has been redefined to include relations between states and individuals, and relations between international organizations.⁴⁴ Some critics argue that international law is neither “international” nor “law”.⁴⁵ However, it is generally defined as a body of rules that states and other agents accept as binding obligation in the world community.⁴⁶

3.5.2 Conflict Resolution through International Law

The most important function and objective of international law is resolution of international disputes without resorting to use of force. Similarly, prevention of war and minimization of human suffering in case of war is an equally important concern of international law. Many scholars and jurists have expressed their opinion on the vital issues pertaining to conduct of war and regulation of use of force and violence during war. The first major compilation of these laws of war was carried out by Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth-century Dutch jurist and a diplomat, in his famous book, *The Law of War and Peace*, published in 1625. He outlined the principles as how, when and by whom a war may be justly conducted. The most important early treaties on war were the conventions signed at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, which resulted in the codification of the laws of war.⁴⁷ Since then and especially following World War I and II, numerous multilateral conventions have taken place aimed at restricting or prohibiting use of means of waging war, treatment of wounded and the prisoners and protection of non-combatants. Probably the most explicit condemnation of war was the General

Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928, otherwise known as *Kellogg-Briand Pact*. The Pact condemned war as means of solving international conflicts, stating that settlement of disputes shall never be sought except by pacific means.⁴⁸

The United Nations Charter demands that:

- All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered (*Article 2.3*);
- All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations (*Article 2.4*).⁴⁹

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter sets forth the fundamental right of “self-defence”. The Article reads, Noting in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations⁵⁰ These provisions of the Charter amply clarify that states are prohibited to use force or threat of use of force or any other form of violence to settle their disputes. Thus, any first use of armed force against another state is contrary to the UN Charter, and therefore illegal.⁵¹

International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established by the Charter of the United Nations as principal judicial organ to adjudicate in matters of dispute amongst its member states. Similarly, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Court (ICC) were constituted to try cases pertaining to war crimes. International law can contribute to the maintenance of world peace only if it is respected by all states. Any selective and interest driven application by more powerful members of international community will erode the confidence of affected parties and the credibility of international judicial institutions.

3.6 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) AND LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (LAC)

The International Humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between States. IHL applies to armed conflicts.⁵² Though, the history of International Humanitarian Law spreads over a long period, yet the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, two Additional Protocols of 1977 and Additional Protocol III of 2005 are the principal instruments of humanitarian law.⁵³

3.6.1 Protected Persons, Property and Objects under IHL

The International Humanitarian Law provides protection to many individuals, some properties and other objects as well. Under International Humanitarian Law, protected persons are those to whom a particular humanitarian treaty applies . . . In particular, protected persons are the wounded, the sick, the shipwrecked, prisoners of war and other persons deprived of their freedom in relation to conflict, civilians and other persons not or no longer taking part in the fighting, medical and religious personnel, the staff of relief operations, the staff of civil defence organizations and mediators. In the event of armed conflict, there are also protected objects. These include cultural property and all other civilian objects as well as military medical facilities and ambulances.⁵⁴

3.6.2 National Implementation of IHL

The Primary objective of IHL is to limit the effects of armed conflict. The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and Red Crescent (ICRC) is custodian of IHL but implementation of IHL remains national responsibility of all those states which have become party to these treaties. Therefore, all states are required to develop appropriate training modules to ensure that their soldiers and other persons involved in armed conflict are fully aware of their obligations under IHL. The ICRC has set up its Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law in 1996 to

step up its support to States committed to implementing IHL.⁵⁵

3.6.3 Application of IHL to UN Peacekeeping Forces

The UN Secretary General's Bulletin ST/SGB/1999/13 deals with fundamental principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control. The Bulletin explains; the fundamental principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.⁵⁶ The Bulletin clearly states that in case of violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.⁵⁷

3.6.4 Exemptions for Application of IHL to US Forces

The International community has observed, with great concern, that US military forces and police have been accorded exemption for application of IHL in many UN peacekeeping missions. This has obviously invited lot of criticism. Selective application of IHL on any pretext would adversely effect its credibility.

3.7 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS FOR WAR CRIMES

3.7.1 The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been established by the Charter of the United Nations, through the "Statute of the International Court of Justice". ICJ essentially deals with international legal disputes and only States can be party to a dispute. Since the ICJ is a formal organ of the United Nations, all UN members are automatically members of the Court.⁵⁸ ICJ comprises fifteen judges who are concurrently elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council for a staggered term of nine years. The full Court hears two types of cases: contentious cases, which deal with issues of legal disputes between two or

more states; and advisory cases, which deal with issues of legal interpretation raised by agencies of the UN. In contentious cases, the Court issues judgment, in advisory cases advisory opinion.⁵⁹ Though ICJ can be considered equal to a World Court, which can play very important role in resolving many contentious disputes through their decisions, yet its decisions have no binding obligation and ICJ have no executive or punitive authority over parties to the dispute. At best its jurisdiction is established only when states voluntarily consent to its authority.⁶⁰

3.7.2 International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent international organization, and is not part of the United Nations system.⁶¹ The Court has been established under Rome Statute. On 17 July 1998, the international community reached an historic milestone when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute, the legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 after ratification by 60 countries.⁶² The Court is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. The Presidency is composed of three judges of the Court, elected to the Presidency by their fellow judges, for a term of three years. The Judicial Divisions consist of eighteen judges organized into the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and the Appeals Division. ⁶³ Judges elected to the court by the Assembly of States Parties serve nine-year terms and are not generally eligible for re-election.

Pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation on the basis of a *referral* from any State Party or from the United Nations Security Council. In addition, the Prosecutor can initiate investigations *proprio motu* on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court received from individuals or organizations (*communications*).⁶⁴ The Court can prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Since the Court came into being on 1 July 2002, over 110 states have joined as members of the Court. However, some significant members of the United Nations, including; China, India, Russia and the United States, have not yet joined the Court. The Court is designed to complement existing national judicial systems: it can exercise its jurisdiction only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute

such crimes. Primary responsibility to investigate and punish crimes is, therefore, left to individual states.⁶⁵

3.7.3 International Tribunals for War Crimes

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials addressed war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda were the result of consensus that impunity is unacceptable.⁶⁶ These tribunals were established to try crimes committed only within a specific timeframe and during a specific conflict.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

4.1 THE MUSLIM WORLD—A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

The concept of unity, solidarity and cooperation is an intrinsic part of Islamic belief, philosophy, creed and teachings. Despite various differences, which have existed amongst the Muslims throughout their history, desire to resolve various disputes amicably and peacefully, in accordance with the guidelines enunciated by Islam, has always existed. Due to their internal differences and disputes, the Muslims have suffered in the shape of social, political and economic subjugation and slavery under colonial rule. They have also faced exploitation of their precious natural resources by foreigners. However, the fact remains that whenever Muslims have demonstrated unity and cooperation, as advocated by true teachings of their religion, it has always been to their collective advantage. Leaving aside deplorable politico-economic, intellectual and technological state of majority of Muslim countries in the last few centuries, Muslims have played very assertive, effective and dynamic role as world leaders in international commerce and trade, academic and intellectual pursuits, and military conquests and campaigns. Starting from the inception of Islam and its spectacular expansion across the globe, Islamic history is full of politico-economic, politico-military, socio-economic and socio-intellectual successes, which have benefitted the human race more than any other social or religious philosophy.

With such rich and enviable historical heritage, especially dominant and leading role played by many empires and dynasties in their respective regions and beyond; such as Umayyad and Abbasids in Arab world, North Africa and parts of Asia, Sultanate of Delhi and Moguls in Indian Sub Continent, Khanates in Central Asia, Fatimid in Egypt and North Africa, Muslim ruler in Spain, and Ottoman Empire in most parts of the Muslim world and some

parts of Europe, it is a natural desire of the Muslim *Ummah* to play its due role in international politics. Regrettably, the importance of the Muslim world had been reduced and marginalized due to colonial rule of the Western powers over most of the Muslim countries in the last two centuries. During this period, due to superior military and economic power and technological pre-eminence, European powers conquered and occupied most of the Muslim land in Asia, the Middle East and Africa and established their authoritarian control over Muslim population and their resources. Towards the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, Russia also conquered many Muslim states in Central Asia and Caucasia, occupying large areas in these regions. Resultantly, Muslims, living as subjugated people under oppressive foreign occupation, for a long time, lost their unity and forgot to cooperate with each other. They hardly managed their mere survival. The biggest loss was stagnation and constant decline in the evolution of their political thought process. In addition, colonial powers deliberately suppressed and alienated Muslims, considering them as their main rivals in global power struggle because they had snatched global political dominance and control from them. Such sense of deprivation and oppression had dominated majority of Muslims all around the world till middle of the Twentieth Century. Muslim countries started getting independence during and after the Second World War. While the colonial powers were vacating their colonies, under political pressures for local autonomy and independence movements or because of their inability to retain the physical control of their colonies for an indefinitely longer period, they created many small states by drawing unnatural boundaries. This was primarily aimed to sow the seed of political and territorial disputes, which could be exploited by them at a later stage. It was assumed that newly established states would not be able to resolve such disputes in a peaceful manner. Moreover, they created many small states, which would allow them to continue exercising their control for perpetual exploitation of their resources. On top of this, creation of a Jewish state of Israel, in total disregard to Palestinian peoples' inherent right to live independently on their own land, and incomplete division of British India, leaving behind the unresolved Kashmir dispute, were deliberate efforts to weaken the Muslim world.

The nineteenth century witnessed a continuous decline in political and economic power of the Islamic world and

resultant inability to influence decision making at regional and international level. Simultaneously, they also lost the ability to protect their sovereignty, independence and national interest. The contemporary concept of international alliances, coalitions and organizations was developed essentially by European political thinkers. The three victorious coalitions of 1815, 1920 and 1945 were directly engaged in certain form of international cooperation which led to successive creation of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations.¹ In fact, the Western nations have dominated the present system of international organizations.² Consequently, the United Nations has always been considered as a vehicle through which powerful nations manage to perpetuate their control and influence over other nations. Therefore, many international organizations, including the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and offices, many a time, are considered tools of Western political, economic, social and cultural hegemony over other nations. This view has been held by many contemporary Muslim political thinkers and scholars, especially those who are inclined towards defiance and anti-imperialism.

Unity, amongst Muslims, is one of the cornerstones of Islamic teaching and philosophy, though it has not been practiced, as desired, especially in recent times. Even today, despite many differences on variety of issues, Muslims across the globe have unanimity of views on many issues such as the establishment of an independent state of Palestine, with Jerusalem (*Al Qudas al Sharif*) as its capital, and its peaceful co-existence with all other countries based on mutual respect for human dignity, political freedom and right of self-determination. Many factors contributed to establishment of the OIC but one tends to agree with Bernard Lewis, who said, historically, the seeds of establishment of the OIC are rooted in Islamic ideology. Islam postulates a universal concept of nationhood, bringing diverse people, nations and regions together in cultural and political harmony.³

Islam, very profoundly, emphasizes on unity amongst all Muslims. Quran says, *Wa Tasemoo Bi Hablillah Hi Jamean Wala Tafarraqoo* [Hold fast, all together, by the Rope which Allah stretches out for you and be not divided among yourself].⁴ It also declares, "The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: so make peace and reconciliation between your two (contending) brothers; and fear from Allah, that ye may receive Mercy."⁵ Hence, the idea of universal Islamic nationhood originates as a fundamental

Islamic concept.⁶ The current regeneration of Islamic brotherhood and quest for political unity is a transnational phenomenon, which emerged during late 19th Century and the 20th Century. It was essentially due to political and economic subjugation of Muslims by non-Muslim colonial powers. During the colonial and imperial era, in the late 19th Century, Jamal ud Din Afghani attempted to start a transnational movement (Pan Islamic Movement) to unite Muslims.⁷ He propagated unity and solidarity amongst all Muslims, irrespective of their nationality, race, culture, languages or any other identity. According to Najam A. Bezigan, Afghani called upon to Muslim *Ummah* to refuse any kind of nationality or solidarity except Islamic solidarity.⁸ Many efforts were made by different Muslim scholars, thinkers, political and religious leaders to mobilize the Muslims all over the world to improve upon their political, economic and academic conditions, in order to break shackles of slavery and to unite together as one powerful nation (group of nations). Significant developments in this regard, from the beginning of the 20th Century until inception of the OIC, are summarized below:

- Between 1910 and 1920, many Muslim leaders launched “*Khilafat Movement*” in support of Ottoman Caliphate (*Khilafat-e-Usmania*). This Movement not only aroused support for the then disintegrating Ottoman Empire, but also galvanized all political forces who were opposing British colonial rule in Indian subcontinent. This Movement is considered as an important contributory factor for independence movement of India, which saw its culmination in 1947 in the shape of creation of two independent states: India and Pakistan.
- In 1926, World Muslim Congress, (*Mo'tamar Al-alam al-Islami*), was established by eminent Muslim leaders in *Makkah* with the aim to unite all Muslims at an international level. King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia played host to the Congress. A leading light in this congress was the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Alhaj Aminul Hussaini.⁹ The Congress resolved that a permanent international Islamic organization be set up to promote solidarity and cooperation among the global Islamic community (*Ummah*). It assumed organizational shape

in the second International Islamic Conference held in *Baitul Maqdas* (Jerusalem) in 1931.¹⁰

- In 1930, Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal—a renowned Muslim political thinker and a philosopher of India—who was a great exponent of global Muslim unity, proposed creation of an independent Muslim state(s) in Indian Sub-continent comprising areas of Muslim majority.
- In 1947, an independent Muslim majority state—Pakistan—came into being, on 14 August, as the British colonial rule over India ended. It must be kept in mind that British East India Company had colonized Indian Sub-continent after defeating Mogul (Muslim) rulers, who had ruled India for more than 300 years. Even prior to Mughals, many Muslim dynasties had ruled over India for many centuries. This was a significant political development, which encouraged other Muslim communities across the globe to strive for their independence through peaceful political means.
- In 1950s, President Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, realizing need for Muslim solidarity, started advocating for global Muslim political unity. He viewed the greatest Muslim annual congregation of *Hajj* (Pilgrimage) as a unique institution and symbol of the cultural and political unity of Islamic people around the world. He called upon the Muslim world to transform this tradition into a viable Islamic Parliament, ensuring it unlimited political power.¹¹
- In 1957, King Hussain of Jordan attempted to gain international support for Palestine Cause through a World Conference on Palestine.
- In 1960, President Ahmed Soekarno of Indonesia called an Afro-Asian Islamic Conference.¹²
- In 1962, the World Muslim League (*Rabita al Alam al-Islami*), one of the largest Islamic non-governmental

organizations, was established at *Makkah*. Its membership has reached sixty. At present, the League is engaged in propagating the religion of Islam.¹³, and is affiliated with the United Nations and the OIC.

4.2 GENESIS OF THE OIC

The creation of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was, in fact, guided by the necessity of developing unanimity of views amongst Muslim countries on various international issues and to increase mutual cooperation among the Muslim countries. The World Muslim League (*Rabita al Alam al-Islami*) can rightly be called the real platform, which paved the way for inception of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In 1964, at the Muslim World League Conference held in Mogadishu, Abdullah Osman-the then Prime Minister of Somalia-suggested the creation of an inter-government organization. In 1964, Tenku Abdul Rahman, Malaysian Prime Minister and later the first Secretary General of the OIC, suggested that a “commonwealth” of Muslim countries be created with a view to coordinating political activities of Islamic countries.¹⁴

By 1964, the momentum for the creation of an international Islamic organization had synthesized to some concrete proposals. In 1965, the Muslim World League held a conference in *Makkah*. Late King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz reiterated the call for the creation of an international organization of Islamic counties to form a common perceptive on issues facing the Islamic *Ummah*.¹⁵ Late Nigerian leader Ahmedo Bello was charged by the Makkah Conference to submit a report on the project.¹⁶ In 1967, the Muslim World Congress pressed for the convening of an Islamic Summit Conference.¹⁷ The Conference discussed the issue of Palestine and rescue of Al-Qudas (Jerusalem) from Zionist occupation and renewed its call for an Islamic Summit.¹⁸ King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia played a very crucial and important role at this stage by visiting various Muslim countries and galvanizing a political consensus among them to demonstrate solidarity and unity for protecting and promoting the cause of global Muslim community.

Arab-Israel War 1967 and humiliating defeat suffered by Arab countries and occupation of their land by Israel rang alarming bells across the Muslim world. Serious realization started to

emerge at the level of heads of the states and governments that without political unity and solidarity, and in the absence of an intuitional mechanism at international level, it would be almost impossible for the Muslim countries to retain their independence, sovereignty and control on their natural resources.

A tragic incident of arson at *Al-Aqsa* Mosque took place on 21 August 1969. Israeli Army occupied Jerusalem, which sent shock waves across the Muslim world. Political leaders were perplexed and Muslims across the world were anguished. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan of Morocco rapidly called a meeting of the Islamic leaders. Within a month of this incident, a conference of twenty three states was held in Rabat, on 22-25 September 1969.¹⁹ The decision to form, a long awaited, international organization to represent most of Islamic countries was made in this conference. Two major decision were taken at this conference: (a) it was decided that in March 1970, a conference of Foreign Ministers would be held with the specific aim to review the joint action of the Muslim States with regard to the Middle East situation; (b) it was also decided to establish the structural framework of the OIC at the international level by establishing a permanent secretariat.²⁰ Official website of the OIC describes its inception as following:

The Organization [of the Islamic Conference] was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 *Hijra* (25 September 1969) as a result of criminal arson of *Al-Aqsa* Mosque in occupied Jerusalem.²¹

With its initial membership of 23 Member States in 1969, at present 57 countries are members of the OIC, with another five countries having status of an observer.

4.2.1 Change of the Title

At the time of its inception, the "Organization" had been named as "the Organization of Islamic Conference" with the "OIC" as its acronym. However, it was always felt that this title (name) did not correctly reflect the true spirit behind its creation and formation. The Muslims all over the world have always desired that the OIC should reflect their aspirations of natural cooperation, unity and solidarity. Therefore, a number of suggestions had been made at

different forums to change the title of the “Organization” with some more appropriate name, which besides reflecting their desire should infuse sense of greater cooperation amongst the member states. Simultaneously, many member states had shown their desire for adopting a new title while retaining its current acronym “the OIC”. Keeping all these considerations in view, on 28 June 2011, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC, during its 38th Session at Astana, Kazakhstan, decided to change the name the “Organization” as “the Organization of Islamic Cooperation” (while retaining acronym “OIC”) and decided to adopt a new emblem as well.²² It is hoped that the change would further strengthen the Organization at international level.

4.2.2 OIC Charter

Though the OIC was formed in 1969, a formal charter of the organization was adopted by the Third Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1972.²³ Prior to adoption of the Charter, extensive consultations took place in March 1970, in Jeddah, during the First Foreign Ministers Conference and in December 1970, in Karachi, during Second Foreign Ministers Conference.²⁴

The Charter adopted in 1972 comprised fourteen articles. The main objectives of the Charter, inter alia, include promotion of solidarity among Member States, consolidating cooperation in economic and other fields, coordination of efforts for the safeguard of the Holy places and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine and strengthening the struggle of all Muslim People with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights.²⁵ The Charter established three main organs: the Conference of Kings and Heads of States and Governments, the Conference of Foreign Ministers and the General Secretariat and subsidiary organs.²⁶ Membership of the OIC was allowed to all the Muslim countries which had participated in the Conference of Kings and Heads of States and Governments held in Rabat [1969], the Foreign Ministers Conferences held in Jeddah and Karachi and signatory to the Charter.²⁷ Any new membership of a Muslim State was subject to the approval by two-third majority of the Conference members.²⁸ Similarly, any change and amendment in the Charter also required approval by two-third majority of the Member States.²⁹ It was emphasized that any dispute that may arise in the interpretation, application or implementation of any Article in the present Charter shall be settled peacefully, and in all cases

through consultations, negotiations, reconciliation or arbitration.³⁰

The OIC, during its 11th OIC Summit held at Dakar (Senegal) on 14 March 2008, adopted the revised Charter (2008) for the Organization, after intense deliberation and consultation. Agency France-Press reported, the new Charter allows new countries to join the 57-Muslim countries body with just a majority vote instead of the usual unanimous agreement.³¹ The new charter was considered necessary to allow faster decision making ... and streamlining the OIC operation.³² Mr Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu was reported to have said that 1972 Charter had become out dated.³³ At this occasion, Indonesian President, Mr Susilo Bambang Ydhoyono said, "the possibility of an Islamic renaissance lies before us."³⁴ He also emphasized that we [Muslims] need to get our acts together as an organization of Muslim nations.³⁵ The revised Charter consists of 39 articles, organized in 18 chapters. It is a very comprehensive charter, which encompasses multifaceted objectives, principles, procedures and provisions. It aims at transforming the OIC from a nominally formal organization, representing more than a billion Muslim population of the world, to a really effective, vibrant and dynamic international organization, which is capable of playing an assertively positive role in world politics. It aims that political, economic, social and religious rights and privileges of Muslims across the world are respected, promoted and protected in a dignified way. Important provisions of the Charter, which distinguish it from the previous Charter, are summarized below:

- The "Preamble" of the Charter focuses on following:³⁶
 - ✓ Acknowledges the importance and essentiality of promoting and consolidating the unity and solidarity among Muslim people and Member States, guided by Islamic values of unity and fraternity.
 - ✓ OIC's commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter and International Law.
 - ✓ OIC's desire to preserve and promote the Islamic value of peace, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice and human dignity.

International Conflict Resolution

- ✓ Islam's role in sustainable development, progress and prosperity.
- ✓ Respect, safeguard and defence of the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all Member States.
- ✓ Contribution to the international peace and security.
- ✓ Understanding and dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions and promotion of mutual respect and cooperation.
- ✓ Respect and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedom, good governance, rule of law, democracy and accountability in accordance with Member State's constitutional and legal systems.
- ✓ Promote confidence and encourage friendly relations, mutual respect and cooperation between Member states and other States.
- ✓ Foster Islamic values of moderation, tolerance, respect for diversity, preservation of Islamic symbols and common heritage and to defend the universality of Islamic religion.
- ✓ Acquisition of knowledge to achieve intellectual excellence.
- ✓ Promote cooperation among Member States to achieve sustained socio-economic development.
- ✓ Respect for right of self-determination, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Member States and principle of non-interference in their domestic affairs.
- ✓ Support for struggle of Palestinian people, including right of self-determination, and to

Organization of Islamic Cooperation
establish their sovereign state with Al-Qudas Al-Sharif as its capital.

- ✓ Assist Muslim minorities outside the Member States to preserve their dignity, cultural and religious identity.
 - ✓ Uphold the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.
 - ✓ Strive to conduct international relations in accordance with principle of mutual respect and non-interference in matter of domestic jurisdiction.
- Chapter 1 (Article 1 and 2) deals with “Objectives and Principles” of the Organization. Main Objectives, as mentioned in Article 1³⁷ are:
- ✓ Enhance and consolidate the bond of fraternity and solidarity among the Member States.
 - ✓ Safeguard and protect the Common interest and support legitimate cause of the Member States.
 - ✓ Respect the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs and to respect sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State.
 - ✓ Support the restoration of complete sovereignty and territorial integrity of any Member State under occupation, as a result of aggression.
 - ✓ Ensure active participation of the Member States in global political, economic and social decision-making processes.
 - ✓ Promote inter-state relations based on justice, mutual respect and good neighbourliness to ensure global peace, security and harmony.

International Conflict Resolution

- ✓ Support UN Charter and international law.
 - ✓ Support and empower Palestinian people to exercise their right of self-determination and establish their sovereign State with *Al-Qudas Al-Sharif* as its capital.
 - ✓ Protect true image of Islam.
 - ✓ Safeguard the rights, dignity and religious and cultural identity of Muslim communities and minorities in non-Muslim States.
 - ✓ Promote and defend unified position on issues of common interest in the international fora.
 - ✓ Cooperate on combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
 - ✓ Cooperate and coordinate in humanitarian emergencies such as natural disasters.
- Article 2 deals with “Principles”, which guide and inspire the Member States to realize the “Objectives” contained in Article 1. Besides committing themselves to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter and acknowledging that all Member States are sovereign, independent and equal in rights and obligations, the OIC Members accept that:
- ✓ All Member States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations.³⁸
 - ✓ All Member States undertake to:
 - Respect national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other Member States and shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others;

- Contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs as enshrined in the present Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law.³⁹

4.2.3 Membership of the OIC

Chapter II (Article 3) deals with the Membership. At present 57 States are members of the Organization. Any member state of the United Nations, which has Muslim majority and abides by the Charter can become OIC's Member after approval by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Observer status to a United Nations member state or to an international organization can be granted by the Council of Foreign Ministers based on the agreed criteria by the Council. At present six UN member states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Kingdom of Thailand, The Russian Federation and Turkish Cypriot State), one Muslim Community (Moro National Liberation Front), two Islamic Institutions (Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States and Islamic Conference Youth Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation) and six International Organizations (The United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement, League of Arab States, African Union and Economic Cooperation Organization) have been granted status of observers with the OIC.⁴⁰

4.2.4 The Organs of the OIC

The OIC comprises following eleven organs / components:

- ✓ Islamic Summit.
- ✓ Council of Foreign Ministers.
- ✓ Standing Committees.
- ✓ Executive Committee.
- ✓ International Islamic Court of Justice.
- ✓ Independent Permanent Commission of Human Rights.
- ✓ Committee of Permanent Representatives.
- ✓ General Secretariat.
- ✓ Subsidiary Organs.
- ✓ Specialized Institutions.
- ✓ Affiliated Institutions.

4.2.5 Islamic Summit Conference

The Islamic Summit comprises Kings and Heads of States and Government of Member States and is the supreme authority of the Organization.⁴¹ The Islamic Summit is convened every three years and its Extraordinary Sessions can be held, whenever the interests of *Ummah* warrant it, to consider matters of vital importance to the *Ummah*.⁴² Until January 2014, eleven regular and four Extra Ordinary sessions of the Islamic Summit Conference have taken place. Summary of dates on which and places where the Summit Conferences were held is attached at Appendix C.

4.2.6 Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers

The Council of Foreign Ministers (formerly known as Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers⁴³) is convened once a year in one of the Member States. Its Extraordinary Session may be convened, at the initiative of any Member State or of the Secretary General, if such initiative is approved by a simple majority of the Member States. The Council of Foreign Ministers may recommend convening other sartorial Ministerial meetings to deal with the specific issues of concern to the *Ummah*. Such meetings shall submit their reports to the Islamic Summit and the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁴⁴ Until January 2013, thirty-nine regular sessions and more than ten Extra Ordinary sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers / Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers had been held.

4.2.7 OIC's Role in Fostering Cooperation

Since its inception, the OIC has attempted to foster closer cooperation among its Member States and has tried to work for greater cooperation among all UN Member State at global level. 1972 Charter expressed determination of the OIC Member States to consolidate the bonds of the prevailing brotherly and spiritual friendship among their people.⁴⁵ After OIC's inception and adoption of its Charter in 1972, efforts were made to cultivate and strengthen the mutual cooperation among all Member States and to ponder upon various problems faced by the Muslim world. Some critics feel that nothing much has been done by the OIC, in tangible terms, either to foster cooperation among its Member States or to promote international cooperation. Considering the diverse nature of national interests of the OIC Member States, such observation, though partially correct, is little too harsh. Given

the colonial background, economic depravity, weak diplomatic influence in global affairs and lack of developed human resource of most of the member states, it can be said with considerable fairness that the OIC has come a long way since its creation, at least to emerge as an international organization to be reckoned with. In this regard Islamic Summit Conference of 1974, held at Lahore (Pakistan), Makkah Declaration 2005, Dakar Summit Conference of 2008 and Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2009) are very important milestones in transforming the role of the OIC.

While adopting new Charter, in 2008, the OIC laid much greater emphasis on fostering cooperation among its Member States, which is evident from the⁹ “Preamble of the Charter”.⁴⁶ The same spirit is further highlighted in the “Objectives of the Charter”.⁴⁷

Article 26 of the current Charter also requires that the Organization will enhance its cooperation with the Islamic and other Organizations in the service of the objectives embodied in the Charter.⁴⁸

4.2.8 Role In Conflict Resolution

Dr Heider Mehdi considers that, at the time of the OIC’s inception and declaration of its Charter in 1972, in the global perspective, the Muslim states had started looking within commonly-defined problematic scenarios and seeking conflict resolution within the framework of shared goal.⁴⁹ However, critical analysis of 1972 Charter reveals that neither “international conflict resolution” nor such effort among its Member States was one of the main objectives of establishing the OIC. Clause 4 of Article II A (Objectives) of the original Charter (1972) envisioned to take necessary measures to support international peace and security founded on justice.⁵⁰ However, primary focus remained on promoting Islamic solidarity among Member States⁵¹ and to coordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support for the struggle of the people of Palestine, and help them to their rights and liberate their land.⁵²

In fact, the revised Charter of 2008 lays considerable emphasis on OIC’s effective role in international conflict resolution and one observes a clear shift in OIC’s policy and approach in this regard. This paradigm shift indicates keen desire of its Member States to play more assertive role in resolving intra-state and inter-states conflicts among OIC Member States, in particular, and in international arena and international politics, in general. Such

shift is clearly reflected in Charter's Preamble and other articles. The Preamble describes OIC Member State's determination to contribute to international peace and security, to promote confidence and encourage friendly relations, to respect right of self-determination and mutual respect between States and non-interference in matters which are within their domestic jurisdiction.⁵³

4.2.9 Objectives and Principles for Conflict Resolution

The OIC Member State's desire to play their rightful role in resolving conflicts among themselves and among other members of the United Nations is also reflected in the Objectives of the Organization, which inter alia, includes to safeguard and protect the common interests and support the legitimate causes of the Member States and coordinate and unify the efforts of the Member States in view of the challenges faced by the Islamic world in particular and the international community in general.⁵⁴

For attainment of above-mentioned objectives, the OIC decided to follow under mentioned principles:⁵⁵

- ✓ All Member States commit themselves to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
- ✓ Member States are sovereign, independent and equal in rights and obligations.
- ✓ All Member States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations.
- ✓ All Member States undertake to respect national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other Member States and shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others.
- ✓ All Member States undertake to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs as enshrined in the present Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law.

- ✓ As mentioned in the UN Charter, nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the Organization and its Organs to intervene in matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or related to it.

4.2.10 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

While adopting the original Charter of the OIC, in 1972, besides accepting total equality between its Member States, the OIC decided to be inspired and guided by the principles of respect of the right of self-determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States, respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each Member State, and settlement of any conflict by peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration.

At the time of adopting, revised Charter in 2008, the OIC, realizing the importance to “conflict resolution” in international affairs, in general, and among its Member States, in particular, and to promote peaceful co-existence, based on the principle of mutual respect for and legal equality of each Member States of the United Nations, gave much greater importance to this issue by adding a separate provision, (Chapter XV), pertaining to “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”. Article 27 of the Charter demands that the Member States, parties to any dispute, the continuance of which may be detrimental to the interests of the Islamic *Ummah* or may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, seek a solution by good offices, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. In this context good offices may include consultation with the Executive Committee and the Secretary General.⁵⁶ Whereas, Article 28 requires that the Organization may cooperate with other international and regional organizations with the objective of preserving international peace and security, and settling disputes through peaceful means.⁵⁷ Both the above-mentioned provisos of the Charter indicate the OIC’s clear desire that all disputes among its Member States (i.e. intra- state or inter-state conflicts among Islamic Countries) or the Members of the United Nations must be resolved / settled though peaceful means.

THE OIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The Muslim world is facing many conflicts, which include a number of “International Conflicts” as well. Among conflicts that are more conspicuous are two old and historic conflicts: the Arab-Israel (Palestine) Conflict and the Kashmir Dispute. In recent past, the Muslim world has witnessed many other conflicts such as Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, massacre of Bosnian Muslims, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Gulf War-1, Kosovo dispute, East Timor problem and US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, a political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, commonly known as “Arab Spring” and ongoing civil war in Syria has generated many shock waves in the Muslim World. Limited scope of this book does not allow detailed coverage of all these disputes and conflicts. However, brief account of some important conflicts, with greater emphasis on the Palestine problem and Kashmir dispute is discussed in this Chapter.

5.1 PALESTINE PROBLEM

No issue is of greater importance to the OIC than the Palestine Problem and the dispute related to Al- Aqsa Mosque. Indeed, this issue became the main cause of forming the OIC. The Palestine problem became an international issue towards the end of the First World War with the disintegration of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Palestine was among the several former Ottoman Arab territories which were placed under the administration of Great Britain under the Mandates System adopted by the League of Nations pursuant to the League’s Covenant (Article 22).¹ The British Government, through “Balfour Declaration”, in 1917, had expressed its support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. However, it did not render any administrative assistance or support for establishment of an independent state of Palestine as was envisioned objective of the Mandate. From the end of World War 1 to 1947, during

the years of the Palestine Mandate, a large-scale Jewish migration, mainly from Europe was allowed to take place, which altered the demographic and ethnic composition of Palestine vis-à-vis Arabs (both Muslims and Christians) and Jews. Palestinian demand for independence and resistance to Jewish migration led to a rebellion in 1937.² The end result was communal violence from both sides during and immediately after World War II. Many Jewish groups indulged in organized terrorist activities, which were aimed at intimidating the native population of Palestine and to force them to leave their homeland. Great Britain failed to resolve the problem and handed over the same, in much complicated and complexed form, to the United Nations.

After looking at various alternatives, the UN proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent States; one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized [Resolution 181 (II)] of 1947). One of the two states envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence as Israel. In 1948 War, it expanded to occupy 77 per cent of the territory of Palestine. Israel also occupied the larger part of Jerusalem. Over half of the indigenous Palestinian population fled or were expelled. Jordan and Egypt occupied the other parts of the territory assigned by the partition resolution to the Palestinian Arab State, which did not come into being.³

In 1967 War, Israel occupied the remaining territory of Palestine, until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). This included the remaining part of Jerusalem as well, which was subsequently annexed by Israel. The war brought about a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 called on Israel to withdraw from territories it had occupied in the 1967 conflict.⁴

In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, and to return to their homeland. The following year, the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The General Assembly conferred on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) the status of observer in the General Assembly and in other international conferences held under United Nations auspices.

5.1.1 Israeli Aggression

The international community, in general, and the Muslim World, in particular has made continuous efforts to resolve the issue of Palestine but no progress could be made due to aggressive attitude of Israel. Besides indiscriminate use of force against Palestinians, Israel has indulged in worst kind of socio-economic genocide by continuously expanding Jewish settlements, through forceful occupation of land, construction of barriers to restrict freedom of movement thus depriving the very basic right of existence to Palestinians. In September 1983, the International Conference on the Question of Palestine adopted the Geneva Declaration, which contained inter alia the following principles: the need to oppose and reject the establishment of settlements in the occupied territory and actions taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem, the right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, and the attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.⁵

Since the occupation of Palestine, various Jewish groups have perpetually used brutal force to terrorize Palestinian civilian population. Such practices have been adopted as a state policy by the Israeli Army and many other secret organizations to maximize state terrorism against unarmed and innocent people. Most of the times, Israeli government tries to defend or justify their heinous actions as measures of self-defence against Palestinian violence. Despite indiscriminate use of brutal forces by Israel, Palestinians have always resisted Israeli occupation. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the declared intention to eliminate the PLO. A cease-fire was arranged. PLO troops withdrew from Beirut and were transferred to neighbouring countries. Subsequently, a large-scale massacre of refugees took place in the camps of *Sabra* and *Shatila*.⁶ In December 1987, a mass uprising against the Israeli occupation began in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (the *intifada*). Methods used by the Israeli forces during the uprising resulted in mass injuries and heavy loss of life among the civilian Palestinian population.⁷ The resistance has continued since then. On 28 September 2000, Ariel Sharon, along with an escort of large number of Israeli police, visited *Masjid Al Aqsa* (Temple Mount Complex). The visit was aimed at gaining popular political support from Jews for the forthcoming national election in which Ariel Sharon was a candidate as Prime Minister. The visit became

highly controversial because Palestinians considered it as naked provocation and a direct disrespect to *Al-Haram Al-Sharif*, one of the three holiest places in Islam. The reaction was so violent and volatile that it turned into the second *intifada*. A massive loss of life, the reoccupation of territories under Palestinian self-rule, military incursions and extra judicial killings of suspected Palestinian militants, suicide attacks, rocket and mortar fire, and the destruction of property characterized the situation on the ground.⁸

5.1.2 Arab-Israel Peace Process

The United Nations has always supported the creation of two independent states to arrive at just and lasting peace between Arabs (Palestinians) and Israel. The Israel, with continuous economic, military and political support from the U S A, in particular, and other European countries, in general, has always rejected such proposals. Instead of opting for a just and fair solution of the dispute, Israel has adopted a policy of systemic genocide of the Palestinian people through brutal use of force and economic strangulation. During the process of resistance to perpetual Israeli atrocities, Palestinian groups, such as Palestine Liberation Organization, Al Fatah Movement and Hamas, have also resorted to use of force and violence in support of their freedom struggle. International community, apparently, has been continuously trying to find some workable solution of this dispute. Towards this end, number of conferences, meetings and negotiations have taken place. As part of these efforts, a Peace Conference on the Middle East was convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991, with the aim of achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on the UNSC resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) (the land for peace formula). A series of subsequent negotiations culminated in the mutual recognition between the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people. These efforts resulted in signing by the two parties of the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" in Washington on 13 September 1993, as well as the subsequent implementation agreements. The involvement of the United Nations has been essential to the peace process, both as the guardian of international legitimacy and in

the mobilization and provision of international assistance. In 2000 and 2001, Israelis and Palestinians held talks on a final status agreement, which proved inconclusive.⁹

In 2002, the UNSC adopted resolution 1397 affirming a vision of two states: Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders. In 2003, the Middle East Quartet (US, EU, Russia, and the UN) released a detailed “Roadmap” to a two-State solution, endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515. In 2005, Israel withdrew its settlers and troops from the Gaza Strip as part of its “Disengagement Plan”, while retaining effective control over its borders, seashore, and airspace. Meanwhile Israel began the construction of a West Bank separation wall, located within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which was ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2004.¹⁰ Despite International community’s stated desire to arrive at a possibly just and workable resolution of this conflict, no solution has yet been possible, primarily due to inflexible, offensive and aggressive stance adopted by Israel.

5.1.3 UN Membership of Palestine

Various Palestinian groups had started resistance movement, right from the beginning, against illegal occupation of their homeland by Jews. Palestinians considered that British Palestine Mandate authorities had encouraged the Jews, who during and immediately after the Second World War had started migrating from all over the world and had forced the Palestinian to leave their houses and farm lands. As a result of intimidation of 1948 and 1956 wars and forced expansion of Israel through military occupation of Palestine, some Palestinian factions started armed struggle as well to protect and preserve their rights. This struggle, in general, was supported by Muslims across the world but they were not in a position to stop Jewish aggression. Some governments of the Muslim countries provided political and diplomatic support to Palestine, especially while extending their support for Palestine cause at United Nations and other international forums.

In 1964, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established by the process initiated by the Arab League Summit held at Cairo. The Palestinian National Charter was adopted on May 28, 1964 at a meeting held in East Jerusalem. In May 1964, the Palestine National Council sent formal notification to the UN Secretary General regarding the establishment of the PLO and,

in October 1965, the Special Political Committee, at the request of some Arab states, decided that a PLO delegation be allowed to attend meetings of the Committee and present a statement, without implying recognition.¹¹ Though the Charter has been amended at different occasions since then, it was extensively amended, in 1968 in the wake of the 1967 Arab –Israel War. Article 1 of the Charter states: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.¹² Whereas Article 2 asserts: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.¹³ The Charter, in addition to clarifying the Palestinian Arab's right to their homeland, categorically declared that "armed struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine" and "Commando action constituted the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war." Articles 3, 9 and 10 of the Charter, explain these aspects as follows:

- **Article 3:** The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.¹⁴
- **Article 9:** Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.¹⁵
- **Article 10:** Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution.¹⁶

The political and armed struggle of the PLO was supported by many countries but it was generally opposed and rejected by Israel, United States, Britain and some other European countries.

On 10 December 1969, the [UN] General Assembly adopted resolution 2535 B (XXIV), which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. On 8 December 1970, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2672 C (XXV), which recognized that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the UN¹⁷

In 1993, PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace, accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and rejected "violence and terrorism"; in response, Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.¹⁸ On 14 October 1974, the General Assembly, through resolution 3210 (XXIX) recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and invited it to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the Question of Palestine in plenary meetings. Accordingly, Yasser Arafat addressed the Assembly on 13 November 1974.¹⁹ Through consistent diplomatic efforts of many countries, the PLO was finally granted observer status of the UN by General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) passed on 22 November 1974. The resolution, inter alia, invited the PLO to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer and invited the PLO to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer. The resolution also considered that the PLO is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations.²⁰ As a result of this decision, the PLO established a permanent observer mission at UN headquarters in New York and in Geneva.²¹

In 1988, the Palestine National Congress (PNC) renounced and abandoned some articles and fundamental objectives mentioned in the Charter, including use of the armed struggle to liberate Palestine. However, the Charter was not immediately amended. The same year, on 15 November, PLO unilaterally declared establishment of independent State of Palestine. Later, when PLO-Israel Accord was signed in September 1993, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat announced that those articles in the Palestine National Charter, which denied Israel's right to exist and contradicted the PLO's commitment to renounce armed struggle were no more operative.²² This was a great shift in PLO's policy that reflected total dependence on political struggle instead

of supporting the same through an armed struggle as well. It was, in fact, acceptance of fast changing international political realities in the wake of post Cold War developments.

As a result of Oslo Accord, signed by PLO and Israel, which was sponsored by United States and Russian Federation, Palestine National Authority (PNA) / Palestine Authority (PA) was established in May 1994 for administrative control of Palestinian territories of West Banks and Gaza. Gradually, some security aspects were also planned to be handed over to Palestine Authority. Chairman Yasser Arafat became the president of the Authority, which was dominated by nominated members, essentially those who had worked at PLO Headquarters at Tunis. Right from its inception, political tug of war started between various factions of PLO, which led to clashes between *Hamas*, an Islamic leaning groups essentially based in Gaza and *Al-Fatah*, the main leading group of PLO and power base of Chairman Yasser Arafat. The establishment of Palestine Authority shifted the centre of gravity of Palestine politics from exile based number of centres of powers, essentially based on Palestinian Diaspora to West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, such formal structure of government, though not as a formally recognized state by UN and other international community, may be at local level and in limited areas only, put enormous demand of leadership, management and statecraft on Palestine National Authority. PLO had been spending more of its energy on Palestine's freedom struggle and sufficient preparation for governance could not be expected from them. Resultantly, there were many complaints about over centralized decision-making process, mismanagement of financial resources and increasing corruption, abuse of power by Authority officials, and human rights violations by the security personnel, including some senior officials. Chairman Arafat was very well respected as a supreme leader of the freedom struggle. However, his dual role as Chairman of PLO and Chief Executive of PA had also become questionable. In November 2004, on Chairman Arafat's death, Mahmoud Abbas succeeded him as leader of PLO and Palestine Authority. With increasing internal and external challenges, especially with growing influence of more fundamentalist groups in Gaza, the task of managing the affairs of Palestine Authority in a smooth manner is certainly very difficult for current Palestinian leadership.

Since unilateral declaration of independence of Palestine in

1988, many a time PLO and later on Palestine Authority had tried to achieve the universal acceptance of their demand of sovereign state by the international community by seeking membership of the United Nations, which is to be ultimately granted by the UN Security Council. A Palestinian application, for full UN membership, submitted by Palestine Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas in September 2011 did not succeed because a committee reviewing it could not agree on the application. The Palestinians also preferred not to call for a Security Council vote after it became clear they do not have the nine votes needed to bring it before the council for a full vote.²³ Palestine withdrew its bid for full UN membership in 2011 after the US threatened to use its Security Council veto. The US and Israel withheld millions of dollars from the Palestinian Authority after Palestine sought and received full membership to the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on October 31, 2011.²⁴

During his visit to Tunis, on 11 November 2011, President Mahmoud reiterated his determination not to abandon his desire and efforts to seek full membership of the UN but continue striving for that. However, he did indicate that Palestine Authority might consider seeking a “Non Member Observer” status of the UN and clarifies that it was not their ultimate objective. While addressing a press conference, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad Malki said:

Our goal is to get full membership. The option to join the UN as non-member state is open for us and we can do it whenever we want. But our focus is to get full membership because this is what we want. If we decide to go for a non-member state, it will be for tactical reasons and to join UN agencies. But this will not be an alternative to efforts to ask the Security Council for full membership. We do not want to just be observers; we want to be full members.²⁵

Having failed to achieve the same in 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas while addressing the UN Assembly next year, on 27 November 2012, announced that he would seek Non-Member State Observer status for Palestine during the same year. He also criticized Israel for rejecting the internationally endorsed two-state solution.²⁶ Following excerpts of his speech at the General Assembly clearly indicate the Palestinian frustration, the grave nature of the situation and the urgency with which the

international community must react to help the Palestinian people in seeking their just right of freedom and independence:

In our endeavour, we do not seek to delegitimize an existing State, that is Israel, but rather to assert the State that must be realized, that is Palestine.

Despite all the complexities of the prevailing reality and all the frustrations that abound, we say before the international community: there is still a chance—maybe the last—to save the two-state solution and to salvage peace.

Despite our feelings of disappointment and loss of hope, we continue to sincerely extend our hands to the Israeli people to make peace. We realize that ultimately the two peoples must live and coexist, each in their respective State, in the Holy Land. Further, we realize that progress towards making peace is through negotiations between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel.

The international community, embodied in the United Nations, is required now more than ever to uphold its responsibilities. The Security Council is called upon to urgently adopt a resolution comprising the basis and foundations for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that would serve as a binding reference and guide for all if the vision of two-States, Israel and Palestine, is to survive and if peace is to prevail in the land of peace.

We are confident that the vast majority of the countries of the world support our endeavour aimed at salvaging the chances for a just peace.²⁷

After a long and an unending struggle, which has caused enormous loss of human lives on both sides but un-bearable atrocities, horrendous miseries and untold devastation for the Palestinian people for more than 65 years, the United Nations General Assembly, through its resolution, enhanced the status of Palestine from “Non-Member Entity Permanent Observer” to that of “Non-Member Observer State”. This status, hitherto, was enjoyed by Vatican only. On 29 November, 2012, at the General Assembly vote, more than 130 countries voted to upgrade Palestine to a non-member observer state of the United Nations, which was considered as a triumph for Palestinian diplomacy and a sharp rebuke to the United States and Israel.²⁸ This decision of the General Assembly was received very well by most of the

member states of the UN. Some experts of international media covered this occasion as under:

The United Nations General Assembly voted to upgrade the status of the Palestinians to that of a “non-member observer state”. It follows a failed bid to join the international body as a full member state in 2011 because of a lack of support in the UN Security Council.²⁹

UN vote makes Palestinians a non-member state similar to the Vatican. France, Spain among notable backers; Israel and US are notable opponents. New status could prove to be an important endorsement of Palestinian legitimacy, a year after failing to win United Nations recognition as an independent state, the Palestinian Authority achieved what is perhaps a largely symbolic though notable status change on Thursday by way of the UN General Assembly in New York. The body decided that their non-member observer entity status should instead be non-member observer state, similar to the Vatican, giving Palestinians a certain implicit degree of statehood recognition.³⁰

In addition to Israel, the United States has been a leading opponent of the Palestinian statehood bid at the UN.³¹ Therefore, Palestine Authority’s efforts were strongly opposed by the United States and the State of Israel. On announcement by Mahmoud Abbas to seek UN Non Member Observer status in General Assembly session of November 2012, Brett D. Schaefer and James Phillips of The Heritage Foundation asserted that “the US must oppose the Palestinian statehood effort at the UN.” On September 28, 2012, they wrote:

The Palestinians have announced their intent to use the United Nations once again to bolster their claims of statehood. Last year, the Obama Administration blocked their bid for full UN membership by threatening to use its Security Council veto. Now the Palestinians are seeking non-member state permanent observer status, which does not require Security Council approval. The Palestinians could then exploit UN recognition to demand membership in UN specialized agencies and organizations.

President Obama and congressional leaders agree that a unilateral assertion of Palestinian statehood absent a

negotiated peace treaty with Israel threatens United States and Israeli interests. The US should make it clear that this effort will have ramifications for Palestinian interests and those international organizations granting them membership by enforcing current financial prohibitions and informing the Palestinians that this path will lead the US to sharply reduce or eliminate funding for the Palestinians and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).³²

After the vote, Israel and the United States criticized the decision, with US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice calling it “unfortunate and counterproductive,” as well as placing “further obstacles in the path of peace”.³³ On 30 November, CNN, New York reported: The United Nations General Assembly on Thursday endorsed an upgraded UN status for the Palestinian Authority, despite intense opposition from the United States and Israel. The resolution elevates their status from “non-member observer entity” to “non-member observer state”, the same category as the Vatican, which Palestinians hope will provide new leverage in their dealings with Israel.³⁴ The Time of Israel wrote “After UN status upgrade, Palestinians seek to join other international organizations” with following comments:

Israel attempting to block move by pressuring Washington, host countries; Foreign Ministry memo reportedly warns EU will seek to impose Palestinian statehood, bypassing negotiations.

In the wake of its successful November UN status upgrade bid, the Palestinian Authority is now seeking to join other international organizations. The Palestinians have applied to join number of organizations including the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Israel’s Foreign Ministry was reportedly attempting to block the Palestinian’s efforts via its ambassadors in countries where the organizations’ headquarters are located. Israeli diplomats have already sent requests to the organizations not to accept the Palestinians into their ranks, explaining that such a move would have a negative effect on relations with Israel and would greatly harm the peace process.

The main challenge facing the Palestinians is overcoming

the US influence on the organizations. Current US law prohibits contributions to any UN body granting membership to the PLO or any other organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood.³⁵

5.2 PALESTINE PROBLEM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

The Palestine conflict and status of Jerusalem has been of great concern and importance to the whole Muslim world. Unfortunately, in the early 20th Century, when seeds of Jewish state were being sown, most the Muslim world was either under foreign occupation or was too weak, politically and militarily, to resist such international moves. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and abolition of Caliphate (*Khilafat*), there was no central authority, which could protect the common interests of Muslims in the changing world. Most of the Muslim world had been colonized and under such circumstances, Muslims lacked the political power to resist the Jewish migration and forceful occupation of Arab lands. However, Palestinians and Muslims all over the globe condemned illegal occupation of Palestine by the Jews. In post-World War II period, many Muslim states became independent and gradually developed their political, economic and military power. Many of them, even today, are just nominally independent because most of them are still either dependent on their former colonial rulers or are too weak to adopt independent foreign policies. Despite these shortcomings, Muslim countries have demonstrated solidarity against Jewish occupation of Palestine and have always condemned Zionist expansionistic designs in the Middle East. Besides providing political and diplomatic support to their Palestinian Muslim brethren at all international forums, many Muslim countries have offered humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, who are facing Jewish atrocities of worst kind in the human history.

The very inception of the OIC is directly connected with the issue of Palestine. According to Mehdi, the incident of the arson at *Masjid Al-Aqsa* (August 21, 1969) and military occupation of Jerusalem by Israel was perceived as an act of aggression against all Muslims throughout the world.³⁶ The issues pertaining to the independence and sovereignty of Palestine and liberation of Jerusalem were given special importance while adopting the

OIC Charter of 1972. Article II of the Charter, inter alia, required the OIC to coordinate efforts for the safeguarding of the holy places and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, and to help them regain their rights and liberate their land.³⁷

While adopting revised Charter in 2008, the OIC re-affirmed its commitment to the Palestinian cause. The preamble of the Charter, inter alia, states the OIC determination to support the struggle of the Palestinian people, who are presently under foreign occupation, and to empower them to attain their inalienable rights, including the right to self-determination, and to establish their sovereign state with *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* as its capital.³⁸ The Objectives of the OIC Charter also aim at supporting and empowering the Palestinian people to establish their sovereign State with *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* as its capital.³⁹ For attaining this objective, the Organization, amongst other Standing Committees, has formed Al Quads Committee.⁴⁰

The OIC's intent and desire to play active role in resolution of Palestine dispute is quite evident from numerous resolutions adopted by the OIC in its Foreign Ministers' meetings and Summit Conferences. Since its inception, the OIC has largely been occupied with the deteriorating military and political conditions in the Middle East . . . More or less all of the OIC deliberations had been directed so far towards the Middle East.⁴¹ Through Dr Mehdi feels that the OIC has remained a weak member within the international system⁴² he states that, by 1978, the OIC had started asserting itself.⁴³ Notwithstanding the OIC's desire to play an active role in this issue, the fact remains that the OIC could neither liberate the Palestine from Jewish occupation nor could do much to stop the further Zionist expansion. It did not take any practical step except making rhetoric, repeatedly passing well-worded resolutions and issuing lofty statements, which has not helped much improve the condition of Palestinians. Israel disregarded the OIC's rhetoric and continued to violate its resolutions with visible contempt.

Unfortunately, the Muslim world and the OIC did not react in a manner, which could force or deter Israel to stop its aggression and expansion, primarily because of lack of unity and political will. The Eleventh Conference of the Foreign Ministers, held in 1980, decided to set up the Jerusalem Trust Fund for providing consistent income in support of Palestinian struggle for self-determination.⁴⁴ The Conference called for the urgent need to liberate Jerusalem and denounced the establishment of Israeli settlements as Judaisation policy.⁴⁵ All member states were asked

by the OIC to sever all kind of relations with any country that would support the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem or recognize the city as the Israeli capital or establish diplomatic missions in the Holy City.⁴⁶ Since then, many sessions of the Council of the Foreign Ministers and Islamic Summit have taken place. Many resolutions have been passed but nothing concrete has happened in reality, as the OIC lacks the ability to implement its demands and resolutions.

5.2.1 Islamic Summit Conference

Various issues pertaining to "The Palestinian Question and the Situation in the Middle East" have always been of crucial importance in each session of the Islamic Summit Conference. Some sessions were especially convened for Palestine and Arab-Israel dispute exclusively. A closer examination of all the Communiqués and Declarations, issued at end of each session, indicates too much of repetitive rhetoric. Many resolutions and communiqués are quite identical. However, some important decisions were made in each session. Notwithstanding the OIC's ability to ensure implementation of its decisions, salient aspects are mentioned here.

After the heinous act of arson in *Masjid Al-Aqsa* and the resultant situation in the Middle East, the Heads of States and Governments and representatives of the Muslim countries held their first summit conference on 22-25 September 1969, in Rabat, which paved the way for establishing the OIC. The "Declaration of the Summit Conference" stated that the grievous event of 21st August 1969 had plunged over six hundred million followers of Islam throughout the world into the deepest anguish. It urged all governments, particularly those of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to take into account the deep attachment of the followers of Islam to Jerusalem and the solemn resolve of their governments to strive for its liberation. They also appealed to all members of the International community, and more particularly to the great powers . . . to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli military forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the war of June 1967.⁴⁷ The Second Islamic Summit Conference was held on 22-24 February 1974, at Lahore, Pakistan. The "Declaration of Lahore" demanded that full and effective support should be given to the Arab countries to recover all their occupied lands. It declared that the international community, and particularly those States which sponsored the

partition of Palestine in 1947, bear the heavy responsibility to redress the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian people. The Declaration also stated that the Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem was a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for lasting peace in the Middle East.⁴⁸ While adopting Resolution 1/2/-IS, The Conference requested all States to support, by all means, the people of Palestine in their struggle against Zionist, racist and settlers colonization and for the restoration of their full national rights . . .⁴⁹

The Third Islamic Summit Conference was held at Makkah from 25-28 January 1981. The Summit took crucially important decisions in economic, political and military spheres in support of Palestine. A review of Makkah Declaration and final communiqué of Third Islamic Summit Conference indicates a clear shift in the OIC's approach towards playing more effective role in international conflict resolution. Makkah Declaration confirmed the OIC's commitment to liberate Jerusalem and to make it the capital of Palestinian State. It invited all states to observe the United Nations' resolutions which had imposed ban on dealing with the Israeli occupation authorities in declaring Jerusalem as the united capital of the "Zionist entity". The Conference also decided to utilize all economic capacities and natural resources of Islamic States to undermine the Israeli economy, to block the flow of financial, economic and political support to Israel, to change international political positions in favour of the Palestinian people, and to support the Palestine Liberation Organization. It also asked the Islamic States to utilize all their military political and economic capacities and natural resources, including oil, as an effective instrument, to support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. Unfortunately, this decision was never implemented due to diverging national interests of various member states. The Conference affirmed the commitment to the liberation of all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the rejection of any situation that may prejudice Arab sovereignty over *Al Quds Al-Sharif*, and inadmissibility of any unilateral solution to the issue of Palestine or the issue of the occupied Arab territories.⁵⁰

Deliberations and the decisions of this Conference are considered as a milestone in describing the OIC's intentions and aspirations about Palestine. The OIC, for the first time adopted a resolution recommending the use of military potential of all the Islamic States against continued Israeli policies of aggression and occupation.⁵¹ According to Mehdi, the Summit seemed

to be extending its military as well economic strategy into a more combatative orientation and showed visible signs of its willingness to take forceful measures with a view to having a larger impact and more effective change in the global balance of power against Israel.⁵² Resolution No. 1/3-P (IS), adopted by the Conference was called "The Islamic Program of Action against the Zionist Enemy."⁵³

The Fourth Summit Conference of the OIC was held at Rabat from 16 to 19 January 1984. Besides reaffirming its commitment to the principles on which the solution of the Palestine and the Middle East should be based, the Conference endorsed the Arab Peace Plan adopted by the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Fez Morocco. The Conference urged Member States to make generous donations to cover the capital of the *Al-Quds* Fund and that of its Endowment.⁵⁴

The Fifth Islamic Summit was held in Kuwait from 26 to 29 January 1987. The Summit adopted a resolution pertaining to Palestine and the Middle East, which demanded unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist enemy from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. It also demanded establishment of an independent Palestinian State on its national soil, with *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* as its capital under the leadership of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people.⁵⁵ The Conference emphasized that no solution could be comprehensive, just and acceptable, unless the PLO participates in, as an equal and independent party, with other parties concerned, in its establishment.⁵⁶ The Conference also called upon Member States and their people not to establish political, economic, cultural, military relations, directly or indirectly, with the Zionist enemy and demanded that Member States, which were still maintaining any form of relations, at any level, with the Zionist entity, should sever such relations forthwith and without delay.⁵⁷

The Sixth Islamic Summit was held in Dakar from 9 to 11 December 1991. The Final Communiqué of the Conference reaffirmed that the Palestine Question was the prime cause for Muslims and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also invited all States to refuse to shift and relocate their embassies and missions in the City of *Al-Qudas Al-Sharif*, thus express their opposition to the annexation of the Holy City by Israel.

The Seventh Islamic Summit was held in Casablanca from 13 to 15 December 1994. The Conference called upon Member States

to continue supporting the PLO and the Palestinian National Authority.⁵⁸ It also called on the international community and the UNSC to compel Israel to comply with UN resolutions, particularly Security Council Resolution 487 (1981).⁵⁹ On conclusion of the Seventh Summit, Casablanca Declaration announced Islamic *Ummah's* commitment to make every effort to strengthen solidarity and join forces to defend all Islamic causes and protect the sanctity of Islam: to call for wisdom, good counsel and conciliatory dialogue.⁶⁰

The Eighth Islamic Summit Conference was held at Tehran from 9 to 11 December 1997. The session was named "Session of Dignity, Dialogue, and Participation." The Conference called for Israel to respect and implement its commitments, pledges, and agreements concluded through the peace process in accordance with the principles based on Madrid Conference pursuant to UN resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425, and the land-for-peace formula.⁶¹ The Conference asked the Islamic States to reconsider their relations with Israel by closing missions and bureaus until Israel completes its withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and fulfils the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.⁶² This demand clearly indicates that many Member States had not acted upon the decisions made in previous OIC Summit Conferences. It also shows the lack of OIC's ability to enforce its decision on member states.

The Conference also called on the UN Security Council to revive the International Committee for supervising and monitoring the ban on settlements in Al-Qudas and the other occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. The Conference asked the United Nations and other International Organizations to force Israel to release the detainees, return the deportees, and put an end to the collective punishments, as well as to the operations of confiscation of land and properties and demolition of houses, and to desist from any acts endangering life and environment in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including *Al-Quds Al-Sharif*.⁶³

The Ninth Islamic Summit Conference was held in Doha from 12-13 November 2000. The Muslim leaders, besides offering their condolences to the Palestinian people and leadership on their righteous martyrs, hailed the heroic Intifada of the Palestinian people. It called for an end to the Israeli occupation and the establishment of freedom, sovereignty and independence of the steadfast Palestinian people and urged all Member States to continue strengthening their solidarity with the Palestinian people,

support its just and legitimate struggle and use all the resources of the Islamic *Ummah* to achieve all its national objectives.⁶⁴

It also requested the UNSC to set up an International Commission of Enquiry to investigate the massacres perpetrated by Israel which resulted in the death of over 200 martyrs and over ten thousand injured persons and to constitute an International Criminal Tribunal, in conformity with international law, to prosecute the Israeli war criminals who have perpetrated these savage massacres.⁶⁵ The Conference also urged the international community to shoulder its responsibility regarding ensuring necessary international protection of the Palestinian people in *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* and the rest of the Palestinian territory.⁶⁶

As a significant development, the OIC called on all states in the world to recognize the State of Palestine with *Al-Qudas* as its capital upon its proclamation in the Palestinian territories and provide the Palestinian people with all forms of assistance so that they could exercise their sovereignty on their soil. The Conference also urged all states to extend their support to the State of Palestine to enable it to gain full membership in the United Nations.⁶⁷ This demand was a fundamental change in OIC's approach towards presenting the Palestine issue to the world.

The Tenth Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Knowledge and Morality for the Progress of *Ummah*) was held on 16-17 October 2003 in Putrajaya. Final Communiqué of the Conference called on the international Quartet to work studiously to reach a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East in implementation of the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy, the Madrid Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the implementation of the Roadmap as published. It urged the Security Council to dispatch international disengagement forces between Palestinians and Israelis to guarantee stability and calm in the region and to monitor the implementation of the two sides' commitments as contained in the Roadmap. The Conference strongly condemned the threats of the Israeli government against the democratically elected President Yasser Arafat, and appealed to the international community to force Israel to abide by the UNGA resolution ES10/12 of 19/9/2003.

The Conference also requested the international community to compel Israel to end the construction of-and remove-the apartheid wall that encroaches upon the Palestinian land; turns it into Bantustans; imposes unjust political realities and further deteriorates conditions in the region. The Conference asked the

international community to ensure Israeli occupation force's withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the lifting of the Israeli siege imposed on the Palestinian people and leadership, the removal of all blockades and barriers imposed on Palestinian crossings, cities, villages and refugee camps, and the release of all Palestinians and Arabs detained in Israeli prisons. The Conference also requested the UNSC to remove Israeli settlements in accordance with UNSC resolution 465 of 1980, and to restore the Committee established by virtue of UNSC resolution 446 of 1979 to monitor the situation of settlement in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the City of *Al-Quds*.⁶⁸

Third Extra Ordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference was held in *Makkah-tul-Mukarramah*, on 7-8 December 2005. The Conference reiterated working hand-in-hand with the international community to cease and dismantle settlements in the occupied territories. It also called for a halt in the building of the Separation Wall and its demolition in accordance with the Opinion of the International Court of Justice.⁶⁹ The Secretary General of the OIC urged that the Palestinian National Authority should be supported in their efforts to negotiate for the rights of the Palestinian people. He asked all Muslim States to build Palestinian economic institutions, establish a university at Al-Aqsa, re-open the Gaza airport and seaport and to create Islamic *Waqfs* to protect religious and cultural sites in Palestine.⁷⁰

During the 11th Islamic Summit, held in Dakar on 13-14 March, 2008, the Conference condemned all illegal and provocative measures carried out by Israel with the intention of altering the Holy City's legal status and demographic composition and character, in particular Israel's illegal colonization practices, including, inter alia, its settlement activities and its construction of the Wall in and around the City in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.⁷¹

The Final Communiqué of 4th Extraordinary Islamic Solidarity Summit held at *Makkah*, on 14-15 August 2012, also did not contain more than mutual praises for some kings and Heads of Governments and usual rhetoric that the issue of Palestine is the central issue of the Islamic World.⁷² The Conference also commended the decision of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), to approve Palestine's request for accession to and full membership in UNESCO.⁷³

5.2.2 Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers

Until January 2013, thirty-nine sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers / Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers have been held. The issue of Palestine has been always of top priority for discussion in almost every session. For brevity and focus, only last twelve sessions of Council of the Foreign Ministers held since 2001 are briefly discussed here.

The 28th Session of the Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers (ICFM) was held in Bamako, Mali from 25 to 27 June 2001. The Conference, in addition to hailing the uprising of the Palestinian people and the Intifada, invited the OIC Member States to keep on fostering their solidarity with the Palestinian people for supporting their just and legitimate struggle. It also called on the Islamic *Ummah* to mobilize all its resources to help them achieve their national goals and to back the Palestinian National Authority. It called upon the UN Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities in ensuring necessary international protection of the Palestinian people and condemned Israel's expansionist settlement policy.⁷⁴

The 10th Emergency Meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers was held in Doha, on December 10, 2001. The Foreign Ministers focused on the deteriorating situation as a consequence of the Israeli military strikes against the Palestinian people. The Meeting called upon the UN Security Council to do its duty to stop Israel from its aggressive acts against Palestine and to send international observers as soon as possible to protect the safety of the Palestinian people; urging the US, Russia and the European Union to intervene immediately to stop the Israeli military actions.⁷⁵

The 29th Session of the ICFM held in Khartoum from 25 to 27 June 2002, was called "Session of Solidarity and Dialogue." The Conference hailed with great pride the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and its valiant uprising against the Israeli occupation forces. It reaffirmed its continuing political, material, and moral support, backing, and endorsement of the Palestinian people.⁷⁶ Moreover, the Conference stressed the need for the establishment of the independent Palestinian State with *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* as its capital. It also stressed the need to implement the international resolutions on the cause of Palestine, particularly UNSC resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002), 1402 (2002), and 1403 (2002). It also called on the UNSC to assume

its responsibilities by intervening immediately to put an end to the Israeli aggression and prevent the Israeli Government from pursuing its aggressive designs aimed at undermining the Palestinian National Authority.

Foreign Ministers of the OIC member states urged the international community and the United Nations to take immediate action to put an end to the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people and compel Israel to stop building the racist fence, lift the internal and external blockades, remove all barricades around the Palestinian cities, villages, and camps, put an end to all Israeli inhuman measures and practices against the Palestinian people, release all Palestinian detainees from Israeli prisons, provide international security for the Palestinian people against Israeli acts of aggression and allow the supply of food and medical products to Palestinian territories and release the funds of the Palestinian Authority seized by Israel.⁷⁷

The Foreign Ministers, during the 30th Session of the ICFM, held in Tehran, from 28-30 May 2003, which was called "Session of Unity and Dignity" stressed the need for the establishment of the independent Palestinian State with *Al-Qudas Al-Sharif* as its capital and asked for implementation of all the international resolutions on the cause of Palestine. They also called on the member states to enforce the Islamic boycott against Israel and to take steps to incorporate the legislations and regulations governing the said boycott into their existing national legislations.⁷⁸

The 31st Session of the ICFM, entitled "Session of Progress and Global Harmony" was held in Istanbul on 14 - 16 June 2004. The Conference adopted a resolution on "the commitment to the implementation of principles and provisions of the Islamic boycott of Israel." The Conference also stressed the need for an end to Israel's occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967 and called for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces. It also commended the valiant Palestinian people and their legitimate leadership headed by the gallant President Yasser Arafat against Israeli aggression and called for an immediate end to the siege imposed on the Palestinian people and President Yasser Arafat.⁷⁹ The Conference also called on the UN Security Council to deploy UN peacekeeping forces in the occupied Palestinian territories in order to ensure international protection of the Palestinian people and their holy places.⁸⁰

The 32nd Session of the ICFM held in Sana from 28 to 30 June

2005 was entitled as “Session of Integration and Development.” Besides routine reiteration of supporting the Palestine Cause, the Conference constituted an Islamic Ministerial Committee to carry out contact with the European Union, USA, the Russian Federation, the UN Secretary General, the Members of the Security Council and the Vatican in order to state the danger which threatens the holy city and to seek implementation of the UN resolutions on the occupied city of *Al-Quds*.⁸¹

The 33rd Session of the ICFM, entitled “Session of Harmony of Rights, Freedom and Justice”, was held in Baku, on 19-21 June 2006. The Conference adopted similar resolutions as had become a practice in vogue. The emphasis remained on reiterating centrality of the cause of *Al-Quds Al-Sharif* in Islamic World. Besides affirming support for the Palestinian people, the Conference called upon the Member States to commemorate the criminal attempt to burn down the blessed *Al-Aqsa* Mosque and to mark 21 August of every year as the Day of Islamic Solidarity with *Al-Quds* and Palestine.⁸²

The 34th Session of the ICFM, entitled “Session of Peace, Progress and Harmony” was held in Islamabad from 15 to 17 May 2007. While affirming the necessity of a just solution to the Palestine cause, on the basis of international law and establishing an independent Palestine state, the Conference strongly condemned Israel for its persistent aggression on Islamic and Christian holy places.⁸³

The 35th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) was held in Kampala from 18 to 20 June 2008, which was entitled as “Session of Prosperity and Development.” The Kampala Declaration, issued after the Session, reiterated the centrality of the cause of Palestine and *Al-Quds* for the *Ummah* and reaffirmed its support for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israel Conflict based on two State solutions.⁸⁴

The 36th Session of the CFM was held in Damascus from 23 to 25 May 2009. It was entitled as “Session of Enhancing Islamic Solidarity”. The Damascus Declaration said following about Palestine issue:

Our Organization was basically established to defend *Al-Quds Al-Sharif*, which is today facing a critical situation that threatens to obliterate its spiritual character and historical diversity. Added to that are the construction of a racist separation wall

in the West Bank, the inhuman blockade imposed on Gaza, the intensification of land grabbing and settlement building. All of this requires us all not to compensate Israel over its crimes but to ensure that any development in relations – if any exist at all – is tied to the concrete expression of Israel's commitment to just and comprehensive peace, which would guarantee the restoration of legitimate national rights and withdrawal from occupied lands in Palestine, Golan and Southern Lebanon.⁸⁵

The 37th Session of the CFM (Session of Shared Vision of a More Secure and Prosperous Islamic World) was held in Dushanbe from 18-20 May, 2010. Through its Resolution No.1/37-IBO on "The Islamic Office for the Boycott of Israel", the CFM observed, the existing cooperation and coordination between the Islamic Office for the Boycott of Israel at the OIC General Secretariat and the Arab Office for the Boycott of Israel at the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, for the purpose of achieving optimal implementation of the principles and provisions of the Boycott of Israel.⁸⁶ It also stressed the support to the Office for the Boycott of Israel to enable it to perform its duties and tasks aimed at increasing the efficiency of the boycott of Israel in Islamic States.⁸⁷ Through another resolution (Resolution No. 1/37-Pal) on "The Cause of Palestine," the CFM condemned the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, expressed its grave concern over the deteriorating social and economic conditions and the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, caused by the Israeli aggression, continued blockade and other illegal measures against the Palestinian people in the Strip and called on the international community to pressure Israel, the occupying power, to open its entire borders and immediately end its blockade and collective punishment of the Palestinian people in Gaza.⁸⁸

The 38th Session of the CFM (Session of Peace, Cooperation and Development) held at Astana on 28–30 June 2011 also condemned the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip and its attendant war crimes, massive violations of human rights and international law. It expressed grave concern over the deteriorating social and economic conditions and the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, caused by the aggression, continued Israeli blockade and other illegal measures against the Palestinian people in the Strip, and called on the international community to pressure

Israel, the occupying power, to immediately end its blockade and collective punishment of the Palestinian people in Gaza.⁸⁹

The 39th Session of the CFM (Session of Solidarity for Sustainable Development), held in Djibouti, 15-17 November 2012 once again condemned the persistence of Israel, the occupying authority, in systematic violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people, including violations resulting from use of excessive force and military operations, which led to the death and injury of Palestinian citizens.⁹⁰ It expressed grave concern over the deteriorating social and economic conditions and the worsening humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem and particularly in the Gaza Strip due to continued aggression and Israeli blockade and other illegal measures against the Palestinian people.⁹¹

The Islamic Summit during its Third Summit Conference (25-28 January 1981) went to the last limit of declaring *Jihad* in support of Palestine and to liberate Jerusalem from Zionist occupation. The resolution adopted for the purpose said:

The Kings, Emirs, and Heads of State of Islamic countries have agreed to declare holy *Jihad* for salvaging *Al-Quds Al-Sharif*, supporting the Palestinian people and bringing about Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. In their resolve to launch *Jihad*, the Islamic states have made it clear that *Jihad* has its Islamic concept that permits no misinterpretations or misunderstandings. They have also agreed that the practical measures to put *Jihad* into effect would be taken in accordance with the Islamic concept of *Jihad* and in continuous consultation among themselves.⁹²

5.2.3 Palestine—The End State

Notwithstanding innumerable resolutions passed by the OIC with regard to the basic rights of the Palestinian people, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to pre-1967 borders, halting of further expansion of settlement and destruction of all illegal settlements, accepting two-state solution, and right of return to Palestinian refugees to their homes, no concrete results in the realm of reality have been seen so far. No progress is likely to happen in near future as well because the OIC lacks the capability; the political will, the diplomatic skills, the economic and military wherewithal to realize its just and fair demands. It also lacks the solidarity

and determination to translate its desires, which, at present, are nothing more than a wish or a dream—only rhetoric. End result of the lack of action (or lack of ability to act) on the part of the international community, in general, and the OIC, in particular is summarized below:

- ✓ In November 1948, total area of the State of Israel was 7993 sq miles only. In June 1967, an area of approximately 27000 sq miles was occupied, which included East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights and Sinai. Except Sinai, which was returned to Egypt as a result of Camp David Accord, all other areas are still occupied by Israeli. As time passes, not only the illegal occupation continues and keeps on expanding, Israeli atrocities have increased manifold, in the worst possible way, adding enormous miseries to the daily life of Palestinian people.
- ✓ Israeli forces carry out air strikes, tank assaults, and artillery shelling at their will and destroy as many homes as they like, without any fear of retaliation from any corner of the world. They have constructed walls, put barriers, stopped free movement of Palestinians and have choked their economic activities to make their lives miserable. No one cares for irreparable human and material loss suffered by the Palestinians.
- ✓ Despite hue and cry from all over the world and numerous resolutions passed by the UN and the OIC, Israeli Government continues to encourage expansion of existing settlements and further construction of new settlements by evicting Palestinian people.
- ✓ Life in Gaza, in particular, has suffered very badly. In January 2009, Israeli forces carried out extremely cruel military incursion and invasion against unarmed and besieged population of Gaza, which was called “Operation Cast Lead”. The Operation resulted in the death of almost 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 400 children. According to the UN estimate, some 6,400 homes were destroyed or severely damaged during the Israeli Offensive, in which white phosphorous was used against the civilian population. This war of aggression

was premeditated genocide against the people of Gaza.⁹³ Israeli Defence Forces have continually perpetrated aggression against Gaza in one form or the other to make the lives of Palestinian extremely difficult. In November 2012, Israel launched an air assault by using indiscriminate missile attack on Gaza, which resulted in loss of around 200 people, including many innocent children. Many more were injured. A cease-fire was, eventually, reached through diplomatic intervention of Egypt and the United States.

- ✓ Palestinian faces perpetual threat of ever-increasing settlement and virtual genocide of Palestinian, without any substantive effort by the Muslim World or the international community to stop the same. It looks that Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, has been forced to make a compromise on the issue, gradually shifting the stance from total freezing of settlements to a temporary halt. With regard to re-starting peace negotiations, which were discontinued due to arrogant behaviour of Israel, he said, we will not accept the re-launching of negotiations without a complete halt to settlement, including *Al Qudas*, for a fixed period.⁹⁴ The media interpreted this as an acceptance of “some kind of temporary settlement freeze.”⁹⁵

5.2.4 International Humanitarian Aid Workers in Palestine

Israel has been committing untold brutalities against the innocent Palestinians. Now she has adopted equally aggressive behaviour towards neutral humanitarian assistance workers and international Non-Governmental Organizations, who try to provide some relief to the affected Palestinians. The blatant aggression by Israel against the international ships, carrying humanitarian aid, on 31 May 2010, in Mediterranean Sea, near Gaza has shocked the whole world. Israeli navy commandos stormed a Gaza-bound aid flotilla on Monday [31 May 2010], killing at least nine non-Palestinian activists in pre-dawn raid that sparked global outrage and plunged the Jewish state into a diplomatic crisis.⁹⁶ At least twenty were injured and more than eighty peace activists were detained. Eventually all six ships were forcibly raided and captured by Israeli Navy. Nineteen

people died, more than six hundred were detained and fifty were deported. Immediate world reaction is summarized below:

- ✓ Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Israel as condemnations erupted across Europe and the Arab World over Israeli deadly raid.⁹⁷
- ✓ European nations, as well as the United Nations and Turkey, voiced shock and outrage at the bloody end of the international campaigners, bid to break Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip.⁹⁸
- ✓ Turkey demanded that the United States condemn the botched Israeli raid on an aid flotilla that ended with Israeli soldiers killing nine activists.⁹⁹
- ✓ Spontaneous protests erupted across Europe and the Middle East, as US President Barack Obama expressed "deep regret" over the massacre.¹⁰⁰
- ✓ The assault will divide opinion in the United States, Israel's staunchest and most powerful ally.¹⁰¹
- ✓ Russia joined the European Union in demanding that Israel should open its borders into the Gaza Strip, and Egypt said it will allow medical and aid shipments into the enclave.¹⁰²
- ✓ The United Nations Security Council condemned acts, which resulted in the deaths while Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the Israeli raid was an act of "despicable recklessness".¹⁰³
- ✓ The United Nations Security Council called for an impartial investigation into Israel's botched assault on a flotilla carrying aid supplies to the Gaza Strip, but it stopped short of an outright condemnation of the attack.¹⁰⁴
- ✓ The United Nations Security Council called for an investigation of Israel's deadly commando raid on ships taking humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and condemned the acts that resulted in the loss of at least nine lives.¹⁰⁵ The United States blocked demands at the UN Security Council for an international inquiry into Israel's assault on the Turkish ship carrying aid to Gaza

that left nine pro-Palestinian activists dead.¹⁰⁶

- ✓ Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on the international community not to accept an independent Israeli investigation into the lethal operation against the “Freedom Flotilla” to Gaza. He called the IDF action a “massacre” and warned Israel not to test Turkey’s patience.¹⁰⁷
- ✓ National Interest *online*, quoting Haaretz wrote that Meir Dagan, the head of the Mossad, told the Knesset, “Israel is gradually turning from an asset to the United States to a burden.”¹⁰⁸
- ✓ Strongly condemning Israel’s actions against the humanitarian flotilla bound for the Gaza Strip, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to dispatch an independent, international probe into the violations of international law resulting from the incident. Italy, the Netherlands and the United States voted against the resolution, which also called on Israel to immediately lift the blockade on Gaza. Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, who also called for a prompt probe, appealed for the immediate release of those detained.¹⁰⁹
- ✓ UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, condemned Israel’s use of military force as disproportionate and said that “the blockade lies at the heart of so many problems plaguing the Israel-Palestine situation, as does the impression that Israeli government treats international law with perpetual disdain”.¹¹⁰

5.3 KASHMIR DISPUTE

Another dispute, which is of great concern for the OIC, is the unresolved issue of Kashmir—a dispute between Pakistan and India. Kashmir had generally enjoyed the status of an autonomous region throughout its history. In the 17th and the 18th Centuries, Muslim rulers of India mostly ruled over Kashmir. In 1846, the British, after defeating the Sikhs, had sold Kashmir, which was until then part of the Sikh empire, to Gulab Singh of Jammu for

Rupees 7.5 million. Gulab Singh died in 1857 and was replaced by Rambir Singh (1857-1885). Two other Maharajas, Partab Singh (1885-1925) and Hari Singh (1925-1949) ruled in succession.¹¹¹ After the Great Rebellion (the War of Independence) of 1857 in India, the British Government had taken over the direct control of India from East India Company. Kashmir was allowed to retain its status of "Princely State" under suzerainty of the British Crown.

In 1947, the British Government decided to grant independence to Indian Subcontinent, creating two independent states: India and Pakistan. The rulers of princely states were given the choice to freely accede to either India or Pakistan, or to remain independent. They were, however, advised to accede to the contiguous dominion, taking into consideration the geographical and ethnic issues.¹¹² Mountbatten convened a conference of India's princes on July 25 [1947], explaining that by August 15 [1947], when British paramountcy would cease, they should have to accede either to India or Pakistan, as geographic proximity dictated.¹¹³ Maharaja Hari Singh remained indecisive and reluctant to accede to either of the newly born states as he himself was a Hindu but majority of the population of Jammu and Kashmir was Muslim. The Kashmir Legislative Assembly had already passed a resolution of State's accession with Pakistan. Hari Singh signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan.¹¹⁴ In fact the Maharaja of Kashmir had sent a telegram asking for a Stand Still Agreement on August 12, 1947 to both the dominions, India and Pakistan. Pakistan immediately accepted the agreement on 15 August through a telegraphic communication. India neither accepted nor rejected the agreement.¹¹⁵ Due to Maharaja's reluctance to join Pakistan, the local Muslim majority revolted against their ruler for not respecting their desire to join Pakistan. Maharaja, threatened by this situation asked for help from India. Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, asked Maharaja of Kashmir to accede to India if he wished to be supported militarily to suppress the uprising. On 26 October, [1947], Hari Singh formally acceded to India and appealed for military support to defend Srinagar. In Pakistan's view, the people of Kashmir were demanding to join Pakistan. The Maharaja, fearing tribal warfare, eventually gave way to the Indian pressure and agreed to join India. As claimed by India, the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October 1947. Mountbatten made it clear that the State would only be incorporated into the Indian Union after a reference had been made to the people of Kashmir.¹¹⁶ The Indian Army was air

lifted into Srinagar. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan wanted to dispatch Pakistan military contingent to stop Indian military invasion of Kashmir but General Gracey, the then Commander-in-Chief, showed his reluctance to do so without prior approval of his Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Auchinleck. Therefore, Pakistan had no option but to accept the illegal invasion and forceful occupation by Indian Army. However, the fighting in Kashmir raged on until the state's *de facto* partition was affected. No plebiscite was ever held in Kashmir as a whole.¹¹⁷

5.3.1 Kashmir Dispute at the United Nations

India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations on January 1, 1948 and lodged a complaint under Article 35 (Chapter VI) of the UN Charter, charging Pakistan with "aiding and abetting" the Pakistani tribal invasion in Jammu and Kashmir. India claimed that all the territories of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir legally belonged to her by virtue of the treaty of accession. Pakistan denied having aided the raiders and accused India of annexing Kashmir. After hearing Indian and Pakistani representatives, the UNSC passed its first resolution (Resolution 38) on Kashmir Conflict on January 17, 1948, calling India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and ease tensions. Three days later, on January 20, the Security Council passed another resolution (Resolution 39), creating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the dispute and mediate between the two countries. Many proposals were prepared by the UNCIP. Both countries-India and Pakistan rejected the proposals giving different reasons. On December 11, 1948, the UNCIP laid out a new set of proposals. As per the proposals, "the question of accession to India or Pakistan was to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite, which was contingent upon having a cease-fire. The two countries accepted the cease-fire plan and allowed the UN to observe the ceasefire from January 1, 1949."¹¹⁸

On January 5, 1949, the Security Council appointed a Plebiscite Commissioner.¹¹⁹ In early 1950, the United Nations appointed an Australian jurist, Sir Owen Dixon, as the United Nations representative, to mediate between India and Pakistan and help them to resolve the Kashmir Dispute. Dixon, having analyzed the problem, proposed limited / regional plebiscite, besides undertaking phased demilitarization of the States by both Pakistani

and Indian military forces. The Government of Pakistan expressed readiness to accept but the Indian Prime Minister rejected this.¹²⁰ On September 15, 1950, Sir Owen Dixon reported to the Security Council that no agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan. He requested formal termination of his position as the United Nations representative.¹²¹ While quitting his assignment, Dixon had stated:

In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled.¹²²

Since then the United Nations has considered the Kashmir Dispute on a number of occasions and has passed numerous resolutions for resolving the Dispute but it has not been able to get them implemented. According to independent and neutral Kashmiri observers, the UN resolutions lie buried in the archives of the United Nations Headquarters in New York.¹²³

5.3.2 Indian Atrocities in Kashmir

India, since occupation of State of Jammu and Kashmir, in 1947, has committed brutal atrocities through its Armed Forces, Paramilitary Forces and Police, in order to suppress the freedom struggle of Kashmiri Muslims. Over the years, all civil liberties of the inhabitants of Kashmir Valley have been snatched, political activities banned and economic progress denied. A large number of young innocent Kashmiris, besides suffering enormous torture in imprisonment and interrogation centers, have lost their lives. Indian Government is involved in a systematic and an organized genocide of Kashmiri Muslims in order to convert their majority into a minority. Women are raped; houses are raided; children and elderly people are killed without fear of any repercussions. Human rights organizations all over the world have raised the issue of Indian atrocities at various international forums but Indian Government continues to perpetrate its cruelties through worst form of state terrorism. Human rights organizations all

over the world demand that the right of self determination of the 12 million people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be respected and steps taken to hold an impartial plebiscite under international auspices to implement the UN Resolutions on Kashmir.¹²⁴

5.3.3 Kashmir Dispute and the OIC

The OIC has discussed Kashmir Dispute in most of its sessions at the level of Summit Conference and the Council of the Foreign Ministers. In addition to condemning (though not as strongly as in case of Palestine) Indian atrocities, and passing numerous resolutions in favour of Kashmir's freedom struggle, the OIC has nominated a Contact Group on Kashmir. However, nothing much has been done in a meaningful manner to help the Kashmiri Muslims to get rid of Indian occupation and to stop perpetual aggression perpetrated by Indian forces against innocent and unarmed people. The issue has been mostly discussed at Foreign Minister's level. A brief summary of important resolutions passed by the OIC at various forums is appended below.

On conclusion of the Sixth Summit Conference, the Final Communiqué said that the Conference expressed its concern at the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations of human rights committed against innocent Kashmiri people. It called for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and as agreed upon in the Simla Agreement. It condemned the massive violations of human rights of the Kashmiri people and called for the respect of their human rights including their right to self-determination. It called upon India to allow International Human Rights Groups and Humanitarian Organizations to visit Jammu and Kashmir. It expressed its deep concern at the prevailing tension that threatens security and peace in the region. It called upon India and Pakistan to redeploy their forces to peacetime locations. It also requested the Secretary General to send a three-member fact-finding mission to visit Jammu and Kashmir.¹²⁵

The Seventh Islamic Summit Conference held at Casablanca, on 13-15 December, 1994, adopted a special declaration on Jammu and Kashmir and expressed their commitment to promoting a peaceful political solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and fervent desire to

see an immediate end to the sufferings of the Kashmiri people and the violence against them so that conditions are created for a sustained and meaningful dialogue between Pakistan and India for a political solution of the dispute.¹²⁶

During its Eighth Summit Conference, held at Tehran in December 1997, the Conference condemned the continuing massive violations of human rights of the Kashmiri people and called for the respect of their human rights including the right of self-determination. It called upon Member States to take all necessary steps to persuade India to cease forthwith the gross and systematic human rights violations of the Kashmiri people and to enable them to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination as mandated by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council. It appreciated the efforts made by the UN Secretary General for enabling the true representatives of the Kashmiri people to have their views expressed in the OIC and other international fora, and requested him to continue to take all necessary steps in this regard. It also took note of the Meeting of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir at the Summit level.¹²⁷

The Ninth Summit Conference, held at Doha in November 2000, called for appointing a special representative of the OIC Secretary General and for sending an OIC fact-finding mission to Jammu and Kashmir. The Conference expressed deep concern over the massacre of civilians and material losses caused by the heavy Indian bombing across the Line of Control. It urged the international community, including the United Nations, to mediate in the conflict, which now threatens to lead to a nuclear confrontation.¹²⁸ It can be noted that, by now, the OIC had gradually started adopting more forceful and firm stand on the Kashmir issue.

The Tenth Summit Conference held in Putrajaya, in October 2003, issued a "Declaration on Jammu and Kashmir. The Conference, in addition to resolutions already adopted, noted with appreciation Pakistan's offer of a ceasefire along the Line of Control and expressed concern at the Indian rejection of the action plan for peace in the region and called upon India to consider Pakistan's proposal for peace in the region.¹²⁹

The Third Extra Ordinary Session of the Summit Conference, held in Makkah, in December 2005, extended its support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir for their inalienable right to self-

determination. It called for respect of the human rights of the Kashmiri people and agreed to provide all possible political and diplomatic support to the true representatives of the Kashmiri people in their struggle against foreign occupation.¹³⁰

During the Eleventh Summit Conference, held in Dakar, in March 2008, the Conference urged India to allow the visit of an OIC fact-finding mission to the Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, as well as, other international human rights organizations in order to verify human rights conditions in Indian-occupied Kashmir and endorsed the recommendations of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir.¹³¹

The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) has discussed the Kashmir Dispute in more details in its various sessions as compared to the Summit Conference. It has also adopted numerous resolutions in support of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for seeking their legitimate right to self-determination, and resolution of the Dispute in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. However, overall, the OIC has not been able to play any decisive role in resolving the Dispute or helping the Kashmiri people for obvious reasons. Summary of various resolutions adopted by last ten sessions of the CFM is appended in succeeding paragraphs.

The 27th Session of the ICFM held in Kuala Lumpur, in June 2000, reaffirmed its support for the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, and called for appointing a special representative of the OIC Secretary General and for sending an OIC fact-finding mission to Jammu and Kashmir.¹³² Moreover, the Conference expressed deep concern over the heavy Indian bombing across the Line of Control, which caused the death of civilians and material losses. It urged the international community, including the United Nations, to mediate in the conflict, which now threatens to lead to a nuclear confrontation.¹³³

The ICFM during its 28th Session held in Bamako, in June 2001, once again, reaffirmed its support for the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, and adopted almost a similar resolution as was done in its 27th Session.

During its 29th Session held in Khartoum, in June 2002, the Conference condemned the violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir and renewed its support for the right of self-

determination for the Kashmiri people in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. It called for appointing a Special Representative of the OIC Secretary General on Jammu and Kashmir. The Conference [also] endorsed the recommendations adopted by the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir and took note of the Memorandum submitted to the Contact Group by the True Representatives of the People of Kashmir.¹³⁴

The 30th Session of the ICFM, held in Tehran, in May 2003, also called for a peaceful settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions. Moreover, the Conference welcomed the visit of the Fact Finding Mission to Azad Jammu and Kashmir dispatched by the Secretary General in April 2003 and expressed its appreciation for the full cooperation of the Government of Pakistan and the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It also expressed the hope that the Mission would be able to visit Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir soon.¹³⁵

The 31st Session of the ICFM, held in Istanbul, in June 2004, 32nd Session held in Sana in June 2005, 33rd Session held in Baku in June 2006 and 34th Session held in Islamabad in May 2007 also reaffirmed OIC's support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir for their right to self-determination, supported the ongoing peace process between Pakistan and India and endorsed the recommendations of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir in a similar way as had been done by it in the previous sessions.¹³⁶ During the 33rd Session, the Secretary General called for respect of the human rights of the Kashmiri people and the ending of their continuous violations, and urged India to allow international human rights organizations to verify the conditions of human rights in Indian occupied Kashmir.¹³⁷

During the 34th Session, the Secretary-General urged India to allow the visit of an OIC Fact Finding Mission to Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir as well as other Human Rights Organizations with a view to verifying the conditions of human rights in occupied Kashmir.¹³⁸ The Conference, besides endorsing the recommendations of the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir, recognized that implementation of the recommendation of the OIC Secretary-General's Representative to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir would facilitate Peace Process between India and Pakistan.¹³⁹ On the conclusion of the 34th Session of the Conference, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan said, I would like to acknowledge

in particular our profound thanks to the OIC Member States for their continued strong support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their longstanding and just struggle.¹⁴⁰

The 35th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) held in Kampala, in June 2008, expressing its concern at the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violation of human rights committed against Kashmiris, regretted the refusal by India to allow the OIC Fact Finding Mission to visit Indian Occupied Kashmir. It also called upon India to cease forthwith the gross and systematic human rights violations of Kashmiri people and allow an impartial inquiry into the issue of more than 1000 nameless graves, discovered in Uri district of Indian Occupied Kashmir.¹⁴¹ The Council also recommended that OIC should initiate to issue annual report of the human rights situation in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁴²

The 36th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Damascus, in May 2009, adopted almost an identical resolution to that of its previous sessions. However, it expressed regret on Indian attempt to malign the legitimate Kashmiri freedom struggle by denigrating it as terrorism and appreciated that Kashmiris condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It also regretted that following the Mumbai incident, India had put a pause on the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan.¹⁴³

The 38th Session of the CFM (Session of Peace, Cooperation and Development) held at Astana on 28 – 30 June 2011 expressed concerns at the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations of human rights committed against the innocent Kashmiris and regretted that India had not allowed the OIC Fact Finding Mission to visit Indian occupied Jammu.

¹⁴⁴ It also recommended that OIC should initiate to issue annual report of the human rights situation in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁴⁵ The Conference also asked the international community including the United Nations to closely monitor the situation inside the Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir and the dialogue process between Pakistan and India.¹⁴⁶

The 39th Session of the CFM, (Session of Solidarity for Sustainable Development) held at Djibouti on 15 – 17 November 2012 asserted, any political process / elections held under foreign occupation cannot be a substitute to the exercise of the right of self-determination by people of Kashmir as provided in the relevant Security Council Resolutions and reaffirmed in the Millennium

Declaration of the UN General Assembly.¹⁴⁷ It also appealed to the Member States, OIC and other Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Solidarity Fund and philanthropists to mobilize funds and contribute generously towards providing humanitarian assistance to the Kashmiri people.¹⁴⁸

5.3.4 Kashmir—The End State

Despite great sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of lives and enormous loss of dignity and property by Kashmiri people over a prolonged period of six decades and many resolutions passed by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and countless resolutions adopted by the OIC Summit Conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers, India still retains its illegal and immoral occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, through brutal presence of her military forces. Indian Armed Forces and Paramilitary Forces carry out raids and attacked on unarmed innocent Kashmiris; destroy their fruit trees to deny livelihood to local population; burn their villages as retaliation and carry out large-scale gang rapes to demonstrate their brutality and authority with impunity. Indian Government has held several elections to legitimize their illegal occupation and to justify perpetual denial of inalienable right of self-determination to Kashmiri people but Kashmiris have out-rightly rejected Indian occupation. Their political struggle for full restoration of human rights of the Kashmiris and freedom struggle for right of self-determination to attain independence from Indian slavery continues.

5.4 CONFLICTS FACED BY OIC MEMBER STATES AND MUSLIM MINORITIES

Many conflicts and disputes are being faced by the OIC Member States and the Muslim communities living in other countries that are not members of the OIC. These conflicts and disputes can be divided into three categories. Firstly, the inter-state conflicts and disputes among the OIC Member States or between the OIC Member State(s) and a non-OIC Member State(s). Secondly, the intra-state conflicts and a disputes within the OIC Member State(s). Thirdly, the problems faced by or a conflict / dispute between Muslim communities (minorities), and their government / state, which is not a member of the OIC. The OIC has tried to play some role in this regard, at least, by discussing these conflicts and

disputes at various levels. It has tried to offer its good office to help the Member States or the Muslim communities to resolve their problems. However, the effectiveness and results of such efforts have not been very encouraging. A brief account of OIC's efforts, in this regard, is summarized in the succeeding paragraphs.

5.4.1 Inter-State Conflicts

Inter-state conflicts, referred above, can be further divided in two categories; the conflict between a Muslim and a non-Muslim state and a conflict between / among two or more Muslim states. The OIC can act as a mediator in both cases. In former situation, it can act as an advocate / supporter of the Muslim state(s) and in the latter case; it can play the role of an impartial mediator in all inter-Muslim states disputes and conflicts.

The two most important conflicts faced by the Muslim world—the Kashmir dispute and the Palestine dispute (Arab-Israel conflict)—were created by the European colonial powers (British colonial rule in India and British and French Mandate in Palestine / the Middle East). India and Pakistan have fought four wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1998 over the Kashmir dispute, which still remains unresolved. Due to severity of the issue, Kashmir, today, is considered a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia. The Palestine problem became more pronounced with creation of Israel. Systematic migration and shifting of Jews from Europe to Palestine had been supported and facilitated by many European countries. Through three wars in 1948, 1956, and 1967 Israel has occupied much greater area of the neighbouring Arab states, primarily the land owned by Palestinians, including the Jerusalem. Some efforts were made by Egypt and Syria to fight against Israeli occupation in 1973, which resulted in the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Sinai restoring Egyptian control on its lost territory. Later on, Syria, partially, helped Lebanon in her resistance against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Most of these acts could, at best, be called assistance at bilateral level and not as a collective effort of the OIC. The OIC, since its inception, has continuously condemned the Israeli occupation of Arab land in Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, extending moral support to these countries. Brief account of the OIC role in resolving Kashmir and Palestine disputes has already been discussed in this Chapter.

In 1971, just after two years of the OIC's creation, a war took place between India and Pakistan. India demonstrated

naked aggression against Pakistan, which resulted in division of the country's eastern and western wings into Bangladesh and Pakistan. The major cause of the problem was internal political dispute between two wings of Pakistan. Since the OIC was in its initial stage, it could not play any effective role in resolving intra-state dispute between erstwhile East Pakistan and West Pakistan. It was also not in a position to put any pressure on India to stop her interference in internal matters of Pakistan and refrain from aggression against Pakistan.

In the 1980s, the OIC extended its support to the Afghan freedom fighters in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Many Muslim countries provided moral, diplomatic and financial support to various resistant groups. The OIC also encouraged its Member States to extend generous help and assistance for many million Afghan refugees, who had been forced to migrate to Pakistan and Iran. At the international level, the United States fully supported this struggle. Some European countries also extended their diplomatic and financial support to Afghan *Mujahideen*.

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was a great challenge for the OIC to play an effective role of a mediator, in resolving an armed conflict, between its two member states. The OIC had passed many resolutions calling upon both countries to resolve their dispute through negotiations and peaceful means but it could not interfere for lack of the mandate and the capability to do so. Resultantly, the conflict spread over many years causing untold loss of precious lives on both sides. This conflict had far-reaching effects on the Muslim World as both the countries tried to extend their war, through proxy players, into many other Muslim countries. Some Arab states extended financial and material support to Iraq, which created a strong division within the Muslim World. In fact, the OIC could not force both the states to stop aggression against each other.

Similarly, the OIC failed to deter Iraq to occupy Kuwait. It also failed to convince, persuade or force Iraq to vacate Kuwait and resolve the dispute through negotiations conducted under the auspices of the OIC. Both these conflicts were clear violation of the OIC Charter, which demand peaceful resolution of dispute between member states. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, which led to Gulf War and eventual US occupation of Iraq, is a great setback for the Muslim world. Iraqi invasion had had serious implications for regional and global peace and security. This misadventure

by Iraq resulted into foreign military invasion in the region and eventually led to the fall of Saddam regime in Iraq. The issue of Iraq's invasion by the US had grown in such magnitude that the OIC was in a position to play any role in resolving this issue.

The OIC has played a positive role in resolving dispute between Sudan and Chad and an agreement between both countries was signed alongside the Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference in Dakar. In the same session, the OIC reiterated its condemnation of the continuing aggression by the Republic of Armenia against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.¹⁴⁹

5.4.2 Intra-State Conflicts and Disputes

Many OIC Member States are facing intra-state conflicts, which pose a serious threat to their existence and integrity. The OIC has discussed most of these issues in almost all sessions of the Islamic Summit and the Council of Foreign Ministers. However, nothing much beyond discussions, advices, suggestions etc. has been done. The OIC should extend maximum help to those countries, which are suffering from intra-state conflict(s), to resolve their internal disputes through negotiations and other peaceful means. The OIC must also play more effective role, even if it has to deploy the OIC peacekeeping force in these countries, to facilities cessation of hostilities in armed conflicts, in order to create conducive atmosphere for negotiations and peaceful settlement of the disputes. The OIC member states, which are currently suffering from internal conflicts and disputes include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leon, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The OIC had "emphasized its full solidarity with the government and people of Sudan. It expressed its support of the efforts for national reconciliation, peace, and lasting stability in the Republic of Sudan, full respect of the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Sudan, and called upon the international community to further support these efforts to reconstruct and develop the country, and meet humanitarian needs of its people, including Darfur."¹⁵⁰ In its Global Monitoring Report for 2010, the World Bank placed Pakistan among the conflict affected countries where political uncertainty and fighting continues to disrupt economic activity.¹⁵¹ The ongoing problem in Pakistan has been controlled largely. Keeping in view Pakistan's capacity to handle such

situation, the conflict is likely to be resolved eventually. However, it has cost very heavily to Pakistan in terms of loss of precious human lives and the damaged caused to properties, commerce, trade and national economy. Moreover, the social cost of the conflict, in terms of fragmentation of the society and resultant socio-political and socio-religious disharmony is more damaging.

Had the OIC played an effective role in settling the political dispute between East Timor and Indonesia, the end result might have been different. Since long, Somalia has been suffering from internal power struggle, which was further aggravated by foreign interference. The OIC, in its Eleventh Summit Conference, reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia [and] called upon OIC Member States to consider providing troops and other forms of assistance for future deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Somalia in order to support peace and stability in the Country.¹⁵² The same Session of the OIC called on the Secretary General to take appropriate steps to organize a donors' conference to assist in the reconstruction of Cote d'Ivoire. It also renewed its full solidarity with authorities and people of Guinea Bissau and expressed its support for the efforts aimed at achieving national reconciliation and long-lasting peace and stability. It also called on the international community to provide more support to those efforts to contribute to the reconstruction and development of the country and to meet the basic needs of the people of Guinea Bissau.¹⁵³

The OIC has also tried to assist Afghan government and Afghan people to establish peace and stability in their country. It has also tried to help improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The OIC has always reiterated that Iraq's sovereignty, political independence, national unity, and territorial integrity must be respected by all; stressed the Iraqi people's right to freely determine their political future, as well as to full control over their natural resources.¹⁵⁴ The OIC has repeatedly "reaffirmed the commitment of the Member States to preserve the unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina within nationally recognized borders."¹⁵⁵

Similarly, internal disturbances in many other member states of the OIC, including Gulf and Arab countries, also require OIC's attention. The so-called "Arab Spring," though apparently an indigenous political movement in different countries, has

very far-reaching political, economic and security implications. Through massive protests and massive political movements, Algerians, Tunisians, Egyptians and Yemenis have been able to oust oppressive regimes, which had ruled their countries with an iron hand for many decades. However, the future political stability in most of these countries still seems quite unclear, as majority of the political workers and protestors, who had launched vigorous campaigns in favour of changing the prevailing political system and had desired broad based political reforms, are neither fully satisfied nor happy with the present outcome. The situation in Syria has become very precarious and intricately complicated. Despite excessive use of brutal force, Bashar al Asad and his military loyalists have not been able to contain the political uprising against their regime. The Arab League and Turkey have asked Bashar al Asad to step down, in order to resolve the current political crisis in Syria. The political opposition in Bahrain has been temporarily suppressed with the help of Saudi forces but the situation certainly remains fragile.

In Libya, the Western force (the United States and Europe) after removing Qaddafi from power by using the brutal military power of the NATO and proxy warriors have managed to get him killed. Only Britain and France played more active role in the military campaign against Qaddafi's regime. They misinterpreted the UN Security Council resolution on Libya; launched an air campaign against Libyan armed forces and destroyed Libyan cities and communication infrastructure, which was resented by China and Russia. The new Libyan Government still has a difficult task ahead to unite all warring factions and various tribes. The final outcome of "Arab Spring" is still quite uncertain. The tendency of foreign forces extending military support of this magnitude to rebellious groups, which actually amounts to military intervention against an established government, will have very serious implications in the future.

In case of Afghanistan, the US President has announced withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan by 2014, but future of Afghanistan still casts shadows of uncertainty, turmoil and instability. The OIC must play an effective role, with intimate support of Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to help the President Karzai's government, the Taliban and other political and militant factions to arrive at mutually accepted formula for a long-term political settlement through peace negotiations.

5.4.3 Problems of Muslim Communities and Minorities

Many Muslim communities, living in various countries, are facing serious problems with regard to preserving their Islamic identity. Whereas some of them are struggling for political autonomy, a few are fighting for their independent status as a sovereign state. Some communities, like Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have succeeded in their efforts to become independent states through enormous sacrifices. In pursuit of their freedom struggles, Muslims of Bosnia, Kashmir, Kosovo and Chechnya have faced worst kind of genocide and ethnic cleansing. The OIC has tried to extend moral support to all such communities, however much more is needed to be done to mitigate the sufferings and miseries of all Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim majority states. In addition to above, some communities to whom the OIC have extended its help include Muslims in Balkans, Caucasus, Cyprus, Cote D'Ivoire, India, Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, the Republic of Myanmar, Western Thrace in Greece, and Sierra Leon. The OIC, during its Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference, called on Government of India to secure safety of Muslims and their holy sites and to take immediate steps to implement its solemn commitment to reconstruct the Babri Mosque on its original site.¹⁵⁶

5.4.4 Problems of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

A large number of Muslims have been forced to migrate to neighbouring and other countries because of ongoing-armed conflicts in their countries. Many more have been internally displaced because of such conflicts. The migration of more than three million Afghan refugees to Pakistan and over one million to Iran, after Soviet invasion, and a large number of Syrian refugees currently moving to Turkey during the recent political turmoil in Syria are point in case. The OIC have tried to extend help to these people but, due to lack of organizational, financial and administrative capacity, the efforts made so far are far less than required. More coordinated effort in this field, by seeking help from concerned UN agencies and more resourceful OIC Member States, is required.

THE OIC—POTENTIAL AND CAPABILITIES

6.1 DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL POWER

The OIC, which is the largest regional organization representing aspirations and desires of 1.5 billion Muslims residing in all continents of the world, comprises fifty seven member states and many observers including four states, one Muslim community / organization, two Islamic institutions and five international organizations. The member states of the OIC occupy a land mass of over eight million sq km, having enormous human and natural resources. According to population estimates of United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), seven member states of the OIC fall in top twenty most populous countries in the world and by 2050, ten Muslim countries will be included in the list of top twenty countries in the world.¹ Besides having such great land mass and major share in the world population, most of the member states of the OIC are blessed with many valuable natural resources, which are crucial to the world economic growth and industrial development. The OIC member states have enormous resource potential but the same has neither been developed nor converted into corresponding capability. Resultantly it has never been used for collective benefit of the Muslim *Ummah*.

Notwithstanding such great advantages, unfortunately, the OIC Member States also badly suffer from lack of human resource development, extremely poor standards of technological knowhow, low level of industrialization, weak organizational and managerial abilities, and awfully poor standard of governance. Above all, it lacks dynamic and visionary leadership, which can bring revolutionary changes to transform present state of anxiety and frustration into a positive hope, in order to contribute to world peace, security, progress and prosperity. These constraints of the OIC will also be discussed and highlighted in this Chapter.

National power and power potential of any state or an alliance / an organized group of states play extremely important role in international politics. Hans J. Morgenthau, a renowned political

scientist says that International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.² Many political scientists and geo-strategists such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbs and Chankia and, in recent times, Hans Morgenthau and Fredrick L. Schuman have developed their theories based on the notion of power. Power, as asserted by Karl W. Deutsch, is the ability to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles.³ Joshua Goldstein defines power as the ability to get another actor does what it would not otherwise have done (or not to do what it would have done).⁴ Amstutz states, each state needs power because it is responsible for its own security and the promotion of vital interests in the world. Kenneth Waltz, a leading International Relations theorist, observes that power provides states with four important resources: (1) maintenance of autonomy, (2) increased freedom of action, (3) greater margin of safety, and (4) greater influence in the international community.⁵

Influence, authority, power and force are inter-related concepts. Brief description of these concepts, as explained by Amstutz, is as under:

- *Influence* involves the ability to alter another person or group's behaviour. Influence can be achieved through coercive and non-coercive methods. Non-coercive influence involves the altering of behaviour through peaceful, nonthreatening means. Coercive influence involves the use of threat or force to alter behaviour.⁶
- *Authority* is the capacity to command obedience without compulsion or threat of coercion. Authority is based on the inherent or consensual right of rulers and government institutions to make binding decisions for a political community. Whereas authority is the basis of domestic politics, power is the foundation of world politics.⁷
- *Power*, the most common form of coercive influence, is the ability to determine outcomes. If a state is to prevail against the interests of other states, it must be able to overcome the goals of opposing states.⁸
- *Force* involves the explicit or implicit use, or threat of use of coercion to punish or compel. In fact, it is

coercive power. The most extreme application [of power] is war, which involves use of military power to compel or punish enemy. At the opposite extreme is the deterrence, which involves solely the threat, but not use of coercion.⁹

Power has many dimensions. Moreover, power is relational and relative. A state or group of states—a regional or an international organization—can be said more powerful to its adversary if it has significantly superior capabilities as compared to other state or group of states. Similarly, power is not an end per se but a primary means to promoting and protecting national goals and objectives. Power does not mean the ability to coerce through military means only; rather it is a total sum of multidimensional abilities and capabilities, including manpower, military, economic, technological, psychological and cultural dimensions and aspects of any nation or a group of nations. In the world politics, perceptions about dominance or pre-eminence of power also matter a lot unless such myths are challenged by another contestant power. It must be noted that power is very dynamic phenomenon. It is continually changing as the relative capabilities of states rise and decline. . . The relative changes of power among states are rooted in the shifting political, economic, and military resources of states.¹⁰ Another important and very significant development of the modern times is institutionalization of power, especially as demonstrated by the international community in the Twentieth Century. Power can be institutionalized by establishing rules, regimes, and institutions that reflect the distribution of power among groups and communities.¹¹ In contemporary period, UN, EU, NATO, World Bank and IMF are a few amongst many examples of institutionalization of political, economic and military power at international level.

Power of a state or a group of states can be measured mathematically. However, an ability of a state or an organized group of states to influence various decisions and to ensure that the ultimate outcome of any conflict is to her or their advantage speaks about their relative power at international level. Such ability to decisively determine the desired result depends upon capabilities, which can be judged by analyzing various tangible and intangible factors. These are commonly called bases or elements of national power. Some important tangible elements of power

include territory (area), geography, population (availability of work force), natural resources, education standards, economic and technological development, and military capabilities. Intangible elements of power are equally important because these factors transform tangible elements into actual and real power. These elements include philosophy and ideology of a nation, nature of government and its institutions, quality of the leadership and cultural and historical heritage.

6.2 POWER POTENTIAL OF THE OIC

Arthur Sharplin defines “Power” as the ability to influence others,¹² whereas Amstutz defines “Potential Power” as the anticipated capacity of a state to determine outcome based on its tangible and intangible resources.¹³ If the OIC has to play an important role, compatible to its power potential, it is imperative to find out its power potential from authentic sources. Identification of power potential of any member states of the OIC or collectively of the OIC as an organization (or for that matter of any country or of a particular group of countries) does not provide them the ability to influence international events or to manage desired outcome in global competition. In fact, it is the ability of transforming the potential to capabilities and the political will to use such capabilities to one’s advantage, which guarantees the desired results. The OIC represents one of the largest groups of people, highest number of UN member states and probably maximum natural resources in the world. Unfortunately, nothing much has been done to galvanize these resources or to transform such great potential to a useable capability. One faces great difficulty even while collecting latest information and updated data regarding the OIC member states because no such comprehensive and authentic database is available. However, effort made by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) to launch a “Statistical Capacity Building Initiative” in 2007, is a positive step towards strengthening coordination, harmonization and standardization¹⁴ of statistical data pertaining to the OIC member states. Similarly establishment of Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC)¹⁵ is another positive development in this regard. Beside SESRIC Statistics & Databases, which provides quite comprehensive and reliable data and statistical information about the OIC member states, for this research, reliance has

been placed on the data and information available at CIA The World Factbook¹⁶, The Military Balance 2009 of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Muslim Index¹⁷. A brief overview of the facts discussed in subsequent paragraphs will indicate that the OIC member states, though weak in certain areas, possess enormous power potential. If organized properly, the OIC has a remarkable possibility to make best use of their human and material resources and to become an effective player in the international politics, in general, and to play very positive, effective and successful role in international conflict resolution.

6.2.1 Area Possessed by the OIC Members

Most of the OIC member states are located in Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, and North and West Africa. However, the OIC is a unique international organization, which represents fifty-seven member states of the UN from all regions of the world. These countries occupy 32,193,125 sq km of area and hold numerous locations that are crucially important for various strategic reasons. Summary of strategic importance and total area occupied by each member of the OIC is shown at Appendix-D.

Fourteen member states of the OIC are located in Asia, having an area of 8,712,278 sq km. Three countries: Bangladesh, Maldives, and Pakistan, situated in South Asia, occupy an area of 948,238 sq km, whereas three countries located in West Asia; Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey occupy an area of 1,514,680 sq km. Remaining five countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan occupy an area of 3,994,400 sq km. Three Muslim countries located in South-East Asia: Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia, occupy an area of 2,250,960 sq km. In Asia Pacific region Maldives occupy smallest area, i.e. 298 sq km whereas Kazakhstan has the largest area, i.e. 2,717,300 sq km, followed by Indonesia having an area of 1,919,440 sq km.

All countries, except one (Israel), located in the Middle East are members of the OIC. They occupy an area of 5,298,854 sq km. These countries include Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. Amongst the Middle Eastern member states, Bahrain is the smallest country having an area of 665 sq km only whereas Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the region, has an area of 2,149,690 sq km.

Majority of the OIC member states; i.e. twenty-seven countries,

are located in Africa. Altogether, they occupy an area of 17,775,005 sq km. Seven countries located in North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan, have an area of 9,289,410 sq km. Fourteen member states of the OIC located in West Africa occupying an area of 5,501,147 sq km. Gambia, with 11,300 sq km, is the smallest Muslim state in West Africa, whereas Cameroon, with an area of 475,440 sq km, is the largest. Six other members of the OIC, occupying an area of 2,984,457, are located in remaining parts of Africa (centre, south, east and southeast). Out of these countries, Comoros has an area of 2,170 sq km only whereas Chad has an area of 1,284,000 sq km.

Only three members of the OIC are located in Europe and Americas. Albania, located in Eastern Europe, has an area of 28,748 sq km, whereas Guyana and Suriname, in Northern South America, occupy 214,970 sq km and 163,270 sq km respectively.

Region-wise Area of the Muslim Countries

Table - 1: Area of the OIC Members in the World

<i>Region</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Asia	8,706,417
Middle East	5,478,021
Africa	18,869,444
Europe and Americas	407,538
Total	33,461,420

Table - 2: Total Area of the OIC Members in Asia

<i>Sub-Region</i>	<i>Area</i>
South Asia	940,393
South East Asia	2,240,181
West Asia	1,522,392
Central Asia	4,003,451
Total	8,706,417

Table - 3: Area of the OIC Members in South and South East Asia

<i>South Asia</i>		<i>South East Asia</i>	
<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Bangladesh	144,000	Brunei	5,765
Maldives	298	Indonesia	1,904,569
Pakistan	796,095	Malaysia	329,847
Total	940,393		2,240,181

Table - 4: Area of the OIC Members in West and Central Asia

<i>West Asia</i>		<i>Central Asia</i>	
<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Afghanistan	652,230	Kazakhstan	2,724,900
Azerbaijan	86,600	Kyrgyzstan	199,951
Turkey	783,562	Tajikistan	143,100
		Turkmenistan	488,100
		Uzbekistan	447,400
Total	1,522,392		4,003,451

Table - 5: Area of the OIC Members in the Middle East

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Bahrain	760	Palestine	5,860
Iran	1,648,000	Qatar	11,586
Iraq	438,317	Saudi Arabia	2,149,690
Jordan	89,342	Syria	185,180
Kuwait	17,818	UAE	83,600
Lebanon	10,400	Yemen	527,968
Oman	309,500		
Total			5,478,021

Table - 6: Area of the OIC Members in Africa

<i>Sub-Region</i>	<i>Area</i>
North Africa	8,645,075
West Africa	5,950,689
Central / Southern Africa	1,286,170
East / South East Africa	2,987,510
<i>Total Area of OIC Members States in Africa</i>	<i>18,869,444</i>

Table - 7: Area of the OIC Members in North Africa

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Algeria	2,381,740	Morocco	446,550
Egypt	1,001,450	Tunisia	163,610
Libya	1,759,541	Sudan	1,861,484
Mauritania	1,030,700		
<i>Total Area of OIC Member States in North Africa</i>			<i>8,645,075</i>

Table - 8: Area of the OIC Members in West Africa

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Benin	112,622	Guinea Bissau	36,125
Burkina Faso	724,200	Mali	1,240,000
Cameron	474,440	Niger	1,267,000
Cote d' Ivoire	322,463	Nigeria	923,768
Gabon	267,667	Senegal	196,722
Gambia	11,300	Sierra Leone	71,740
Guinea	245,857	Togo	56,785
<i>Total Area of OIC member States in West-Africa</i>			<i>5,950,689</i>

Table - 9 Area of the OIC Members in East, South and South East Africa

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Chad	1,284,000	Mozambique	799,380
Comoros	2,235	Somalia	637,657
Djibouti	23,200	Uganda	241,038
Total		2,987,510	

Table - 10: Area of the OIC Members in Europe and America

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area(sq km)</i>
Albania	28,748
Guyana	214,970
Suriname	163,820
Total	407,538

Source:

CIA Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>. Accessed on 24 Jul 2013.

6.2.2 Geopolitical and Geostrategic Significance of the OIC Member States

According to Joshua S. Goldstein, the use of geography as an element of power is called geopolitics,¹⁸ whereas Amstutz considers that geopolitics is the field that examines the interrelationship of geography, national power, and foreign policy.¹⁹ Theodore A. Coulombis and James Wolfe consider that geopolitics is a discipline, which fuses subjects such as geography, strategy and politics.²⁰ In a nutshell, geography, i.e. the territory, area and location of any state or an alliance and coalition of states play an extremely important role in international politics.

It is worth noting that nature has gifted unique geo-strategic advantage to the OIC Member States. Most of the important waterways and strategic choke points are either possessed or dominated by Muslim countries. Moreover, many Muslim countries control major hydrocarbon energy sources and other precious natural resources. Among the waterways and international trade choke points, the OIC Member states can completely control Gibraltar, Southern and Eastern coasts of

Mediterranean, Suez Canal, Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Strait of *Hormuz* larding out of Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans are two of the world most strategic choke points.²¹ Both these areas are dominated by the OIC member states. Another extremely important water passage, *Bab el-Mandeeb*, which connects Arabian Sea with Red Sea, is also totally controlled by the members of the OIC. Approximately one-half of the total oil production, which has been rightly called “lifeblood of modern civilization,”²² is transported through sea routes. The blockage of a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs.²³ The Persian Gulf’s coastal areas are known as the world’s largest single source of crude oil. Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. *Hormuz* is the world’s most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil flow of 15 to 20 million barrels, which is roughly 40 percent of all seaborne traded oil or 20 percent of oil traded worldwide. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require the use of longer alternate routes at increased transportation costs.²⁴ The Strait of Malacca, located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. Malacca is the shortest sea route between Persian Gulf suppliers and the Asian markets—notably China, Japan, South Korea, and the Pacific Rim. Oil shipments through the Strait of Malacca supply China and Indonesia, two of the world’s most populous nations. It is the key chokepoint in Asia. Over 50,000 vessels transit the Strait of Malacca per year. If the Strait was blocked, nearly half of the world’s fleet would be required to reroute around the Indonesian archipelago through Lombok Strait, located between the islands of Bali and Lombok, or the Sunda Strait, located between Java and Sumatra.²⁵

In addition to above, many Muslim countries provide very important land and air routes. The Middle East and Turkey act as a land bridge between Asia and Europe. In South and West Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan occupy strategically very important locations, as these countries provide the only viable land route from Central Asian States, Russia and China to Indian Ocean. Thus, their strategic significance for “Great Game” in the past and for a “New Great Game” at present is evident. A summary of geo-strategic significance of the OIC member states is attached at Appendix D.

6.2.3 Muslim Population in the World

Population, like territory, is an important tangible factor in estimating power potential of any nation or group of nations, as it can be counted and quantified. Amstutz observes, although the size of a nation's population is not a key determinant of power, it nevertheless contributes to the power potential of a country in part because it determines the size of the pool from which soldiers are selected for military services. In general, most influential states in the world are those with large military forces and those, with a few exceptions, tend to be nations with large populations.²⁶ Similarly, a large population can be a major factor in economic development of a country and can enhance its economic potential by providing a large work force. Population figures alone are not correct indicators of real power potential of any nation because many other aspects such as literacy rate, number of university graduates, technical education, availability of skilled labour, the age group and health state etc, indicating overall human development level, are some factors which determine real potential of the population of any nation or a group of nations.

It is hard to find an accurate and updated data about Muslim population as this aspect was never given any serious attention. For the last few years, Statistical Economic and Social Research and Training Centre (SESRIC) is making such information available for Islamic Countries. However, for this book, reliance has been laid on more than one source. Therefore, the data has been compiled from "CIA World Factbook," "Military Balance," "Muslim Index" and "Basic Facts and one word Figures on OIC Member Countries" issued by SESRIC. Notwithstanding minor variations, the total population of the OIC Members States ranges between 1.485 to 1.545 billion. Country-wise details are shown at Appendix F. These statistics are validated by a study carried out by The Pew Forum on the Muslim Population in the World. Published in October 2009, with the title of "Mapping the Global Muslim Population," this is one of the most comprehensive information on the subject. According to this Report, study of more than 200 countries finds that there are 1.57 billion Muslims of all ages living in the world today, representing 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion.²⁷ This Report indicates the Muslim population in the OIC Member States and all over the world, whereas the above-mentioned sources show the complete population of the OIC Member States, including non-Muslims living in those countries.

According to Pew Research Centre's Report, while Muslims are found on all five inhabited continents,²⁸ more than 60 % of the global

International Conflict Resolution

Muslim population is in Asia and about 20 % is in the Middle East and North Africa. However, the Middle East-North Africa region has the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries. It is important to note that four Muslim countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan are among ten most populous countries.²⁹ Seventeen Muslim countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Yemen are among fifty most populous countries of the world.³⁰ Four countries; Indonesia (228-234 million), Pakistan (163-167 million), and Bangladesh (144-158 million), and Nigeria (135-151 million) have population of more than 100 million, whereas three countries; Egypt (75-81 million), Turkey (71-73 million), and Iran (65-72 million) have population of more than 50 million.³¹ A summary of twenty most populous Muslim states is given at Table - 11.

Table – 11: Top 20 Most Populous Muslim Countries
(Population in Millions)

<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>CIA Fact Book (1)</i>	<i>Muslim Index (2)</i>	<i>The Military Balance (3)</i>	<i>The Pew Forum (4),(5)</i>	<i>World's 50 Most Populous Countries: 2012 (6)</i>
1.	Indonesia	251.16	240.50	248.64	202,87	248.645
2.	Pakistan	193.23	172.20	190.29	174.08	190.291
3.	Bangladesh	163.65	169.10	161.08	145.31	161.083
4.	Nigeria	174.50	164.80	170.12	78.06	170.123
5.	Egypt	85.29	81.50	83.68	78.51	83.688
6.	Turkey	80.69	73.00	79.74	73.62	79.749
7.	Iran	79.85	77.90	78.86	73.78	78.868
8.	Sudan	34.84	42.20	34.20	30.12	34.206
9.	Algeria	38.08	33.36	33.76	34.20	37.367
10.	Uganda	34.75	36.50	33.64	3.96	33.640
11.	Morocco	32.64	32.50	32.30	32.00	32.309
12.	Iraq	31.85	33.60	31.12	30.43	31.129
13.	Saudi Arabia	26.93	27.30	26.53	24.95	26.534
14.	Afghanistan	31.10	32.00	30.41	28.07	30.419
15.	Uzbekistan	28.66	28.90	28.39	26.47	28.394
16.	Malaysia	29.62	29.20	29.17	16.58	29.179

17.	Yemen	25.40	25.90	24.77	23.36	24.771
18.	Mozambique	24.09	22.50	23.51	5.22	23.515
19.	Syria	22.45	21.60	22.53	20.20	-
20.	Cote d'Ivoire	22.40	0.00	21.95	7.74	-

Sources:

- (1) *CIA World Factbook*,
<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>.
Accessed on 22 Jul 2013.
- (2) Muslim Index, www.muslimindex.net. Accessed on 22 July 2013.
- (3) *The Military Balance 2013*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2013. Info compiled from respective country profiles.
- (4) *Mapping The Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Washington D.C., October 2009. Available at www.pewforum.org. Accessed on 22 Jul 2013.
- (5) Estimated 2009 Muslim population only.
- (6) World's 50 Most Populous Countries: 2012, <http://www.infoplease.com/world/statistics/most-populous-countries.html>. Accessed on 22 Jul 2013

Note: All data rounded to nearest million.

6.2.4 Muslim Minorities

It is worth mentioning that while 80% of the world's Muslims live in countries where Muslims are in majority, significant number – about one fifth of the Muslim population – lives as religious minorities in their home countries. Of the roughly 317 million Muslims living as minorities, about 240 million – about three quarters – live in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million).³²

Table - 12: Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims Minorities

<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Estimated Muslim Population (million)</i>	<i>% of Population that is Muslim</i>
1.	India	160.95	13.4 %
2.	Ethiopia	28.06	33.9 %
3.	China	21.67	1.6 %

4.	Russia	16.48	11.7 %
5.	Tanzania	13.22	30.2 %
6.	Ivory Coast	7.74	36.7 %
7.	Mozambique	5.22	22.8 %
8.	Philippines	4.65	5.1 %
9.	Germany	4.02	5.0 %
10.	Uganda	3.96	12.1 %

Source: *Mapping The Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Washington D.C., October 2009, available at www.pewforum.org. Accessed on 28 April 2010.

6.2.5 Muslims in Europe and Americas

Europe has about 38 million Muslims, constituting about 5 % of its population. European Muslims make slightly more than 2 % of the world's Muslim population. Germany is home to more than 4 million Muslims—almost as many as North and South America combined. The European countries with the highest concentration of Muslims are located in eastern and central Europe: Kosovo (90%), Albania (80%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40%) and Republic of Macedonia (33%).³³ Approximately 4.6 million Muslims live in Americas. About 2.5 million live in the United States and about 700,000 Muslims live in Canada.³⁴ Surinam is the country in the region with largest Muslim population, at about 16%. Guyana is next, at about 7 % Muslim, and Trinidad and Tobago is about 6 % Muslim. Argentina, with 800,000 Muslims, has the largest number of Muslims in South America.³⁵

6.2.6 Workforce

As mentioned earlier, availability of the workforce is directly related and proportionate to the total population of nation(s). The OIC countries with a large population base have great potential of equally large work forces. According to the data compiled from the CIA The World Factbook, the OIC Member States have workforce of approximately 1104 million, 560 million males and 544 million females. Indonesia, alone, has a work force of over 212 million followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh having work force of 141 and 137 million respectively. Details about availability of workforce in each Member State of the OIC are shown in Appendix-E. Summary of top twenty OIC Member States is shown in Table - 13.

Table - 13: Availability of Work / Labour Force in Top 20 Muslim Countries

Ser	Country*	Population*	Work / Labour Force (Millions)*			Un-employment Rate*	Population below Poverty* (%age)
			Male	Female	Total		
1.	Indonesia	251.16	106.37	105.71	212.09	6.1%	11.7
2.	Pakistan	193.23	72.62	68.63	141.25	6.2%	22.3
3.	Bangladesh	163.65	70.85	66.58	137.43	5.0%	31.5
4.	Nigeria	174.50	57.38	56.47	113.86	4.9%	70
5.	Egypt	85.29	34.36	33.52	67.88	13.5%	20
6.	Turkey	80.69	33.67	32.99	66.66	9.2%	16.9
7.	Iran	79.85	35.99	34.33	70.33	15.5%	18.7
8.	Sudan	34.84	15.63	15.45	31.08	20.0%	46.5
9.	Algeria	38.08	15.34	14.94	30.29	10.2%	23
10.	Morocco	32.64	14.96	14.91	29.87	9.0%	15
11.	Uganda	34.75	11.62	11.67	23.29	-	24.5
12.	Afghanistan	31.10	11.22	10.53	21.67	35%	36
13.	Saudi Arabia	29.63	10.87	9.47	20.34	10.6%	-
14.	Uzbekistan	28.66	12.35	12.52	24.87	4.8%	17.0
15.	Iraq	31.85	11.66	11.28	22.94	16.0%	25.0
16.	Malaysia	29.62	11.25	10.96	22.21	3.0%	3.8
17.	Yemen	25.40	9.14	9.20	18.34	35.0%	52.0
18.	Mozambique	24.09	9.04	9.05	18.09	17.0%	70.0
19.	Syria	22.45	8.20	7.98	16.18	18.0%	11.9
20.	Cote d'Ivoire	22.40	8.20	7.80	16.01	-	42.0

*Source: Data compiled from the country profiles at CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>. Accessed on 22 Jul 2013.

Statistics about availability of work force, indeed, do not reflect correct and true workforce capability of any country. Human resource development index and level of employment, which indicates the ability of the workforce to contribute towards national income, is a better indicator to evaluate the real capability of any nation's workforce. It is a matter of great concern that

rate of un-employment in most of the OIC Member States is alarmingly very high; so is the number of people living below poverty-line. Unless these countries pay special attention towards human resource development, such large workforce would never be able to utilize its potential to the maximum and will not be able to contribute fully towards economic progress and prosperity of their respective nation or for the OIC collectively.

6.2.7 Military Capability of the OIC Member States

According to Goldstein, Realists tend to see military forces as the most important element of national power in the short term.³⁶ Since national security is ultimately based on each state's ability to protect its territories from foreign aggression and to promote its vital interest abroad,³⁷ Amstutz considers that military resources are undoubtedly the most important element of power.³⁸ Study of the human history indicates that most influential nations and states in the world are those who have large military forces. Amstutz asserts that military capacity is the foundation of a country's national power.³⁹ He further adds, the ability to deter aggression or to influence other actors is ultimately rooted in the capacity to achieve its objective through force.⁴⁰ The mere number (quantity) of military force does not reflect true military capability of any nation or a coalition and an alliance of nations. The real capability and capacity of the armed forces depends upon its quantity and quality. The quality, of course, amongst many other factors, includes organizational strength, doctrine, training standards, state of discipline, motivation, esprit de corps, and availability of modern equipment and new technologies. All these elements when put together provide reach, lethality, accuracy and rapid reaction capability to any armed force, which are acknowledged yardsticks for measuring its effectiveness. For general comparison, overall quantity of the armed forces (including army, air force, navy, national guards, and paramilitary forces), availability of manpower for military service and annual defence expenditure are some clear indicators of military capabilities of any state. However, it must be realized that mere figures regarding military force and defence expenditure cannot reflect real military strength of any nation.

Details about military capabilities of the OIC Member States are mentioned in Appendix F, whereas summary of the military capabilities of the NATO, P-5 and G-8 countries are shown at

Appendix G for the purpose of comparison. It is worth noting that total military strength of the OIC Member States is 5.3 million (Army: 4.59 million, Navy: 0.27 million and Air Force: 0.44 million). This force is more than the military strength of NATO forces which is 4.06 million (Army: 2.66 million, Navy: 0.66 million and Air Force: 0.75 million), and is almost equal to the military forces of permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council, 5.26 million (Army: 3.53 million, Navy: 0.81 million and Air Force: 0.92 million). In addition the OIC Member States have a large number of Reserves and Para Military Forces, amounting to 3.25 million and 2.0 million respectively as compared to 3.43 million and 0.49 million with NATO countries.

Besides having such substantial number of military forces, the OIC Member States have enormous capacity of the manpower, which is fit for military service and can be called upon to join respective armed forces if required. Moreover, a large portion of the population reaches militarily significant age every year as well. According to data available at CIA Factbook, the OIC Member States have availability of 639 million (344.04 million male and 295.47 million) people for military services i.e. between age 16 to 49 years out of which 481 million people (257 million male and 224 million female) are fit for military service. Another important factor is availability of approximately 21 million every year reaching up to militarily significant age. For details refer to Appendix - G.

As regards military expenditure, though most of the OIC states are neither rich nor developed many of them spend very big amount on their defence, which ranges from as low as less than 1.0% (Gambia: 0.5%, Suriname: 0.6 %, Mozambique: 0.8%, and Somalia: 0.9 %) of the GDP to as high as 10 % or more (Qatar: 10 %, Saudi Arabia: 10 %, and Oman: 11.5%) of the GDP. Strength of the military forces, along with percentage of the GDP spent on defence expenditure in case of the OIC Member States having military forces larger than 50,000 is summarized in Table-14.

Table - 14: Military Forces and Defence Expenditure of OIC Member States with More than 50,000 Armed Forces

Ser	Country	Total Military Force	Military Expenditure % of GDP
1.	Pakistan	642,000	3.1
2.	Iraq	271,400	8.6
3.	Iran	523,000	2.5
4.	Turkey	510,600	5.3
5.	Egypt	438,500	2.2
6.	Indonesia	395,500	1
7	Saudi Arabia	233,500	9.0
8	Syria	178,000	3.6
9.	Morocco	195,800	5.0
10.	Bangladesh	157,050	1.4
11.	Algeria	130,000	4.3
12.	Sudan	244,300	4.0
13.	Malaysia	109,000	2.3
14.	Jordan	100,500	9.5
15.	Azerbaijan	66,950	2.6
16.	Nigeria	80,000	0.90
17.	Libya	76,000	3.5
18.	Uzbekistan	48,000	2.0
19.	Yemen	66,700	6.6
20.	Lebanon	56,600	2.5
21.	Afghanistan	190,700	10.0
22.	UAE	51,000	6.4

Source: The Military Balance 2013, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2013.

6.2.8 Economic and Natural Resources of the OIC Member States

Possession and exploitation of natural resources and industrial production are essential to the economic development, progress and prosperity of any nation. Availability of raw materials is extremely important for national economic development and expansion of economies. Access to cheap raw materials has always been the main source of competition and conflict at global level. For this reason, human history has witnessed many wars and disputes between

empires, colonial powers and other states. The struggle for availability of cheap and readily obtainable raw material and access to markets continues even in present times, which is considered as one of the main causes of global conflicts. It is an obvious fact that countries gifted with more natural resources have better prospects of economic progress than those having lesser natural resources. The extraordinary oil reserves of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, for example have been major contributing factors to their regional and international influence in the 1970s and 1980s. Similarly, most of the newly independent countries of Central Asia have enormous hydrocarbon energy resources. Whereas natural resources are a great blessing for any country, these can also be a source of serious tension and worry if a country is not in a position to protect and defend these resources from foreign intervention. This threat could be a direct occupation or more often through bilateral contracts and concessions through business deals by multi-national companies, which predominantly serve the national interests of their mother country.

The dispute between Iran and Iraq, Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, foreign interest and involvement (primarily by US and UK) in national security matters of all the Gulf States, US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan (though in the garb of a reaction to destruction of World Trade Center- 9/11/2001), politico-military turmoil in many African countries, including: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Ivory Coast and Liberia and power struggle in Central Asian States are some glaring examples of conflicts and wars for natural resources.

Though, total gross national product (GNP) and per capita income are reliable measures of accessing any country's economic capacity, there are some other critical indicators; such as total exports and imports, balance of payment, foreign exchange and gold reserves, public and external debt, and consumption of electricity, oil and gas, as well. However, Goldstein considers that the most important single indicator of a state's power is its total GDP, which combines overall size, technological level, and wealth.⁴¹ Details of the GDP of all the Members of the OIC are attached as Appendix-H. It is pertinent to note that GDP of Muslim countries is very low as compared to developed countries because economies of these countries primarily depend upon raw material or low quality products. Moreover, overall production is, generally, much lesser than their consumption, which is clearly evident from their exports and imports. Another point of great concern is ever increasing internal and external debts of many

International Conflict Resolution

OIC Member States. Table 11 (below) indicates that only 10 members of the OIC are amongst the world top 50 countries with higher GDP in the world.

Table-15: Top 50 Countries of the World with the Highest GDP (Listed by IMF - 2013)

<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ Millions</i>	<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ Million</i>
-	<i>World</i>	73,982,,138	-	<i>European Union</i>	17,371,618
1.	United States	16,799,700	26.	Argentina	488,213
2.	People's Republic of China	9,181,377	27.	Austria	415366
3.	Japan	4,901,532	28.	United Arab Emirates	396,235
4.	Germany	3,635,959	29.	Thailand	387,156
5.	France	2,737,361	30.	Colombia	381,822
6.	United Kingdom	2,535,761	31.	Venezuela	373,978
7.	Brazil	2,242,854	32.	Iran	366,259
8.	Russia	2,118,006	33.	South Africa	350,779
9.	Italy	2,071,955	34.	Denmark	330,958
10.	India	1,870,651	35.	Malaysia	312,433
11.	Canada	1,825,096	36.	Singapore	295,744
12.	Australia	1,505,277	37.	Israel	291,500
13.	Spain	1,358,687	38.	Nigeria	286,470
14.	Mexico	1,258,544	39.	Chile	276,975
15.	South Korea	1,221,801	—	<i>Hong Kong</i>	273,658
16.	Indonesia.	870,275	40.	Philippines	272,018
17.	Turkey	827,209	41.	Egypt	271,427
18.	Netherlands	800,007	42.	Finland	256,922
19.	Saudi Arabia	745,273	43.	Greece	241,796
20.	Switzerland	650,814	44.	Pakistan	238,737
21.	Sweden	557,938	45.	Iraq	229,327
22.	Poland.	516,128	46.	Kazakhstan	220,347
23.	Norway.	511,128	47.	Portugal	219,972

<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ Millions</i>	<i>Ser</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ Million</i>
24.	Belgium.	506,560	48.	Ireland	217,884
25.	Republic of China (Taiwan)	489,213	49.	Peru	206,542
			50.	Algeria	206,095

Source:

World Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>. Quoted by Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_nominal#cite_note-6. Accessed on 14 April 2014.

It is worth noting that the total GDP of Top 10 OIC Member States is almost equal to GDP of France alone and GDP of Top 25 Muslim countries hardly match that of Germany alone. The same is almost four times lesser than the GDP of the United States. The GDP and the world ranking of top 25 Muslim countries are shown in Table - 16.

**Table - 16: GDP of Top 25 Member States of the OIC
(Listed by IMF - 2013)**

<i>Ser</i>	<i>GDP World Ranking</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ (Million)</i>
1.	16	Indonesia	870,275
2.	17	Turkey	827,209
3.	19	Saudi Arabia	745,273
4.	28	United Arab Emirates	396,213
5.	30	Iran	381,822
6.	35	Malaysia	312,433
7.	38	Nigeria	286,470
8.	41	Egypt	271,427
9.	44	Pakistan	238,737
10.	45	Iraq	229,327
11.	46	Kazakhstan	220,347
12.	50	Algeria	206,542
13.	51	Qatar	202,561
14.	54	Kuwait	185,319
15.	58	Bangladesh	141,275

<i>Ser</i>	<i>GDP World Ranking</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>GDP US \$ (Million)</i>
16.	61	Morocco	105,101
17.	64	Oman	80,571
18.	65	Azerbaijan	73,537
19.	65	Sudan	70,127
20.	68	Libya	67,622
21.	73	Uzbekistan	56,476
22.	84	Lebanon	44,318
23.	87	Turkmenistan	81.92
24.	89	Yemen	39,152
25.	97	Jordan	33.860

Source: World Economic and Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>. Quoted by Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_nominal#cite_note-6. Accessed on 14 April 2014.

6.2.9 Human Resource Development and Education Standards

Corresponding to a large population of the OIC Member States (approximately 1.5 billion), a very large number of people need to be educated and trained to take full advantage of such great human resource available to the Muslim world. As mentioned earlier, a workforce of approximately 900 million (455 million males and 439 million females) is available with the OIC. If such large human resource is properly trained and developed they can bring about an economic revolution in their respective countries and resultantly the OIC would emerge as a real global power. Such development will transform the Muslim world from economic dependency to political independence from the clutches of prevailing world economic order, which is considered inherently exploitative by most of the Muslims in the world. Unfortunately, literacy rate and standards, in general, and human resource development level, in particular, of the OIC Member States are alarmingly very low. In many countries, it is even less than 50 %. The situation

regarding technical and higher education is even worse. There are only a few universities, which fulfil international standards. Government allocations for education in most cases, especially for higher, technical, and scientific education and research work, are very low. Resultantly, the OIC has never been able to take advantage of a large workforce available to its Member States. Details of literacy rates and annual expenditure on education of all Member States of the OIC are summarized at Appendix I.

6.3 INTANGIBLE ELEMENTS OF POWER

Intangible elements of power can be called software of the national power, which converts physical and tangible elements into actual and real power. At the level of the OIC, these elements could include cohesiveness and political will, institutional strength and mechanism, nature and type of governments, diplomatic skills and quality of leadership.

6.3.1 Cohesiveness and Political Will

Cohesiveness, at any international organization level, means commonality and convergence of national interest and willingness to sacrifice individual state's interests for greater cause of the community as a whole. Collective worldview and commonly shared vision about community's objectives, goals and aspirations bring cohesiveness in a group of nations, which otherwise may not be united because of ethnic, racial, and linguistic diversities. In case of the OIC, the main binding force is religion. Islam is a religion of peace and harmony, which advocates peaceful and harmonious mutual cooperation and co-existence without usurping any one's rights and privileges. Due to innumerable reasons, Muslim world is neither united nor cohesive. The lack of unity and solidarity has harmed the Muslims in many ways. For many centuries, most of the Muslim world remained subjected to colonial slavery and their resources were mercilessly exploited by foreign occupation forces. After a brief period of ostensible and nominal independence, the lack of unity and cohesiveness is once again being exploited by bigger players of the new Great Game. Therefore, it is in the interest of all members of the OIC that they should demonstrate greater cohesiveness, unity and solidarity, which is very profoundly mentioned as a desired objective in

the OIC Charter. The same has been repeated as a cherished goal in almost all Islamic Summit Conferences and meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

6.3.2 Nature and Type of Governments

The OIC represents a very large group of nations. It is probably the largest international regional organization, which stands to protect and promote the safety, security and progress of 1.5 billion people living across the globe in 57 countries. It is obvious that structure, character, nature and type of governments in such diverse group of people would differ considerably due to their peculiar history and geography. Notwithstanding their common politico-historic heritage, colonial control over most of these countries, in last two centuries, and their division into many petty small states by their erstwhile colonial masters at the time of their independence have had very pronounced effect on the type and nature of governments which are ruling the Muslim countries. Many Muslim countries are being (or have been) ruled by hereditary monarchs or authoritarian military despots, who have (or had) their personal and family interests, which generally run opposite to the interest of their people. Mostly interests of such rulers are (were) at a tangent to the collective interest of the Muslim *Ummah* as a whole. Only a few countries have democratic system, which mostly suffer from many non-democratic practices and tendencies. Moreover, there is no appropriate forum where representatives of the masses and ordinary Muslims could interact freely and frequently to discuss the common problem and issues of collective interests and look for practical solutions in the contemporary environment. Annual congregation of *Hajj* (Pilgrimage) is an excellent occasion and opportunity for an international conference of Muslims from all over the world but for certain obvious reasons it has been reduced and restricted to performance of few religious rituals only. In addition to formal meetings of diplomats, foreign ministers, and heads of states and governments, it is important to increase consultative contacts between elected and true representatives of the people to develop wise and pragmatic policies to safeguard the collective interest of the Muslims all over the world. A mechanism should also be instituted to ensure implementation of such decisions as a binding obligation for all Muslim countries.

6.3.3 Leadership

The quality, wisdom, foresightedness, sincerity and vision of the political and military leadership have always played very crucial and decisive role in the history of nations. Better leaders would correctly identify national goals, chalk out desired strategies to achieve such goals and take correct decisions through consultative decision-making process. National institutions train and build national leadership. Good leadership provides continuity, consistency, and predictability to decision making at national and international levels. Diplomats play very crucial role to promote the national interests in international system. Skilled, stable and visionary diplomats would manage to resolve very complicated and complex disputes to their national advantage through their diplomatic skills. It can be said without hesitation that Muslim world has not been able to produce very many towering personalities, who could steer the crucial matters facing the *Ummah* at present. Therefore, Muslim world needs many men of knowledge, vision and courage wisdom, who can identify the contemporary problems correctly and get the right solutions implemented without causing any friction and dispute.

6.3.4 Cooperation at the OIC Level

The OIC, over a period of time, has attained a pivotal position to foster cooperation among its members and to help and assist them in finding out solutions to their collective problems. The OIC has established many subsidiary institutions and organizations for this purpose. Some of these are working satisfactorily but many of them are required to work more vigorously to attain the desired level of cooperation in the fields of diplomacy, international politics, defence, international peace and security, commerce and trade, industry, education, human resource development, science, and technology to mention only a few. The cooperation is not only required at governmental level, it rather be encouraged and promoted at people-to-people level by allowing visa free easy travel for all Muslims to the OIC Member States, of course with due regard and consideration to internal security issues of respective member states. Closer inter-action among youth organizations and exchange programs among universities can be very useful in fostering greater cooperation among the OIC Member States. The key to success, progress and prosperity for

the OIC lies in enhancing cooperation among its members to all possible limits.

6.4 OIC AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

As mentioned in its Charter, the OIC supports all UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. To this end, members of the OIC have made phenomenal contribution towards international peacekeeping. Without exaggeration, it can be said that the OIC Member States have provided maximum forces to the UN for various peacekeeping operations. It is pertinent to note that in last ten years the OIC Member States have provided almost one-half of the total forces made available to the UN for various peacekeeping missions. Interestingly almost half of these forces were provided by only two OIC members: Pakistan and Bangladesh. Details of troop contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Operations by all UN members for ten years, from 2004 to 2013, are summarized at Appendix-J. Contributions made by the OIC Member States during same period are shown at Appendix-K. Troop participation by Top 10 OIC members in UN peacekeeping operation, indicates Muslim World's contribution towards maintenance of international peace and security, along with participation in respective peacekeeping missions is shown at Appendix-L. It is worth noting that either Pakistan or Bangladesh has provided maximum troops in the last ten year continuously. Similarly, Nigeria, Jordan, Senegal, Morocco and Egypt have also made substantial contributions towards international peacekeeping. A brief comparison of international community's total contribution towards UN peacekeeping vis-à-vis that of the OIC members is shown in Table-14. Year-wise participation of Top 10 OIC members is also indicated at Table 15.

Table - 17: International Community's Contribution towards UN Peacekeeping vis-à-vis the OIC

<i>Year</i>	<i>International Community, including OIC</i>	<i>The OIC Members</i>	<i>International Community, excluding OIC</i>
2004	58308	27240	31068
2005	68985	31288	37697
2006	72790	33429	39361
2007	84094	37573	46521
2008	88354	39887	48467
2009	93354	43926	49428
2010	100501	49289	51212
2011	98821	46967	51854
2012	94034	42939	51095
2013	85059	41758	43301
Total	844300	394296	450004

Source: Data about monthly contributions by the UN Member States available at UN Peacekeeping website www.un.org. Accessed on 22 Jul 2013

Note: No compiled data is available. These figures are near accurate.

Table - 18: The OIC Top Ten Member's Contribution towards UN Peacekeeping

Ser	Country	Contribution of Peacekeepers
1.	Pakistan	97759
2.	Bangladesh	93572
3.	Nigeria	45603
4.	Jordan	32262
5.	Senegal	20074
6.	Morocco	15775
7.	Egypt	21779
8.	Benin	10348
9.	Indonesia	11566
10.	Tunisia	3856
	Total	352594

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/pages> (Accessed on 22 July 2013)

Note : Data / Info compiled from monthly / year-wise contributions

6.5 CONSTRAINTS OF THE OIC AND ITS MEMBER STATES

Most of the OIC Member States have enormous resources, which, at best, can be called "a great potential." However, they lack the ability to transform this potential (resource) to useable capabilities. This is true in almost all spheres of international affairs and politics. It is more applicable in conflict resolution at three levels, the intra-state conflicts, the interstate conflicts between members of the OIC, and in interstate conflicts between a Member State of the OIC and any other state(s). These constraints or inability to resolve the conflicts at bilateral, regional or international levels have tarnished the image of the Muslim world, in general, and the OIC, in particular. At the time of the Extraordinary Summit session of the OIC held at Islamabad on 23 March 1997 for "Preparing the Islamic World for the Twenty-first Century" Ishtiaq Ahmad, an analyst, had assessed, the OIC lacks effectiveness as a player on the international stage.⁴² In his opinion, the first and foremost reason is that it fails to represent the actual strength of the Muslim world.⁴³

However, he felt that the said Summit Conference provided an excellent opportunity for the Muslim world to chalk out a credible future course of action while taking into consideration its organizational, collective failures and achievements of the past.⁴⁴ The constraints of the OIC can be divided into three categories: constraints pertaining to organizational matters, politico-military capabilities and resource constraints, which are briefly discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

6.5.1 Organizational Matters

The Muslim world, for last few centuries, has not been able to organize itself as per demands and requirements of the modern times. Since weakening and eventual fall of Ottoman Empire, which had some kind of semblance of last Caliphate (*Khilafat*), the Muslim world has lost its ability to organize itself at international level. Therefore, it is unable to identify and protect its collective interest. Most of the Member States of the OIC, in fact 51 out of 57 states, got their independence after World War II. Out of remaining six, Lebanon (1943) and Syria (1944) got their independence during World War II, whereas only four countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Saudi Arabia and Turkey had the status of an independent country prior to 1939. Many Muslim countries, as compared to their pre-colonial status, have been fragmented into tiny states as part of grand design of their erstwhile imperial and colonial masters. Most of the boundaries in Africa are very unnatural. Until 1969, when the OIC was formed, the Muslim world had no united forum even to voice their collective opinion on any issue at the global level.

The OIC has come up a long way since its inception. However, it still lacks the organizational framework to become a true representative of its Member States and to express real aspirations of the Muslim world. The OIC is more of a consultative forum and a chatting club for higher leadership and rulers of the Muslim countries that provide them a good opportunity to vent out their frustration and anxiety, which is, in fact, mostly created by their own actions or failures to act in an appropriate manner. Notwithstanding some appreciable achievements of the OIC in the field of social sector, its capacity and ability to lead the Muslim world out of present turmoil and to provide required leadership in extremely competitive environment of Twenty First Century and beyond is not very promising. The OIC, at present,

is neither structured nor has the political wherewithal to make binding decisions on behalf of the majority of the Muslim world. The Islamic Summit, the highest forum of the OIC, meets after every three years.⁴⁵ An extraordinary session of the Summit can be called at any time on the recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers or on the initiative of one of the Member States or the Secretary General.⁴⁶ The Council of Foreign Ministers meets on yearly basis.⁴⁷ An extraordinary session of the Council of Foreign Ministers can also be convened at the initiative of any Member State or of the Secretary General if such initiative is approved by a simple majority of the Member States. Though mostly the decisions are made through consensus yet in practice, these decisions do not have any binding authority on the Member States. These are more of suggestions and guidelines for the Member States to follow, if it suits them. Moreover, there is no oversight mechanism or any supervisory body to ensure the implementation of the decisions made by the Islamic Summit or the Council of Foreign Ministers. It has been observed with great concern and despair that many Member states do not follow these decisions in letter and spirit. They either ignore or manage to avoid implementing such decisions.

6.5.2 Capacity for Proactive Response

The OIC's authority with regard to conflict resolution among its Member States is a matter of serious concern. The OIC Charter prohibits it to take cognizance of any such matter(s) which is considered (or declared by member states) as internal matters or a domestic affair of the states.⁴⁸ It is true that all members must respect national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other Member States and shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others⁴⁹ and should settle their disputes through peaceful means and refrain from use or threat of use of force in their relations.⁵⁰ However, some mechanism must exist to help and assist the Member States to manage and resolve their internal disputes, which have potential and danger to escalate and to become international disputes, especially those that are likely to invoke international response and intervention. Problems of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970/71, East Timor in Indonesia, and ongoing situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Syria are case in point. It is difficult to say at this stage whether separation of East Pakistan and East Timor and division

of Sudan could have been avoided with active intervention of the OIC, however, it can be said safely that much of the bloodshed in all these conflicts and disputes could have certainly been avoided. The same is true in case of many ongoing internal disputes. Similarly, many inter-state disputes; such as war between Iran and Iraq and Iraq's misadventure of attacking Kuwait could have been managed in far better way, if the OIC had the mandate or had taken the initiative to play more effective and dynamic role to help these countries to resolve their disputes through peaceful means or with help of the OIC. Failing which the OIC should have taken a punitive actions against the aggressors. A collective decision-making in all these cases (or a fear of unanimously decided punitive reaction by all other Member States) could have deterred the aggressor from attacking other Member States. It would have certainly saved the *Ummah* from such great human and material loss. The OIC, besides developing organizational ability to resolve the internal (intra-state) disputes and inter-state disputes among its Member States, needs to develop the capability for "collective defence" and "collective security". The Secretariat and the Secretary General's Office must be equipped and restructured accordingly. Moreover, in addition to defence and security collaboration, the OIC must move towards closer cooperation in the fields of economic development and political and diplomatic support for each other.

6.5.3 Politico-military Capabilities

The military capabilities of any nation or an alliance of nations and coalition of forces are extremely important in international relations and global politics. Greater the military capabilities possessed by any nation corresponding influence it will enjoy in global politics. Military capability alone is neither good enough nor it provides any surety for greater influence, but besides economic strength, it plays vital role as an ultimate arbiter in any armed conflict among nations. Clausewitz, a great military philosopher, whose politico military thoughts have had very pronounced effect on military thought process in the world, in general, and on the Western military approach, in particular, considered war as a purely rational instrument of state policy. Writing in German, Clausewitz used the word *Politik*. His most famous phrase has been generally translated as "War is a continuation of policy or of politics by other means."⁵¹ The end result of using military force

for pursuing a conflict or for managing and resolving a conflict is greatly contingent upon the political and military leadership, who has the authority to use these resources.

Barring a few Muslim countries, many Member States of the OIC have not been able to train their political, diplomatic and military leadership to conduct crises management and to exercise control of employment of their armed forces at global level. No organizational mechanism, such as developed by European Union (EU), Atlantic Council, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), exists in case of the OIC Member States. Such an organized politico-military mechanism is essentially required to analyze and evaluate the security concerns and requirements of the OIC in global context and to make appropriate preparations for the collective security of the Muslim world.

Military capabilities are not confined to number of military forces alone. The military capability is the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.⁵² Most of the Member States of the OIC do have sufficient force structure i.e. army corps / divisions and brigades / units, navy ships and aircrafts etc but they lack other three elements in varying degree. Details of the military personnel held by the OIC Member States are stipulated in Table-10 and Appendix H. Undoubtedly, some Muslim countries have fairly large and modern armed forces but most of them still lack this ability. Readiness and sustainability, which mean ability to deploy the required number of forces in desired theatre (geographic area / zone) in operationally preferred timeframe and the ability to maintain these forces, operationally and logistically, as per requirement of the military campaign (for a longer duration) are, indeed, surely lacking. However, if the resources and expertise available with the OIC Member States are put together through an integrated planning process under some joint planning and control mechanism, especially in the context of collective defence or for international conflict resolution, these limitations can be easily overcome to a great extent.

6.5.4 Resource Constraint

One of the major impediments in the OIC's capacity for international conflict resolution is the resource constraint. Collectively, the OIC has sufficient resources to fulfil their legitimate requirement yet there exists a great disparity in the financial resources of individual member states. Per capita GDP of the OIC member states vary from as high as US \$ 121,700, US \$ 54,100, US \$ 50,100, US \$ 42,000 and US \$ 38,400 in case of UAE, Kuwait, Brunei, Qatar and Bahrain respectively, on one hand, to as low as US \$ 800, US \$ 700, US \$ 699 and US \$ 600 in case of Afghanistan, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Egypt and Somalia on the other hand. Despite some member states having very low per capita GDP, the overall situation is not very bad because per capita GDP of about twenty member states is more than US \$ 5,000 (Appendix-H), which indicates reasonable economic growth and prosperity in these countries. Moreover, many members of the OIC have enormous natural resources, which have not yet been fully exploited and developed. With better management of the collective resources, the OIC can afford to fund and finance its conflict resolution efforts, which in return will be more beneficial to the Muslim world. Peace and stability achieved through these efforts would allow greater economic development and prosperity for all members of the OIC. The OIC states are also quite rich in the human resource. The Muslim world is gifted with enormous workforce (Appendix E). If this potential is converted into technologically qualified human resource, it can revolutionize their economic condition. It will also assist them to control ongoing extremism, internal violence, poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, and unemployment in the Muslim world

6.6 SURVEY ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CAPACITY AND RESPONSE OF THE OIC

In order to assess the potential, abilities and response capacities of the Muslim countries, a survey was conducted by this author through a "Questionnaire" sent to number of experts and intellectuals, who are working *(or have worked) in the field of international peace and security and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. A summary of major conclusions and observations expressed by these experts is reflected in subsequent paragraphs.

6.6.1 Parameters of Survey

- **Population:** Conflict resolution experts, diplomats, academicians, UN peacekeepers and military officers having sufficient knowledge of international peacekeeping and peace-buildings activities across the globe and the OIC's contribution in this field.
- **Sample:** 150
- **Instrument:** Written questionnaire and personal interviews.
- **Methodology:** Quantitative analysis (tabulation and result count).

6.6.2 Part I – OIC Member States and Conflicts

Majority of the participants (58%) thought that Muslim countries are suffering from or were affected by conflicts, which affect international peace and security.

- a. Almost one third (35%) thought that these conflicts were essentially internal, around one fourth (24%) considered these conflicts to be international, whereas approximately a half of them (44%) considered that these conflicts were internal and international as well.
- b. Around 28% opined that Muslim countries were themselves more responsible for such sad state of affairs of the Muslim World. One fourth (25%) considered the OIC's ineffectiveness as the main cause, another one fourth (26%) thought that regional environment could be the reason, whereas one fifth (21%) blamed international imperialism to be the main root cause of instability and conflicts in the Muslim world.
- c. Most the participant (61%) thought that internal conflicts posed more serious and greater threat than those (39%) who considered external threats as a greater danger to the survival and territorial integrity of Muslim world.
- d. As to what could be considered as the main problem of the majority of the member states of the OIC, there was a mixed response. Following factors were identified:

- (1) 44% participants thought that poor and under-

developed political, economic and administrative institutions were main contributory factors.

- (2) 36% considered lack of democratic system / poor governance as a main issue.
- (3) 26% perceived poor economic conditions and 37% pointed out poor human resources (weak education / technological base) as a main weakness.
- (4) 44 % thought that poor national leadership was responsible and 33% each considered that poor military power, poor diplomacy, lack of unity among OIC member states and lack of collective will and vision was responsible for decline of the Muslim world.
- (5) All put together 40% of the participants of survey considered that most of the above mentioned factors were the main root cause of current dismal state of affairs of the Muslim world.

6.6.3 Part II – Potential and Capacity of the Member States of the OIC

- a. One forth 25% participants of survey believed that most the OIC member states possessed sufficient natural and economic resources whereas one third 33% did not agree with them. Remaining 42% opined that only few countries have all such recourses but many of them do not possess these resources.
- b. Almost similar reply was received regarding the OIC member states military power / capacity to protect themselves and their natural/economic resources. A little more than one froth (28%) considered that most of the Muslim courtiers possessed sufficient military capability to protect them and their natural resources. Around 30% did not agree with them and 42% thought that few countries had this capability.
- c. Majority of the scholars and peacekeeping experts (85 %) feel that If the military and economic resources of

all the member states are appropriately utilized for collective defence arrangement (i.e. collective political will and consensus decision making), the OIC member states have sufficient resources to protect the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the member states. However, a small minority (15 %) does not agree with them.

- d. Around one forth (23%) judged that the current political and military leadership of the Muslim world possess political will; diplomatic skills and determination to resolve the crises being faced the Muslim countries. 43% thought that some of them did but 34% thought that they did not possess this acumen and wisdom.
- e. Opinion of the expert about the level of existing Human resources development in the Muslim world is quite mixed. One fifth of them (21%) consider that it is well developed/strong, about 27% of them evaluate it as an average and remaining 28% and 24% participants think it to be weak and very poor respectively.
- f. Almost similar observation has recorded about state of affairs of political, economic, administrative and other institutions in majority of the member states of the OIC, which is as under:

(1) Strongly effective	:	21%
(2) Fairly Functional	:	23%
(3) Weak	:	30%
(4) Very Poor	:	25%
- g. Commenting on if development and strengthening of democratic institutions could help the Muslim world to resolve internal and international disputes, 38% replied in affirmative, 34% did not support it whereas remaining 28% were not sure if could help or otherwise. They thought that it may be of some help.

6.6.4 Part III – Role of the OIC in Conflict Resolution

- a. Majority of experts (62%) opined that the OIC Charter does not accord due importance to international conflict

- resolution amongst its member states and with other states as well, whereas remaining 38% considered it gave required importance to this aspect.
- b. Similarly most of the participants of the survey (60%) concluded that the OIC has not played effective and positive role in resolving the internal conflicts faced by its Member states. Contrary to this, 40% felt it had played fairly effective role in this regard.
 - c. Likewise, opinion about the role played OIC in resolving the conflicts between / amongst its Member states was almost same. Two third participants (67%) considered it ineffective and only one third (33%) thought it to be positive.
 - d. Opinion about the role played by the OIC in finding out just and durable solutions of number of international conflicts and disputes, such as Arab-Israel Conflict / Palestine Dispute, Kashmir Dispute, Iran-Iraq War, Bosnia Herzegovina, Afghanistan Crisis, Gulf War I & II, US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, Kosovo war for independence, East Timor Issue, Darfur Dispute and recent crises in Libya and Syria is also quite mixed. Mostly it fall much short of the expectations and aspirations of majority Muslims. However, in some other areas of cooperation among its members, efforts of the OIC have been appreciated and encouraged.
 - e. Weather or not the OIC, as an international organization, possess requisite political, diplomatic, economic and military capacities to handle the international conflict, following opinion was expressed:
 - (1) Political / Diplomatic Capacity: Yes 57%, No 43 %.
 - (2) Economic Capacity: Yes 63%, No 37%.
 - (3) Military Capacity: Yes 60%, No 40%.
 - f. Vis-à-vis the OIC role in international conflict resolution and if it has been able to play an effective and positive role in facilitating resolution of international conflicts through the UN, general opinion was positive. One third (33%) acknowledged the OIC's positive role

and another 29% felt that the OIC's role was partially positive. However, 38% participants of survey did not agree with this contention and their reply was in negative.

- g. About the OIC Secretariat's institutional capacity to correctly evaluate threat to peace and security of its Member states and develop required response to counter that threat, experts' assessment was again divided. Around one third (30%) was satisfied with existing capacity and capability of the Secretariat, almost the same participants (32%) were partially satisfied. Whereas a little more than one third (39%) were totally dissatisfied and found this important capability/capacity to be seriously deficient and was of strong opinion to build and develop this prowess on emergency and top priority basis.
- h. Regarding the OIC Secretariat's institutional mechanism / capacity for planning and execution of peacekeeping operations under its own auspices, the opinion of the expert almost reflected the same observations. About one third (32%) thought that the Secretariat could plan and undertake such operation and another one third (32%) partially acknowledged this capability. However, remaining 36% were sceptical and did not grant this capability to the Secretariat and thought much more needed to be done before international level peacekeeping operations can be planned and launched by the OIC under its own banner.
- i. Taking into account the military capacity and experience of many member states of the OIC, who have contributed substantially in UN peacekeeping efforts, some being largest contributors of UN peacekeepers, the collective potential and capacity of the all-Muslim states can be put together under OIC's organizational arrangement / mechanism. In case, whether the OIC could play real effective role in international peacekeeping / conflict resolution, especially for peaceful resolution of conflict amongst its own member States? The reply to

this query also had different perspectives. More than one third (37%) replied in affirmative and supported the concept and another one third (33%) partially supported this idea/concept. Though, 30% replies did see any prospects of success in any such proposal.

- j. It was emphasized that many member states of the OIC have many institutions for peacekeeping / conflict resolution and some of these are recognized at international level as well. It was realized that cooperation among all such institutions can accrue appreciable dividend for international peace and security. However, many participants (44%) were not as hopeful and optimistic.
- k. If the OIC can organize all available resources of its member states on the lines of UN, AU, EU etc. for collective employment under OIC auspices for conflict resolution, as mentioned above, will the member states offer desired cooperation and provide all such resources to OIC? Summary of the replies is;
 - (1) Most member states will cooperate and provide necessary military and financial resources to the OIC: 29%.
 - (2) Only few countries would do so: 37%.
 - (3) Most member states are not likely to do so: 34%.
- l. Keeping all factors analyzed above, almost one third of the participants (31%) finally concluded that the OIC member states have positive prospects of agreeing on a Collective Security Agreement. However, 29% considered this proposition less likely and 40% thought it was not likely to happen at all.
- m. With regard to a question pertaining to Muslim countries' ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, in order to safeguard their national interests, the reply was almost identical to other such questions. 30% experts thought that most of the Muslim countries could pursue independent foreign policies for attainment of their national objectives. Another 30% thought that

only few countries could do so, whereas a majority of them (40%) had different opinion and considered that most of the Muslim countries were not in a position to pursue any independent policies.

- n. Hoping that the OIC will be able to re-organize itself as an effective international organization and by evolving collective security mechanism, it was expected by 28% participants that the OIC will play more decisive role in resolving major international disputes, such as Palestine Conflict, Kashmir Dispute and many other crises currently being faced by the Muslim world. Though, more than 40% partially agreed with this conclusion and hope yet another 30% did not share this optimism.
- o. To sum up, 30% participants of this survey showed keen desire that the OIC must focus on resolving international conflicts affecting Muslim countries, whereas 70% desired that the OIC must concentrate its effort to resolve both internal / intra-state conflicts and international conflicts, which are adversely destroying the peace and security in most of the Muslim countries.

6.6.5 Suggestions Offered by Survey Participants

A brief summary of other suggestions received through this survey, which can help the OIC to become an effective international organization for international conflict resolution, is appended below:

- The OIC needs to change its name to make it a more effective and meaningful organization. It should be called the “Organization of Islamic Countries” or “Organization of Islamic Cooperation” rather than a Conference.
- To become an effective international organization, collective economic, political, diplomatic and security mechanism should be evolved.
- The charter of the Organization should be re-written, making it more effective.

- The OIC members have a strategic geographical advantage, which must be exploited.
- The OIC member states need to cooperate and demonstrate political will to translate its agenda into reality and to attain credibility.
- To begin with, The OIC may set realistic and limited objectives and continue to enlarge its scope, as it grows stronger.
- The OIC should establish an “Executive Council” to make collective decisions.
- Conflict resolution capacity will have to be developed. So far, there is no institution, which can undertake this task.
- Establishment of “Joint Defence Force” having a permanent standing strength of 50,000 troops for peacekeeping operations to resolve disputes within Muslim World.
- All OIC states should have a collective security pact on the lines of NATO to avoid invasion of any Muslim country by foreign military forces.
- OIC member states should contribute towards UN peacekeeping missions through OIC Secretariat.
- A nucleus of a few willing countries be created to undertake conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The “OIC Coalition Force” for Conflict Resolution may be established.
- The OIC should develop “Quick Response Force” for crisis management and humanitarian assistance.
- The OIC should look for greater military and economic cooperation among its members and develop common

market / single currency.

- The OIC member countries should create a common fund to help each other, especially the poor / under-developed countries.
- Muslim countries should work for the overall development in education and human resource development of Muslim Ummah.
- Governments should become more democratic and more responsive to public sentiments, which will promote cooperation among OIC members. The OIC does not lack resources rather it lacks political will.
- Establishment of "OIC Policy Research Institute" to continuously analyze conditions of Muslims and suggest measures to face challenges of the 21st Century.
- Establishment of OIC TV channel for worldwide broadcast.

FUTURE ROLE OF THE OIC

7.1 INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

As elaborated thoroughly in Chapter 4, the OIC representing aspirations of around 1.5 billion Muslims residing in 57 Member States is the largest regional international organization. The OIC Charter provides very limited space for interference and intervention into a conflict situation in its Member States. Even if such provisions existed, the OIC, at present, lacks the organizational ability and politico-military capability to perform this task. Many Member States of the OIC having sufficient military capability have contributed positively in the UN efforts for international conflict resolution by actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Taking advantage of this experience and expertise of the peacekeeping operations of these countries, the OIC can improve its organizational structure, including institutionalization of collective defence mechanism. Having done that, it can play an effective role in international peacekeeping operations based on Islamic principles, besides internationally accepted norms of peacekeeping.

7.1.1 Resolution of Arab-Israel Dispute (Palestine Conflict)

The OIC came into existence primarily due to unacceptable atrocities committed by Israel against Palestinian people and an attempt to destroy the holy *Al-Aqsa* Mosque at *Al Quds Al Sharif*. The OIC has not been able to achieve its main objective of liberating Palestine. Neither could it stop ever-increasing brutalities nor state sponsored terrorism of Israel against the innocent Palestinian people, and construction of illegal settlements, which have been declared totally unlawful, illegitimate and unacceptable activity by the UN and the ICJ. The OIC has also not succeeded to facilitate return of many million Palestinian refugees to their homeland. It also could not force the Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 borders and vacate illegally occupied Palestinian and Arab land. On the political front, the OIC has made some progress but most of its efforts and activities, at best, can be termed as politico-diplomatic

rhetoric, which are not backed and supported by corresponding political will, diplomatic determination and required military and economic measures.

7.1.2 Resolution of Kashmir Dispute

The Kashmir dispute primarily pertains to the fundamental right of self-determination for more than 12 million Kashmiris. The OIC has extended diplomatic and moral support to the perpetually oppressed Kashmiris but the OIC's support for Kashmir has also remained restricted to political rhetoric. No worthwhile effort has been made to provide any material or real support to Kashmiri people in their freedom struggle against illegal occupation by India and heinous crimes perpetrated by Indian armed forces against innocent Kashmiris.

7.1.3 Other Conflicts and Crises

Various other conflicts confronted by the OIC members can be divided into four categories: occupation by foreign forces, inter-state disputes, the internal disputes and the freedom struggles by Muslim minorities in their home country. The first category includes current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan as it emerged after the US-led invasion in both countries. Notwithstanding the multinational composition and nature of foreign forces and their legal status, which has remained questionable since the very first day of such operations, the fact remains that the United States plays lead role in deciding the composition of coalition forces and duration of these operations. The OIC, due to its weak politico-military position, is unable to intervene in these situations. The political opposition and militant resistance against foreign presence in both the countries are prominently visible. Some OIC Member States have greater leverage to play their role in these conflicts. However, nothing much has been (was) done to stop internal fight between various factions in both the countries. The OIC must play active role to facilitate complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Otherwise, lasting peace would remain a distant reality and a dream in these countries.

Some conflicts exist between members of the OIC and their neighbours, such as territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Turkish and Greek Cyprus. Though the OIC cannot play any direct role in resolving these issues, yet it can extend all possible help and political support to its Member States

at various international forums, especially at the UN.

The situation in Sudan, the dispute in southern Nigeria, the problem in Sierra Leone, ongoing anarchy in Somalia and suicide attacks taking place in Pakistan are some examples of internal disputes still going on in some OIC Member States. The UN, at present, has its peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone, Sudan and South Sudan. It has already conducted a peacekeeping operation in Somalia from 1992 to 1995. Some observers of conflict and crisis management have expressed sceptical views about international community's ability and sincerity to resolve these problems. They think that perpetuation of conflict in Sierra Leone allows unchecked exploitation of her natural resources. Similarly, aggravation of conflicts in Nigeria has seeds of dividing the country in order to exploit and control its natural resources, particularly the oil. The conflict in Sudan has already resulted into division of that country. The situation in Somalia is, of course, very precarious, especially with regard to ongoing piracy in Red Sea. There are internal disturbances in some other Muslim countries as well, such as politico-military assertions by various militants groups in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The Kurd problem also affects four members of the OIC: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The ongoing civil war in Syria poses great danger for its integrity, unity and future of the country. These disputes have potential of becoming more dangerous conflicts, if not properly controlled by respective countries. More serious aspect of these disputes is the potential to affect their neighbouring countries as well.

7.2 REFORMING THE OIC

The OIC Charter, adopted in 1972, was revised in 2008, though no major conceptual change in the OIC's role and functions was incorporated. Whereas, the current Charter is certainly an improved version of the original Charter, it still does not address the major problem of security concerns of the OIC Member States. It also does not provide pro-active means of conflict resolution – an issue of serious consequences for survival and progress of the OIC Member States in the 21st Century. Another real challenge for the OIC is to guard its member states against neo-colonization and neo-imperialism in the garb of variety of multinational activities and so called globalization. Therefore, it is imperative

that necessary changes are incorporated in the OIC Charter and its organization is modified accordingly. Suggestions in this regard must be sought from all Member States. As a result of these changes, the OIC should be transformed into an assertive and effective organization which is capable of protecting and promoting the legitimate rights, aspirations and interests of Muslims all over the world.

7.2.1 Collective Security and Collective Defence

The revised Charter must include adequate measure for “Collective Security” and “Collective Defence”¹ of the OIC Member States. Details for such arrangements can be finalized by the Council of the Foreign Ministers. More appropriately, the “OIC Peace and Security Committee” may be constituted for this purpose. Defence and security experts and senior diplomats of international repute from the OIC Member States, having experience of international conflict resolution and peacekeeping, should be assigned this task. Based on the recommendations of the Committee and final approval by the Islamic Summit, new provisions for peace and security, having binding obligations on all members, should be incorporated in the revised Charter. To start with, all OIC Member States must sign a “Non-aggression Protocol” and a “Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance,” which will pave the way for greater cooperation on defence and security matter. At a later stage it will provide a framework for a Joint Armed Force for “Collective Defence.” After due deliberations, the OIC should develop OIC Joint Forces Headquarters, which should analyze the security threat to the Muslim world and prepare joint response to be approved by the OIC Summit Conference. As a follow up action, Joint Doctrine to implement various contingency plans needs to be developed. The OIC Joint Forces Headquarters can undertake contingency planning and joint exercises at regional level.

7.2.2 Peace and Security Committee and Security Advisor to the Secretary General

In order to continuously monitor the global security situation and to analyze its effects and implications for the member states and to suggest appropriate response, creation of the “the OIC Peace and Security Committee” is suggested. The Committee may consist of the foreign and defence ministers or their nominees (preferably former foreign and / or defence ministers or a retired service

chiefs of the defence forces) of seven Member States of the OIC, which are elected (or unanimously nominated) by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Committee should meet on quarterly basis and submit regular reports to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Committee should also monitor implementation of the decisions of the Council with regard to issues pertaining to international peace and security affecting the Muslim World. It should report to the Secretary General through the "Advisor on Peace and Security", who should act as ex-officio Secretary of the Committee. The "Office of the Peace and Security Advisor" to the Secretary General should also be established to work as the secretariat for the Committee and to provide required input to the Committee and to the Secretary General. Preferably, a serving or a retired senior military officer, having requisite experience and exposure at the international level, should be appointed as Peace and Security Advisor to the Secretary General. As the concept of "the OIC Collective Security and Collective Defence" develops and matures, this office may be restructured accordingly.

7.2.3 Peacekeeping Operations

In order to ensure that various conflicts, taking place within or amongst the OIC Member States, are controlled and resolved at an earlier stage before becoming a greater danger for the OIC, in particular, and the international community, in general, the OIC must embark upon undertaking peacekeeping operations, under the OIC" auspices, as envisaged in Article 52 and 53, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The case in point is such operations being carried out by the OSCE, NATO, Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). To start with, the OIC may conduct "observer missions" alone. Having gained sufficient, experience, expertise and the confidence in managing these operations, the OIC should start undertaking other peacekeeping activities within two years. The organizational capability and force structure should be developed accordingly. Indeed, the OIC possesses sufficient politico- military capacity and potential to manage all kinds of crises and conflicts within its Member States. The existing capacity only needs to be further developed as a credible capability. Besides undertaking the OIC mandated peacekeeping missions, the OIC must ensure that in case of any new peacekeeping mission authorized by the United Nations Security Council in any OIC Member State, at

least fifty percent force must be contributed by the OIC Member States. This arrangement will require a collective effort by all the OIC members, which will allow early resolution of the disputes.

7.2.4 Creation of Standby Peacekeeping Force

As explained in Chapter Six, many OIC Member States have extensive experience and expertise of providing large number of military and police force for the UN peacekeeping missions. In order to meet complex requirement of peacekeeping operations, much longer time is required for planning and force generation. Therefore, it is suggested that the OIC must maintain Standby Peacekeeping Force. The members of the OIC should contribute specified resources, within agreed (desired) response time, for the OIC peacekeeping operations and activities. The standby arrangement can be made functional on similar lines as already established by the United Nations and some other regional organizations. These resources may be used exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the OIC or may be made available to the UN as well under the OIC auspices. The resources made available to the United Nations out of the OIC Standby Arrangement should be recouped by respective member states within a mutually agreed or a specified timeframe. Survival of the OIC Member States and their economic progress is directly dependent upon the political stability in their counties, which is contingent upon their ability to resolve their intra-state and inter-state conflicts in their individual capacity or through a collective mechanism. Therefore, participation in the OIC Peacekeeping Standby Force should be declared mandatory for all Member States. It is recommended that five percent of the national defence forces, three percent of para-military forces and two percent of the police force should be made available for the proposed OIC Peacekeeping Standby Force by all member states. Necessary mechanism, at the OIC Secretariat, for employment, control and coordination of the forces will have to be developed. Similar standby arrangement may be made for diplomatic, civilian administration and humanitarian assistance resources to be made available by the member states. The Member States shall remain responsible for necessary training and provision of equipment for envisaged peacekeeping operations, in accordance with guidelines issued by the OIC Secretariat.

7.2.5 Rapid Response and High Readiness Force

In crises, such as rapid and swift deployment for humanitarian assistance, rescue and relief operations during natural disasters, peacekeeping and peacemaking or other crises demanding immediate response, the only answer is “Rapid Response / High Readiness Force.” Such forces exist in the world under different protocols and arrangements. Most of the Muslim countries live in highly volatile environment, which demand rapid reaction to many emerging crises. Such response is more important as part of preventive strategy, in order to avert further deterioration and aggravation of the crisis. Though, limited capacity does exist with some members of the OIC, most of the OIC members lack this capability. It is therefore, suggested that the OIC must develop reasonable “rapid response capability” to be able to respond to such situations. Organizational framework and force requirement can be analyzed by the proposed “Peace and Security Committee” and the “OIC Commissioner for Refugees and Humanitarian Assistance”.

7.2.6 Commissioner for Refugees, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management

At present, there are more refugees in the Muslim countries than any other part of the World. This number is increasing due to prolonged conflicts prevailing in many Muslim countries. Unfortunately, refugees affected by the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara, Somalia and Syria have caused a lot of internal displacement. Therefore, number of the internally displaced people (IDPs) is increasing to an alarming level. Though, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Office of Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and many NGOs are extending all possible help, magnitude of the problem demands much greater support than it is available. In addition, many Muslim countries have been adversely affected by a variety of natural calamities and disasters: such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, and droughts, resulting into shortage of shelter, food and availability of essential medicines. Many Muslim NGOs and some governments of the OIC Member States have extended considerable help and assistance, besides similar assistance made available by various IGOs. However, experience shows that a well-coordinated management and

regulated flow of humanitarian assistance was missing due to lack of such organizational mechanism at the national or the OIC level. Recently, Pakistan has established a National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) and Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Authority (ERRA). Similar expertise is available in Turkey, Iran and Indonesia as well. It is suggested that the OIC should establish an Office of the Commissioner for Refugees, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management for better-coordinated response in all such crises situations. Establishment of this office will facilitate high-level coordination with the UN agencies, besides synchronizing all support extended by various governments and other organizations.

7.2.7 Conflict Resolution Institutions in the Muslim World

Many Muslim societies and countries are facing the horrendous damages caused by a variety of conflicts in the Muslim world. The vicious cycle of cause and effect is multiplying the sufferings faced by large number of Muslims, who are the worst victims of terrorism. This situation must be addressed urgently. Therefore, all Muslim countries and societies must focus on a realistic analysis to identify the actual causes and sources of their miseries and sufferings. Hence, the need to establish, as many as possible, centers of excellence for “conflict analysis” and “conflict resolution.” These institutes of “peace and conflict studies” should be established at all major universities in the Muslim countries. Besides evaluating and analyzing the root causes of their local disputes, these institutes must interact at the OIC level to recommend remedial measures at national, regional and international level to get rid of this menace. Moreover, they should interact with the world at large to remove misgivings and negative perceptions about Islam. These institutions should also act as centers of inter faith and inter societal dialogue on all such issues.

7.2.8 Peacekeeping Training Centers

While conflict resolution institutes need to be established at the national and the OIC level to provide conceptual framework for resolution of conflicts at regional and international levels, all OIC Member States, which are maintaining a military force of more than one hundred thousand, should be asked to establish “Peacekeeping Training Centers.” All such centers may be

integrated into an Association of the Islamic Peacekeeping Centers (AIPC) at an appropriate stage. Having acquired required standards, these training centers can become members of International Associations of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). Some members of the OIC are already part of this Association.

7.2.9 Conflict Resolution Fund

The OIC would require sufficient funds to implement the proposed steps, in order to enhance the OIC's capability for conflict resolution. Many proposals have already been made, from time-to-time, in this regard. Keeping in view varying financial capacity of the OIC members, the contributions need to be divided into two categories: mandatory contribution, which should be proportionate to the GDP of the Member States, and a voluntary contribution. It is proposed that in order to generate reasonable financial resources for the OIC Conflict Resolution Fund a mandatory contribution, to start with, may be fixed as following for the first two years.

Based on the actual requirement of funds and contributions made during these two years, the percentage of contribution may be revised. In addition, the Member States may contribute to the general fund or a mission specific fund in accordance with their capacity and availability of resources.

Table - 13: Proposed Contribution for the OIC Conflict Resolution Fund

Ser	Per Capita GDP of the Country US \$	% of the GDP as Mandatory Contribution	No of Countries as per GDP data of 2009
1.	1,000-5,000	0.5 %	29
2.	5,000 – 10,000	1. %	5
3.	10,000 – 20,000	2.0 %	9
4.	20,000 and above	3.0 %	7

Source: Data compiled from the country profiles at CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>. Accessed on 3 May 2010.

Note: Seven countries having per capita GDP less than US \$ 1,000 will make no contribution.

7.2.10 A Comprehensive Security Concept

Unity, solidarity, peace and harmony at home and above all the economic progress provide necessary strength and ability to deal with the outside world. A house divided within sends luring invitation to rest of the world to invade, conquer its land, capture its resources and subjugate its people. Notwithstanding, the moral cries of internationalists, the real world is more often governed by the conclusions drawn by the realists. The ultimate survival is for the fittest. Security is an all-encompassing concept, which does not mean protection from military threat alone. It also includes protection from political coercion, economic exploitation and cultural invasion. Right to exercise collective choice for governance and religious freedom etc. are part of the comprehensive security as well. The security and safety of all natural resources, including food and energy resources is also essential to this concept.

The survival and growth of the Muslim world depends upon their ability to attain and maintain political unity and economic cooperation. In addition, social and cultural solidarity, religious and racial harmony among all Muslims of the world, and harmonious and peaceful coexistence within the Muslim societies and the whole world are key to living a respectable life. These goals can only be achieved if the Muslim world is free from internal strife and strong enough to protect itself from outside aggressions. Internal harmony demands fair and just distribution of resources and equal opportunities for progress and prosperity – in other words good governance. Capability for appropriate response against external threat demands strong economy and sincere leadership, which can withstand global pressures in order to safeguard national interests of their respective nations, while keeping the collective interests of the *Ummah* supreme in all matters. Amstutz considers that five stages: free trade area, custom union, common market, economic union, and political union, are essential for global and regional integration.² Without closer economic cooperation and political integration, the OIC cannot gain the strength, which is a pre-requisite to consolidate and strengthen any regional organization.

7.2.11 Commission of the Eminent Persons and Ten-Year Plan of Action

The OIC Commission of Eminent Persons was established during the Tenth OIC Summit held in Putrajaya, Malaysia in October 2003. The Commission, besides analyzing and making proposal on some other important issues, was tasked to prepare a strategy and plan of action enabling the Islamic *Ummah* to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.³ The Commission submitted its report in 2005, making comprehensive recommendations for reforming and restructuring the OIC. During the Third Extra Ordinary Session of the Islamic Summit, held at Makkah on 7-8 December 2005, it was realized that the Muslim World is faced with grave political, socio-economic, cultural and scientific challenges and the OIC Member States would need to cooperate decisively in order to face these challenges and to take necessary initiatives to overcome them⁴. A “Ten-Year Program of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in The 21st Century” was also issued. Recommendation of the “Commission of Eminent Persons” and the OIC “Ten Year Program of Action” must be implemented in true letter and spirit. The OIC Member States need to incorporate fundamental changes in their governing styles as well. Socio-economic justice, majority participation in collective decision-making, rightful access to and fair distribution of national resources, promotion of democratic practices, elimination of exploitation and intimidation of minorities, and equal welfare measures for all citizens are must to maintain desired level of peace in Muslim societies. The rulers of the Muslim countries must address genuine grievances of their fellow citizens otherwise conflicts will keep arising and perpetuating, which will have very adverse affects on the Muslim World.

CONCLUSION

The OIC Member States have enormous resources, which can be used for their progress and prosperity, provided peace and stability prevails in these countries. Many members of the OIC are suffering from internal and international conflicts but unfortunately nothing much is being done by the OIC Member States to resolve these conflicts at regional and international level. However, if the OIC's potential is translated into capabilities and its capacity for conflict resolution is enhanced, peace and stability can be achieved in the Muslim World, which will results into greater harmony at the global level in general, and progress and development in the Muslim countries in particular.

Some OIC members have participated very actively in UN peacekeeping missions by offering their military and police contingents to be deployed all over the world in support of the mandate authorized by the UN Security Council. Major contributors for UN peacekeeper among these countries include: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Senegal. Nigeria has also contributed substantially to many peacekeeping missions of the African Unity at regional level. Many other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Turkey can also contribute towards the OIC sponsored peacekeeping force, as most of them possess fairly large armed forces. Some of these countries, which do not have adequate experience of international peacekeeping, would certainly require requisite training. Such training can be very conveniently organized by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria Senegal and Turkey, who have enormous experience of UN / international peacekeeping across the globe. Such training can be arranged at regional levels, e.g. in Africa by Nigeria and Senegal, in Middle East and Central Asia by Pakistan and Turkey, and in South Asia by Bangladesh and Malaysia. Gradually, other Muslim countries can also develop national training centers for peacekeeping.

As regards "conflict resolution," this subject has not been accorded due recognition and importance in the universities and academic institutions of the Muslim world. Recently some universities have started undergraduate and graduate programs in "Peace and Conflict Studies." Amongst them are

National Defence University (NDU) and National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) of Pakistan, besides "Center for Peace Studies" and "Strategic Studies Department" is already functioning in Karachi University and Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Turkey, being a member of NATO, has a "Center of Excellence against Terrorism" at Istanbul. Bangladesh has also established a UN Peacekeeping Center at Dhaka. Malaysia is also setting up "Center for Resolution of Conflicts Relating to Muslim Countries".¹ The proposal has been welcomed by most of the members of the OIC. The Secretary General of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, has also asked the Member States to establish a department for peace and security within the OIC General Secretariat, an OIC Peace and Security Council and to activate the Islamic Court of Justice for the resolution of conflicts among Islamic countries.² During thirty-sixth session of the OIC Foreign Ministers Council in Damascus, he also organized a brainstorming session on the organization's role in promoting peace and security. Reminding its members of the numerous conflicts taking place within the Muslim world, he called on them to consider developing OIC's mechanisms for conflict resolution, including establishing future peacekeeping capabilities.³

A long history for many unresolved conflicts in the Muslim world and recently emerging and ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Gulf States and Africa underscore the importance and urgency of developing a collective conflict resolution mechanism at the OIC level. It also highlights the need to organize the OIC's potentials for greater participation in international peace and security efforts. Similarly, it draws attention of the OIC to develop the concept and organizational structure of the OIC peacekeeping force. If these steps, which are crucially important for the survival, progress and prosperity of the Muslim world, are not taken by the OIC, the territorial integrity, political sovereignty and economic independence of all members of the OIC will remain compromised. Moreover, many of these states stand threatened to be physically occupied by neo-colonial and neo-imperialist forces, and alliances and coalitions of the willing as has happened in case of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Therefore, the need to undertake immediate steps in formulating, developing and strengthening the conflict resolutions capabilities by the OIC.

Appendix A

Current United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

(On 1 January 2014)

There are currently 15 UN peace operations deployed on four continents. These include 14 peacekeeping operations, and one special political mission in Afghanistan. These are all led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Africa

- ✓ United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
- ✓ United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- ✓ UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- ✓ African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
- ✓ UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
- ✓ UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
- ✓ UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

Americas

- ✓ UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Asia and the Pacific

- ✓ UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
- ✓ UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) *

International Conflict Resolution

Europe

- ✓ UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
- ✓ UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

Middle East

- ✓ UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- ✓ United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- ✓ UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

*** UNAMA is a special political mission, directed by DPKO.**

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>.
Accessed 1 February 2014.

Appendix B

Past United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

(Up to January 2014)

Some Peacekeeping Missions were given new names as on completion of their existing mandate and these missions continued with a new set of objectives.

Africa

- ✓ United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)
- ✓ United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
- ✓ United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
- ✓ United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)
- ✓ United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOM-SIL)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UN-OMUR)
- ✓ United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
- ✓ United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)

International Conflict Resolution

- ✓ United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
- ✓ United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)
- ✓ United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)
- ✓ UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)
- ✓ United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
- ✓ United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
- ✓ United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)

Americas

- ✓ Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)
- ✓ United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
- ✓ United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)
- ✓ United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)
- ✓ United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)

Asia and the Pacific

- ✓ United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
- ✓ United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
- ✓ United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)

- ✓ United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)
- ✓ United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UN-MISET)
- ✓ United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)
- ✓ United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
- ✓ United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UN-TAC)
- ✓ UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

Europe

- ✓ United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)
- ✓ United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)
- ✓ United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN-MIBH)
- ✓ United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
- ✓ United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
- ✓ United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)
- ✓ United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
- ✓ United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)

Middle East

- ✓ United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)
- ✓ United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)
- ✓ United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNI-MOG)
- ✓ United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

International Conflict Resolution

(UNIKOM)

- ✓ United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
- ✓ United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)
- ✓ UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)

Source:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>Appendix-1.
Accessed 1 February 2014.

Appendix C

Summary of Islamic Summit Conferences of the OIC

Ser	Summit	Year	Location	Title
1	First Islamic Summit Conference	September 1969	Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco	-
2	Second Islamic Summit Conference	22-24 February 1974	Lahore, Islamic Republic of Pakistan	-
3	Third Islamic Summit Conference	25-28 January 1981	Makkah-tul-Mukarramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	-
4	Fourth Islamic Summit Conference	16-19 January 1984	Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco	-
5	Fifth Islamic Summit Conference	26-29 January 1987	Kuwait, State of Kuwait	-
6	Sixth Islamic Summit Conference	9-11 December 1991	Dakar, Republic of Senegal	Session of <i>Al-Quds Al-Sharif</i> , Concord and Unity
7	Seventh Islamic Summit Conference	15 December 1994	Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco	Session of Fraternity and Revival
8	Eighth Islamic Summit Conference	9-11 December 1997	Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran	Session of Dignity, Dialogue, Participation
9	Ninth Islamic Summit Conference	12-13 November 2000	Doha, State of Qatar	Session of Peace and Development "Al Aqsa Intifada"
10	First Extra Ordinary Islamic Summit Conference	23 March 1997	Islamabad, Islamic Republic of Pakistan	Preparing for Twenty-first Century
11	Second Extra Ordinary Islamic Summit Conference	05 March 2003	Doha City, Qatar	

International Conflict Resolution

12	Tenth Islamic Summit Conference	16-17 October 2003	Putrajaya, Malaysia	Session of Knowledge and Morality for the Progress of Ummah
13	3rd Extra Ordinary Islamic Summit Conference	December 2005	Makkah-tul-Mukarramah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, Solidarity in Action
14	Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference	13-14 March 2008	Dakar, Republic of Senegal	Session of the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century
15	4th Extra Ordinary Islamic Summit Conference 3rd Islamic Summit Conference	14-15 August 2012	Makkah-tul-Mukarramah, Saudi Arabia	Session of Promotion of Islamic Solidarity

Appendix D

Geo-strategic Significance of the OIC Member States

Ser	Country	* Area (Sq Kms)	Region	* Geographic Location
1	Afghanistan	652,230	South West Asia	North and west of Pakistan, east of Iran
2	Albania	28,748	South-east- ern Europe	Bordering the Adriatic Sea and Ionian Sea, between Greece in the south and Montenegro and Serbia to the north
3	Algeria	2,381,740	Northern Africa	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Morocco and Tunisia
4	Azerbaijan	86,600	South-west- ern Asia	Bordering the Caspian Sea, between Iran and Russia, with a small European portion north of the Caucasus range
5	Bahrain	760	Middle East	Archipelago in the Persian Gulf, east of Saudi Arabia
6	Bangladesh	144,000	South Asia	Bordering the Bay of Bengal, between Burma and India
7	Benin	112,622	Western Africa	Bordering the Bight of Benin, between Nigeria and Togo
8	Brunei	5,765	South-east Asia	Bordering the South China Sea and Malaysia
9	Burkina Faso	274,200	Western Africa	North of Ghana
10	Cameroon	475,440	Western Africa	Bordering the Bight of Biafra, between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria
11	Chad	1.284 mil- lion	Central Africa	South of Libya
12	Comoros	2235	Southern Africa	Group of islands at the northern mouth of the Mozambique Channel, about two-thirds of the way between northern Madagascar and northern Mozambique

International Conflict Resolution

13	Cote d'Ivoire	322,463	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Ghana and Liberia
14	Djibouti	23,200	Eastern Africa	Bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, between Eritrea and Somalia
15	Egypt	1,001,450	Northern Africa	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Libya and the Gaza Strip, and the Red Sea north of Sudan, and includes the Asian Sinai Peninsula
16	Gabon	267,667	Western Africa	Bordering the Atlantic Ocean at the Equator, between Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea
17	Gambia	11,300	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and Senegal
18	Guinea	245,857	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone
19	Guinea Bissau	36,125	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Guinea and Senegal
20	Guyana	214,970	Northern South America	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Suriname and Venezuela
21	Indonesia	1,904,569	South eastern Asia	Archipelago between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean
22	Iran	1.648 million	Middle East	Bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Pakistan
23	Iraq	438,317	Middle East	Bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iran and Kuwait
24	Jordan	89,342	Middle East	Northwest of Saudi Arabia
25	Kazakhstan	2,724,900	Central Asia	Northwest of China; a small portion west of the Ural River in eastern-most Europe
26	Kuwait	17,818	Middle East	Bordering the Persian Gulf, between Iraq and Saudi Arabia

27	Kyrgyzstan	199,951	Central Asia	West of China
28	Lebanon	10,400	Middle East	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Israel and Syria
29	Libya	1,759,540	Northern Africa	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Tunisia
30	Malaysia	329,847	South-east- ern Asia	Peninsula bordering Thailand and northern one-third of the island of Borneo, bordering Indonesia, Brunei, and the South China Sea, south of Vietnam
31	Maldives	298	Southern Asia	Group of island in the Indian Ocean, south-southwest of India
32	Mali	1.24 mil- lion	Western Africa	Southwest of Algeria
33	Mauritania	1,030,700	Northern Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Senegal and Western Sahara
34	Morocco	446,550	Northern Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, between Algeria and Western Sahara
35	Mozambique	799,380	South east- ern Africa	Bordering the Mozambique Channel, between South Africa and Tanzania
36	Niger	1.267 mil- lion	Western Africa	Southeast of Algeria
37	Nigeria	923,768	Western Africa	Bordering the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin and Cameroon
38	Oman	309,500	Middle East	Bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Persian Gulf, between Yemen and UAE
39	Pakistan	796,095	Southern Asia	Bordering the Arabian Sea, between India on the east and Iran and Afghanistan on the west and China in the north
40	Palestine	5,860	Middle East	West of Jordan

International Conflict Resolution

41	Qatar	11,586	Middle East	Peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia
42	Saudi Arabia	2,149,690	Middle East	Bordering the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, north of Yemen
43	Senegal	196,722	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania
44	Sierra Leone	71,740	Western Africa	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Guinea and Liberia
45	Somalia	637,657	Eastern Africa	Bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, east of Ethiopia
46	Sudan	1,861,484	Northern Africa	Bordering the Red Sea, between Egypt and Eritrea
47	Suriname	163,820	Northern South America	Bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between French Guiana and Guyana
48	Syria	185,180	Middle East	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Lebanon and Turkey
49	Tajikistan	143,100	Central Asia,	West of China
50	Togo	56,785	Western Africa	Bordering the Bight of Benin, between Benin and Ghana
51	Tunisia	163,610	Northern Africa	Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Algeria and Libya
52	Turkey	783,562	South eastern Europe and South western Asia	Bordering the Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria
53	Turkmenistan	488,100	Central Asia	Bordering the Caspian Sea, between Iran and Kazakhstan
54	UAE	83,600	Middle East	Bordering the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, between Oman and Saudi Arabia
55	Uganda	241,038	Eastern Africa	West of Kenya

56	Uzbekistan	447,400	Central Asia	North of Afghanistan
57	Yemen	527,968	Middle East	Bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia

Source

* CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>. Accessed on 22 Jul 2013.

Note: Data compiled from the OIC Member States' country profile.

Appendix E
Population and Workforce of the OIC Member States (2013)

S/n	Country	Population (in millions)					Work Force (in millions)	
		CIA Factbook 1	Muslim Index 2	Military Balance 3	SESRC 4	Male	Female	Total
1	Afghanistan	31.10	32.00	30.41	28.14	11.22	10.53	21.76
2	Albania	3.64	3.20	3.00	3.14	1.60	1.53	3.13
3	Algeria	38.08	33.36	33.76	34.36	15.34	14.94	30.29
4	Azerbaijan	9.59	9.20	9.49	8.68	3.95	4.08	8.04
5	Bahrain	1.28	1.20	1.24	0.77	0.15	0.15	0.30
6	Bangladesh	163.65	169.10	161.08	144.66	70.85	66.58	137.43
7	Benin	9.87	10.20	9.59	8.66	3.09	3.18	6.27
8	Brunei	0.41	0.40	0.32	0.40	0.13	0.13	0.26
9	Burkina Faso	17.81	15.40	17.27	15.21	5.57	5.95	11.53
10	Cameroon	20.55	21.50	20.12	18.90	7.40	7.47	14.87
11	Chad	11.19	10.70	10.97	11.07	3.90	3.98	7.88
12	Comoros	0.75	0.70	0.00	0.64	0.35	0.35	0.70
13	Cote d'Ivoire	22.40	0.00	21.95	20.59	8.20	7.80	16.01
14	Djibouti	0.79	0.90	0.77	0.85	0.29	0.33	0.63

15	Egypt	85.29	81.50	83.68	81.53	34.36	33.52	67.88
16	Gabon	1.64	1.50	1.60	1.45	0.61	0.62	1.23
17	Gambia	1.82	1.90	1.84	1.66	0.64	0.66	1.30
18	Guinea	11.17	10.90	10.88	9.83	4.10	4.05	8.15
19	Guinea Bissau	1.66	1.70	1.62	1.58	0.59	0.60	1.19
20	Guyana	0.74	0.80	0.74	0.76	0.36	0.40	0.76
21	Indonesia	251.16	240.50	248.64	228.25	106.37	105.71	212.09
22	Iran	79.85	77.90	78.86	72.58	35.99	34.33	70.33
23	Iraq	31.85	33.60	31.12	30.41	11.66	11.28	22.94
24	Jordan	6.48	6.40	6.50	5.91	2.55	2.35	4.90
25	Kazakhstan	17.73	15.60	15.60	15.67	7.84	8.32	16.17
26	Kuwait	2.69	3.80	2.64	2.73	1.11	800.00	1.91
27	Kyrgyzstan	5.54	5.80	5.49	5.28	2.41	2.50	4.91
28	Lebanon	4.13	4.00	4.14	4.14	1.71	1.78	3.49
29	Libya	6.00	0.00	5.61	6.28	1.46	1.44	2.90
30	Malaysia	29.62	29.20	29.17	26.99	11.25	10.96	22.21
31	Maldives	0.39	0.30	0.79	0.31	0.14	0.14	0.28
32	Mali	15.96	14.20	15.49	12.71	5.62	5.72	11.35
33	Mauritania	3.43	3.30	3.35	3.20	1.32	1.34	2.66

International Conflict Resolution

34	Morocco	32.64	32.50	32.30	31.23	14.96	14.91	29.87
35	Mozambique	24.09	22.50	23.51	21.78	9.04	9.05	18.09
36	Niger	16.89	15.60	16.34	14.67	5.45	5.37	10.83
37	Nigeria	174.50	164.80	170.12	151.32	57.38	56.47	113.86
38	Oman	3.15	3.20	3.09	2.79	1.34	1.19	2.53
39	Pakistan	193.23	172.20	190.29	163.76	72.62	68.63	141.25
40	Palestine	2.50	0.00	4.14	3.84	0.74	0.71	1.45
41	Qatar	2.04	1.80	1.95	1.28	0.36	0.19	0.55
42	Saudi Arabia	26.93	27.30	26.53	24.81	10.87	9.47	20.34
43	Senegal	13.30	13.80	12.96	12.21	4.69	4.72	9.41
44	Sierra Leone	5.61	6.20	62.94	5.56	6.95	7.26	14.21
45	Somalia	10.25	0.00	10.08	8.95	4.35	4.42	8.77
46	Sudan	34.84	42.20	34.20	41.35	15.63	15.45	31.08
47	Suriname	0.56	0.50	0.56	0.52	0.20	0.21	0.41
48	Syria	22.45	21.60	22.53	21.23	8.20	7.98	16.18
49	Tajikistan	7.91	7.90	7.76	6.84	3.03	3.05	6.08
50	Togo	7.15	7.30	6.96	6.46	2.24	2.27	4.52
51	Tunisia	10.83	10.80	10.73	10.33	4.77	4.68	9.45
52	Turkey	80.69	73.00	79.74	73.91	33.67	32.99	66.66

53	Turkmenistan	5.11	5.60	5.05	5.03	2.34	2.39	4.73
54	UAE	5.47	5.40	5.31	4.48	1.72	0.88	2.60
55	Uganda	34.75	36.50	33.64	31.66	11.62	11.67	23.29
56	Uzbekistan	28.66	28.90	28.39	27.31	12.35	12.52	24.87
57	Yemen	25.40	25.90	24.77	23.05	9.14	9.20	18.34

Source

1. CIA World Factbook,
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>. Accessed on 2 Jul 2013.
2. www.muslimindex.net. Accessed on 02 Jul 2013.
3. The Military Balance 2013, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2013.
4. <http://sesric.org/files/article/384>. Accessed on 2 Jul 2013.

* CIA World Factbook, op.cit.

Note: Data compiled from the OIC Member State's country profile.

Military Capabilities of the OIC Member States (2013)

Ser	Country	*Total Military Force	*Army	*Navy	*Air Force	*Reserve	*Para Military Forces	*Foreign Forces
1	Afghanistan	190,700	184,700	0	6,000	0	149,650	62,556
2	Albania	14,295	Joint	Joint	Joint	0	500	0
3	Algeria	130,000	110,000	6,000	14,000	150,000	187,200	0
4	Azerbaijan	66,950	56,850	2,200	7,900	300,000	15,000	0
5	Bahrain	8,200	6,000	700	1,500	0	11,260	3,100
6	Bangladesh	157,050	126,050	16,900	14,000	0	63,900	0
7	Benin	6,950	6,500	200	250	0	2500	0
8	Brunei	7,000	4,900	1,000	1,100	700	2,250	1,050
9	Burkina Faso	11,200	6,400	0	600	0	250	0
10	Cameroon	14,200	12,500	1,300	400	0	9,000	50
11	Chad	25,350	25,000	0	350	0	9,500	3,378
12	Comoros	0	0	0	0	0	500	0
13	Cote d'Ivoire	17,050	15,450	900	700	10,000	1,500	8,017
14	Djibouti	10,450	10,000	200	250	0	2,500	1,350
15	Egypt	438,500	390,000	18,500	30,000	479,000	397,000	917

16	Gabon	4,700	3,200	500	1,000	0	2,000	762
17	Gambia	15500	11500	2000	2000	0	2600	0
18	Guinea	9,700	8,500	400	800	0	2,600	0
19	Guinea Bissau	4,450	4,000	350	100	0	2,000	0
20	Guyana	1,100	900	120	100	670	0	0
21	Indonesia	395,500	233,400	6,500	30,100	400,000	281,000	0
22	Iran	523,000	475,000	18,000	30,000	350,000	40,000	748
23	Iraq	271,400	193,400	3,600	5,050	0	0	399
24	Jordan	100,500	88,000	500	12,000	65,000	10,000	0
25	Kazakhstan	39,000	20,000	3,000	12,000	0	31,500	0
26	Kuwait	15,500	11,000	2,000	2,500	23,700	7,100	555
27	Kyrgyzstan	10,900	8,500	0	2,400	0	9,500	500
28	Lebanon	60,000	56,600	1,800	1,600	0	20,000	12,543
29	Libya	76,000	50,000	8,000	18,000	40,000	0	0
30	Malaysia	109,000	80,000	14,000	15,000	51,600	24,600	128
31	Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
32	Mali	7,350	7,350	0	0	0	4,800	0
33	Mauritania	15,850	15,000	600	250	0	5,000	0
34	Morocco	195,800	175,000	7,800	13,000	150,000	50,000	0

International Conflict Resolution

35	Mozambique	11,200	10,000	200	1,000	0	0	7
36	Niger	5,300	5,200	0	100	0	5,400	0
37	Nigeria	80,000	62,000	8,000	10,000	0	82,000	0
38	Oman	42,600	25,000	4,200	5,000	0	4,400	80
39	Pakistan	642,000	550,000	22,000	70,000	528,500	304,000	0
40	Palestine	0	0	0	0	0	56,000	0
41	Qatar	11,800	8,500	1,800	1,500	0	0	453
42	Saudi Arabia	223,500	75,000	13,500	20,000	0	15,500	287
43	Senegal	13,600	11,900	950	750	0	5,000	350
44	Sierra Leone	10,500	Joint	Joint	Joint	0	0	0
45	Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,400
46	Sudan	244,300	240,000	1,300	3,000	0	85,000	9,333
47	Suriname	1,840	1,400	240	200	0	0	0
48	Syria	178,000	110,000	5,000	27,000	314,000	0	1,043
49	Tajikistan	8,800	7,300	1,500	0	0	7,500	280
50	Togo	8,550	8,100	200	250	0	750	0
51	Tunisia	35,800	27,000	4,800	4,000	0	12,000	0
52	Turkey	510,600	402,000	48,600	60,000	378,700	102,200	1,570
53	Turkmenistan	22,000	18,500	500	3,000	0	0	0

54	UAE	51,000	44,000	2,500	4,500	0	0	1,428
55	Uganda	45,000	45,000	0	0	0	1,800	0
56	Uzbekistan	48,000	24,500	16,000	75,000	0	20,000	163
57	Yemen	66,700	60,000	1,700	3,000	0	71,200	0
	Total	5,214,235	4,131,100	250,060	511,250	3,241,870	2,117,960	117,447
	Total in Mn	5.32	4.59	0.27	0.44	3.25	2	0.27

Source

* The Military Balance 2013, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2013
 @ CIA World Factbook(<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>). Accessed on 22 Jul 2013

Military Capabilities—Comparison between the OIC, NATO, G-8 and P-5 (in Mn)

S/n	Country	*Total Military Force	*Army			*Navy			*Air Force			*Reserve	*Para Military Forces	*Foreign Forces	@Manpower Available for Military Service (Age 16-49 years)		@Manpower Fit for Military Service (Age 16-49 years)		@Manpower Reaching Military Significant Age Annually		@ Military Exp (of GDP)
1	OIC	5.32	4.59	0.27	0.44	3.25	2	0.27	344.04	295.47	256.96	224.82	13.03	8.06	3.38%						
2	NATO	4.06	2.66	0.63	0.75	3.43	0.49	0.05	199.19	196.76	163.29	160.86	5.58	5.32	2.02%						
3	G 8	6.03	4.05	0.91	1.07	22.29	1.3	0.08	533.64	512.24	428.66	421.8	18.47	17.34	2.49%						
4	P 5	5.26	3.53	0.81	0.92	22.05	1.15	0.01	474.23	455.29	380.21	375.41	17	15.95	3.3%						
TOTAL		21	15	3	3	51	5	0	1,551	1,460	1,229	1,183	54	47	2.8%						

Source

- * The Military Balance 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London, 2009
- @ CIA World Factbook ([https:// www.cia.gov/library /publications /the-world factbook/ geos.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html))

GDP of the OIC Member States

S / n	Country	Sector Wise					Per Capita (US \$)	Inflation Rate (%age)		
		Purchasing Power Parity (Billion US\$)	Official Exchange Rate (Billion US\$)	Real Growth Rate	Agriculture (%age)	Industry (%age)	Services (%age)	Inflation Rate (%age)		
1	Afghanistan	32.50	19.85	7.5%	3730.0	26.9	35.8	1.0		
2	Albania	26.20	12.39	3.6%	18.9	24.4	56.6	3.5		
3	Algeria	275.70	206.50	3.2%	8.0	61.7	30.3	4.3		
4	Azerbaijan	98	71.04	2.5%	7.1	61.0	31.9	7.5		
5	Bahrain	33	26.51	5.1%	0.4	40.9	58.7	2.8		
6	Bangladesh	300.2	118.7	6.6%	18.6	28.6	52.8	7.3		
7	Benin	15.5	7.541	4.3%	35.0	14.0	51.0	3.0		
8	Brunei	22.1	16.85	2.6%	0.7	72.9	26.5	1.2		
9	Burkina Faso	22.9	10.27	5.6%	34.6	23.5	41.9	2.0		
10	Cameroon	49.2	24.51	4.5%	22.2	31.0	46.8	2.5		
11	Chad	19.6	9.72	6.0%	20.6	53.6	25.8	3.0		

International Conflict Resolution

12	Comoros	0.9	59.5	3.5%	1254	48.2	10.5	41.4	3.6
13	Cote d'Ivoire	37.20	24.27	6.0%	0	26.2	28.4	45.4	2.5
14	Djibouti	2.40	1.36	5.7%	2760	3.7	17.9	78.4	2.3
15	Egypt	535.90	255.00	4.0%	6575	13.6	37.6	48.8	12.0
16	Gabon	25.10	16.80	3.3%	16,307	4.6	61.5	33.9	3.4
17	Gambia	4.00	940 Million	5.5%	2151	27.7	16.6	55.7	5.5
18	Guinea	12.00	5.74	4.5%	1108	24.7	40.8	34.4	15.1
19	Guinea Bissau	2	884 Million	4.5%	1160	44.9	13.6	41.6	2.0
20	Guyana	6.10	2.78	5.9%	7874	19.8	33.1	47.1	6.1
21	Indonesia	1193.80	894.90	6.5%	4964	15.3	47.6	37.1	6
22	Iran	863.80	483.80	3.0%	11,087	9.40	43.6	47.0	12.5
23	Iraq	143.40	130.60	12.6%	4,264	4.8	60.8	34.3	5.0
24	Jordan	38.00	31.35	3.9%	5,930	2.7	30.1	67.2	5.6
25	Kazakhstan	225.20	210.90	5.6%	14,420	6.3	38.1	55.6	6.4
26	Kuwait	154.90	174.60	5.1%	41,277	0.2	51.7	48.1	2.7
27	Kyrgyzstan	13.70	6.20	6.0%	2,514	23.9	22.3	53.8	9.3
28	Lebanon	65.60	41.77	5.0%	16,352	5.9	17.8	76.2	3.0
29	Libya	0	85.11	0.0%	0	2.6	72.5	24.9	0.0

30	Malaysia	471.40	307.20	5.2%	16,133	9.4	43.6	47.0	2.5
31	Maldives	3.10	1.54	5.0%	9,429	4.9	16.8	78.4	5.8
32	Mali	19.20	9.60	5.4%	1,351	39.2	20.4	40.4	2.7
33	Mauritania	7.60	4.09	5.8%	2,276	18.4	37.6	44.0	6.7
34	Morocco	168.60	97.17	6.6%	5,183	14.3	26.8	58.8	2.9
35	Mozambique	25.90	14.64	7.8%	1,155	27.9	24.6	47.4	7.2
36	Niger	13.80	6.55	15.4%	886	43.6	16.0	40.4	2.0
37	Nigeria	441.10	272.60	6.6%	2,677	37.2	33.9	28.9	9.5
38	Oman	84.40	79.97	4.1%	26,553	1.2	63.2	35.6	3.0
39	Pakistan	509.10	230.50	4.0%	2,957	20.8	24.3	54.9	14.0
40	Palestine	0.00	6.64	0.0%	0	7.1	25.3	67.6	0.0
41	Qatar	198.30	184.60	7.1%	107,841	0.1	61.3	38.6	4.1
42	Saudi Arabia	706.20	657.00	3.0%	25,900	3.0	59.1	37.9	5.6
43	Senegal	26.80	13.95	4.8%	1,948	18.5	21.4	60.1	2.5
44	Sierra Leone	5.40	3.88	6.0%	875	58.2	5.2	36.6	8.8
45	Somalia	0.00	2.37	0.0%	0	60.2	7.4	32.5	0.0
46	Sudan	113.30	51.58	5.6%	2,682	28.8	29.3	41.9	7.0
47	Suriname	5.30	5.09	5.0%	9,855	5.8	44.3	49.9	10.4
48	Syria	119.20	64.70	5.1%	5,506	21.0	33.9	39.1	5.0

49	Tajikistan	16.80	759.00	5.0%	2,117	28.0	38.8	33.1	9.7
50	Togo	6.60	3.62	4.0%	902	47.2	18.9	34.0	2.0
51	Tunisia	109.60	44.70	5.6%	10,177	10.6	34.0	55.4	3.3
52	Turkey	1075.80	783.10	4.5%	14,742	9.1	25.1	65.7	6.0
53	Turkmenistan	43.90	33.47	6.4%	7,813	16.3	42.7	41.0	7.3
54	UAE	271.10	361.90	3.8%	50,550	1.1	55.0	43.9	3.0
55	Uganda	48.80	20.46	6.5%	1,337	23.0	24.9	52.1	11.0
56	Uzbekistan	100.70	48.30	7.0%	3,482	25.6	31.0	43.4	12.3
57	Yemen	69.90	36.37	4.0%	2,699	10.0	42.4	47.6	11.0

Source:
([https:// www.cia.gov /library / publications / the-worldfactbook / geos.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos.html))

Appendix I

Literacy Standard of the OIC Member States

Ser	Country	Population (in mil- lions) ¹	Literacy Rate ¹			Education Expenditure (% of GDP) ¹
			Male	Fe- male	Total	
			43.1%	12.1%	28.1%	NA
2	Albania	3.64	99.2%	98.3%	98.7%	2.9
3	Algeria	38.08	79.60%	60.1%	69.9%	5.1
4	Azerbaijan	9.59	99.5%	98.2%	98.8%	2.1
5	Bahrain	1.28	88.6%	83.6%	86.5%	3.9
6	Bangladesh	163.65	54.0%	41.4%	47.9%	2.7
7	Benin	9.87	47.9%	23.3%	34.7%	4.4
8	Brunei	0.41	95.2%	90.2%	92.7%	NA
9	Burkina Faso	17.81	29.4%	15.2%	21.8%	4.2
10	Cameroon	20.55	77.0%	59.8%	67.9%	3.3
11	Chad	11.19	40.8%	12.8%	25.7%	1.9
12	Comoros	0.75	63.6%	49.3%	56.5%	3.8
13	Cote d'Ivoire	22.40	60.8%	38.6%	48.7%	4.6
14	Djibouti	0.79	78.0%	58.4%	67.9%	8.4
15	Egypt	85.29	83.0%	59.4%	71.4%	4.2
16	Gabon	1.64	73.7%	53.3%	63.2%	3.8
17	Gambia	1.82	47.8%	32.8%	40.1%	2
18	Guinea	11.17	42.6%	18.1%	29.5%	1.6
19	Guinea Bis- sau	1.66	58.1%	27.4%	42.4%	5.2
20	Guyana	0.74	99.1%	98.5%	98.8%	8.3
21	Indonesia	251.16	94.0%	86.8%	90.4%	3.6
22	Iran	79.85	83.5%	70.4%	77.0%	5.1
23	Iraq	31.85	84.1%	64.2%	74.1%	NA
24	Jordan	6.48	95.1%	84.7%	89.9%	4.9
25	Kazakh- stan	17.73	99.8%	99.3%	99.5%	2.3

International Conflict Resolution

26	Kuwait	2.69	94.4%	91.0%	93.3%	3.8
27	Kyrgyzstan	5.54	99.3%	98.1%	98.7%	4.9
28	Lebanon	4.13	93.1%	82.2%	87.4%	2.7
29	Libya	6.00	72.4%	72.0%	82.6%	2.7
30	Malaysia	29.62	92.0%	85.4%	88.7%	6.2
31	Maldives	0.39	92.2%	96.4%	96.3%	8
32	Mali	15.96	53.5%	39.6%	46.4%	4.5
33	Mauritania	3.43	59.5%	43.4%	51.2%	2.9
34	Morocco	32.64	65.7%	39.3%	52.3%	NA
35	Mozam- bique	24.09	63.5%	32.7%	47.8%	5
36	Niger	16.89	42.9%	15.1%	28.7%	3.4
37	Nigeria	174.50	75.7%	60.6%	68.0%	0.9
38	Oman	3.15	86.8%	73.5%	81.4%	4
39	Pakistan	193.23	63.0%	36.0%	49.9%	2.6
40	Palestine	2.50	96.7%	88.0%	92.4%	NA
41	Qatar	2.04	89.1%	88.6%	89.0%	3.3
42	Saudi Arabia	26.93	84.7%	70.8%	78.8%	6.8
43	Senegal	13.30	51.1%	29.2%	39.3%	5
44	Sierra Leone	5.61	46.9%	24.4%	90.7%	3.8
45	Somalia	10.25	49.7%	25.8%	37.8%	NA
46	Sudan	34.84	71.8%	50.5%	61.1%	6
47	Suriname	0.56	92.0%	87.2%	89.6%	NA
48	Syria	22.45	86.0%	73.6%	79.6%	3.9
49	Tajikistan	7.91	99.7%	99.2%	99.5%	3.4
50	Togo	7.15	75.4%	46.9%	60.9%	2.6
51	Tunisia	10.83	83.4%	65.3%	74.3%	7.3
52	Turkey	80.69	95.3%	79.6%	87.4%	4
53	Turkmeni- stan	5.11	99.3%	98.3%	98.8%	3.9
54	UAE	5.47	76.1%	81.7%	77.9%	1.3
55	Uganda	34.75	76.8%	57.7%	66.8%	5.2

56	Uzbekistan	28.66	99.6%	99.0%	99.3%	9.4
57	Yemen	25.40	70.5%	30.0%	50.2%	9.6
	Total	1657.21				

Source:

Data compiled from the country profiles at CIA World Factbook,
<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos.html>

GLOBAL CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (2004-2013)

Ser	Country	Year of Contribution											Total
		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013		
1	Pakistan	8554	9881	9787	10762	10553	10820	10798	9416	8967	8221	97759	
2	Bangla- desh	7163	8459	10122	9642	9520	9800	10766	10394	8828	8878	93572	
3	India	2934	6191	9290	9348	8745	8703	8765	8115	7839	7845	77775	
4	Nigeria	3579	3515	2412	2502	5206	5910	5837	5749	5441	5452	45603	
5	Ghana	3341	3325	2524	2932	3247	3520	3911	2989	2814	2821	31424	
6	Nepal	1637	3572	3510	3662	3658	4200	5186	3597	4429	417	33868	
7	Jordan	1864	2619	2798	3572	3068	3450	3769	4063	3505	3554	32262	
8	Uruguay	1962	2435	2591	2598	2604	2520	2516	2270	2185	2163	23844	
9	Ethiopia	2863	3419	2771	1875	2322	2413	2412	6224	5857	6507	36663	
10	South Africa	2480	2172	2094	1568	1886	2075	1973	2067	2138	2081	20534	
11	Senegal	1425	1886	1904	1956	2012	2059	2248	2339	2115	2130	20074	
12	Kenya	1832	1562	1305	1091	1012	980	884	834	852	856	11208	

13	Morocco	1544	1707	1548	1537	1561	1552	1562	1579	1601	1584	15775
14	China	907	1045	1648	1830	2016	2120	2137	1924	1869	1868	17364
15	Egypt	109	200	931	963	1162	2405	5258	4083	3577	3091	21779
16	Italy	170	132	107	2455	2816	2535	2265	1108	1127	1113	13828
17	Rwanda	0	6	309	344	2955	3650	3663	3665	4697	469	19758
18	France	561	594	587	1928	1982	2097	1673	1391	968	956	12737
19	Brazil	1013	1268	1257	1271	1297	1342	1339	2493	2199	2201	15680
20	Ukraine	1398	896	564	556	532	383	363	372	516	530	6110
21	Argentina	732	1013	893	889	895	871	858	1039	1025	880	9095
22	Poland	742	726	717	982	989	840	21	17	10	9	5053
23	Benin	326	410	1228	1314	1337	1345	1332	1021	1011	1024	10348
24	Zambia	927	342	449	481	526	609	995	316	215	215	5075
25	Philippines	293	463	559	642	667	690	1064	908	727	738	6751
26	Indonesia	204	205	200	1070	1216	1570	1668	1981	1717	1735	11566
27	Sri Lanka	27	780	1011	1057	1068	1070	1052	1208	1072	1072	9417
28	Spain	28	258	50	1187	1294	1102	1134	1102	723	715	7593
29	Tunisia	518	514	523	506	510	507	509	40	99	130	3856
30	Germany	297	288	255	1019	634	290	287	258	182	193	3703
31	Turkey	288	251	254	966	668	713	547	505	636	636	5464

International Conflict Resolution

32	Australia	141	43	38	110	112	112	108	104	56	56	880
33	United Kingdom	596	391	371	355	342	287	275	279	283	283	3462
34	Malaysia	127	81	99	672	691	947	1090	1187	977	959	6830
35	Portugal	36	22	20	440	355	331	358	332	2	2	1898
36	UAE	435	345	340	307	252	85	86	126	128	116	2220
37	Austria	418	422	422	422	109	421	400	545	545	544	4248
38	Chile	463	585	572	561	522	521	536	538	533	499	5330
39	Niger	431	478	530	581	584	612	531	1145	1138	1120	7150
40	Slovakia	375	303	297	293	185	198	198	162	121	161	2293
41	Ireland	479	462	288	210	91	400	465	493	392	391	3671
42	Fiji	198	52	174	269	272	275	268	375	243	245	2371
43	Russia	340	332	305	298	293	310	362	210	86	101	2637
44	Namibia	853	881	652	645	60	55	58	77	31	29	3341
45	Togo	304	323	332	340	342	615	850	691	720	720	5237
46	Bolivia	232	243	263	454	456	435	438	222	224	231	3198
47	Republic of Korea	39	40	30	393	427	395	401	634	379	349	3087
48	Thailand	6	183	195	61	34	44	47	852	25	15	1462
49	Canada	574	307	192	189	176	175	160	190	150	132	2245

50	Guinea	24	91	120	78	107	91	75	53	51	55	745
51	Finland	234	584	38	258	34	31	101	21	200	200	1701
52	Romania	234	230	232	265	272	90	94	65	72	73	1627
53	Burkina Faso	71	110	153	146	165	275	901	1064	1102	1098	5085
54	Sweden	307	325	327	177	115	78	61	52	76	73	1591
55	Gambia	217	56	63	100	382	352	363	414	307	317	2571
56	Tanzania	0	0	0	110	112	290	1060	1195	1340	1311	5418
57	New Zealand	14	11	14	40	41	38	38	19	13	13	241
58	Mongolia	5	7	257	258	262	312	424	78	932	929	3464
59	Japan	80	30	30	38	36	39	38	260	278	270	1099
60	Guatemala	6	209	217	253	240	284	290	312	303	305	2419
61	Peru	20	236	248	231	233	240	239	387	396	401	2631
62	Belgium	14	15	17	335	353	292	261	130	129	181	1727
63	Hungary	149	109	106	121	118	92	95	88	89	89	1056
64	Malawi	71	68	169	170	175	192	199	883	938	937	3802
65	Cameroon	97	119	120	156	148	150	149	124	106	85	1254
66	Norway	49	66	78	79	86	180	216	50	56	64	924

International Conflict Resolution

67	Zimbabwe	78	83	98	106	126	129	137	94	74	78	1003
68	Denmark	57	91	70	106	68	47	176	21	31	31	698
69	Mali	65	90	106	119	126	120	89	115	63	64	957
70	Greece	27	24	25	253	249	55	49	50	53	46	831
71	Bulgaria	86	60	41	58	62	3	2	2	2	2	318
72	Yemen	8	17	42	75	121	195	216	303	318	337	1632
73	Cambodia	0	0	151	146	144	95	95	35	368	370	1404
74	Uganda	20	29	56	70	123	128	190	37	41	40	734
75	Croatia	28	38	40	56	127	130	136	128	127	128	938
76	Netherlands	16	21	54	195	53	48	48	14	40	38	527
77	Cote d'Ivoire	11	9	8	127	128	160	136	153	161	167	1060
78	Singapore	0	0	0	25	23	20	23	12	0	0	103
79	Paraguay	40	47	52	80	79	85	96	208	209	205	1101
80	Ecuador	6	73	93	93	95	88	89	79	75	77	768
81	Mozambique	234	162	8	5	7	8	3	1	1	1	430
82	El Salvador	12	22	41	47	48	98	113	96	73	106	656

83	Czech Republic	31	26	42	37	38	17	10	10	5	5	221
84	Sierra Leone	0	7	2	3	23	37	244	408	342	217	1283
85	Switzerland	30	29	32	33	32	24	24	22	25	25	276
86	Madagascar	0	4	15	21	164	48	59	57	68	66	502
87	Djibouti	24	24	40	42	51	53	52	38	44	71	439
88	Bosnia and Herzegovina	36	38	31	26	23	22	28	30	47	43	324
89	Chad	4	41	42	15	17	53	65	72	68	67	444
90	Samoa	22	24	35	35	27	17	15	5	7	6	193
91	Qatar	0	0	0	214	3	3	3	3	3	3	232
92	Slovenia	16	15	16	29	31	17	16	17	17	17	191
93	Serbia	23	24	22	18	26	22	45	80	127	122	509
94	Kyrgyzstan	10	18	20	30	28	24	24	20	16	25	215
95	Algeria	14	19	15	13	7	6	0	0	5	0	79
96	Vanuatu	0	0	9	11	14	28	33	0	0	0	95
97	Honduras	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	6	114

International Conflict Resolution

98	Burundi	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	74	87	120	135	461
99	Jamaica	10	13	18	13	18	21	21	21	19	12	12	157
100	Albania	3	3	3	3	1	1	63	0	0	0	0	77
101	Central African Republic	0	0	10	11	12	27	19	40	21	18	158	
102	DR Congo	6	5	4	4	28	20	8	30	17	15	137	
103	Lithuania	8	8	8	9	9	2	0	2	0	0	46	
104	Moldova	6	9	10	10	9	7	7	8	9	10	85	
105	Colombia	0	0	0	2	2	16	26	35	12	12	105	
106	Gabon	6	5	5	8	10	2	0	0	0	0	36	
107	Botswana	0	0	5	5	11	8	0	0	0	0	29	
108	Iceland	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	6	
109	Mauritania	0	0	0	0	15	1	0	0	0	0	16	
110	Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	6	9	11	13	14	53	
111	Brunei	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	30	30	30	103	
112	Libya	0	0	0	0	11	2	0	0	0	0	13	
113	Estonia	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	13	
114	Montenegro	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	6	6	6	27	

115	Cyprus	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	14
116	venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
117	Grenada	0	0	1	0	3	1	1	2	0	0	8
118	Palau	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	3	3	12
119	FYR of Macedonia	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	5
120	Kazakhstan	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	4	0	7
121	Israel	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	Total	58308	68985	72790	84094	88354	93354	100501	98821	94034	85059	844300

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/pages>

Note : Data/Info compiled from monthly /year wise contributions

CONTRIBUTION OF THE OIC MEMBER STATE’S TROOPS IN UN PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS (2004 – 2013)

Ser	Country	Year of Contribution											Total
		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013		
1	Pakistan	8554	9881	9787	10762	10553	10820	10798	9416	8967	8221	97759	
2	Bangla- desh	7163	8459	10122	9642	9520	9800	10766	10394	8828	8878	93572	
3	Nigeria	3579	3515	2412	2502	5206	5910	5837	5749	5441	5452	45603	
4	Jordan	1864	2619	2798	3572	3068	3450	3769	4063	3505	3554	32262	
5	Senegal	1425	1886	1904	1956	2012	2059	2248	2339	2115	2130	20074	
6	Morocco	1544	1707	1548	1537	1561	1552	1562	1579	1601	1584	15775	
7	Egypt	109	200	931	963	1162	2405	5258	4083	3577	3091	21779	
8	Benin	326	410	1228	1314	1337	1345	1332	1021	1011	1024	10348	
9	Indonesia	204	205	200	1070	1216	1570	1668	1981	1717	1735	11566	
10	Tunisia	518	514	523	506	510	507	509	40	99	130	3856	
11	Turkey	288	251	254	966	668	713	547	505	636	636	5464	
12	Malaysia	127	81	99	672	691	947	1090	1187	977	959	6830	

13	Niger	431	478	530	581	584	612	531	1145	1138	1120	7150
14	Togo	304	323	332	340	342	615	850	691	720	720	5237
15	Guinea	24	91	120	78	107	91	75	53	51	55	745
16	Burkina Faso	71	110	153	146	165	275	901	1064	1102	1098	5085
17	Gambia	217	56	63	100	382	352	363	414	307	317	2571
18	Cameroon	97	119	120	156	148	150	149	124	106	85	1254
19	Mali	65	90	106	119	126	120	89	115	63	64	957
20	Yemen	8	17	42	75	121	195	216	303	318	337	1632
21	Uganda	20	29	56	70	123	128	190	37	41	40	734
22	Cote d'Ivoire	11	9	8	127	128	160	136	153	161	167	1060
23	Mozambique	234	162	8	5	7	8	3	1	1	1	430
24	Sierra Leone	0	7	2	3	23	37	244	408	342	217	1283
25	Djibouti	24	24	40	42	51	53	52	38	44	71	439
26	Qatar	0	0	0	214	3	3	3	3	3	3	232
27	Kyrgyzstan	10	18	20	30	28	24	24	20	16	25	215
28	Algeria	14	19	15	13	7	6	0	0	5	0	79

29	Albania	3	3	3	1	1	63	0	0	0	0	77
30	Gabon	6	5	5	8	10	2	0	0	0	0	36
31	Mauritania	0	0	0	0	15	1	0	0	0	0	16
32	Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	6	9	11	13	14	53
33	Brunei	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	30	30	30	103
34	Libya	0	0	0	0	11	2	0	0	0	0	13
35	Kazakhstan	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	4	0	7
	Total	27240	31288	33429	37573	39887	43926	49289	46967	42939	41758	394296

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/pages>
Note : Data/Info compiled from monthly /year-wise contributions

Appendix L

**PARTICIPATION OF TOP TEN MEMBER STATES OF
THE OIC IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
(2004-2013)**

Ser	Country	Total Participation in Last Ten Years	Past Participation	Current Participation
1	Pakistan	97759	Ethiopia, Angola, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor, , New Guinea, Bosnia	Chad, Congo, Darfur, Liberia, Sudan, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara, Kosovo, East Timor
2	Bangladesh	93572	Ethiopia, Angola, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Chad, Libe- ria, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Le- one, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Bosnia	Chad, Congo, Dar- fur, Liberia, Sudan, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara, Lebanon
3	Nigeria	45603	Ethiopia Angola, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Chad, Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, East Timor, Bosnia	Lebanon, Liberia, East Timor, Cote d' Ivoire
4	Jordan	32262	Ethiopia, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Li- beria, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Le- one, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, Bosnia	Chad, Congo, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara
5	Senegal	20074	Angola, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Cen African Rep, Cambo- dia, East Timor	Chad, Congo, Dar- fur, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara, Liberia
6	Morocco	15775	Ethiopia, Congo, Somalia	Congo, Cote d' Ivoire

International Conflict Resolution

7	Egypt	21779	Angola, Burundi, Cen African Rep, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, East Timor, Bosnia	Chad, Congo, Darfur, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara, Liberia, Sudan
8	Benin	10348	Ethiopia, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Cen African Rep, Haiti, East Timor	Chad, Congo, Cote d' Ivoire, Western Sahara, Liberia, Sudan
9	Indonesia	11566	Congo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia	Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan
10	Tunisia	3856	Ethiopia, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, Cen African Rep, Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia	Chad, Congo, Cote d' Ivoire
	Total	352594		

Source

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/pages>

Note: Data/Information compiled from monthly / year-wise contributions

REFERENCES AND NOTES

Chapter 1

1. S. A. Hornby, *Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary*, Seventh Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 319.
2. Victoria Neufeldt and David B. Guralnik, Third Ed, *Webster's New World College Dictionary*, Macmillan Company, New York, 1997, p. 292.
3. Ibid.
4. Kate Woodford and Guy Jacson, *Cambridge Advance Learner's Dictionary*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 255.
5. Professor Tom Woodhouse and Dr. Tamara Duffey, *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000, p. 22.
6. Johnson, Bradford P. and Barnes, Catherine, *Conflict Resolution and Negotiation: A Practice Guide to Diplomacy after Cold War*, Institute of World Affairs, Washington DC, 2003, p. 5.
7. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1981, p. 187, quoted in, William G. Cunningham, Jr., *Conflict Theory and the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict>. Accessed on 2 April 2009.
8. Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960, quoted in William G. Cunningham, Jr., *op.cit*.
9. *Aggression: Problems with Definitions*, http://www.psy.gla.ac.uk/~paddy/level_2/L7_aggrobio.pdf. Accessed on 4 April 2010.
10. William G. Cunningham, Jr., *op. cit*.
11. Ibid.
12. Mark R. Amstutz, *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*, McGraw-Hill College, Boston, 1999, p. 143.
13. Ibid, p. 142.
14. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, 3rd Ed, New York,

1990, p. 30, quoted in Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 142

15. Kutle, Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York, 1979, referred by Tim Jacoby, *Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and interdisciplinary approach*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 28.
16. Tim Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
18. Charles Krauthammer, *The Unipolar Moment*, *Foreign Affairs* 70, (1990/91), quoted in Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
19. Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 229.
22. Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations*, The Macmillan Press Ltd, Houndmills, 1987, p. 136.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
25. Ronald J. Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse* *Journal of Peace Research*, 2001, Vol. 38, No. 3 (307–26), p. 307.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 308
27. Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Dartmouth Publishing Co., Hampshire, 1990, referred in Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
28. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 86, quoted in *Protracted Social Conflict*, Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.com. Accessed on 29 May 2009.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*

33. Summary of "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy"- an article by John W. Burton, [http:// www.beyondintractability.org/ articlesummary/10086](http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10086). Accessed on 10 May 2009.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. John W. Burton, Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension, [http:// www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm). Accessed on 10 May 2009.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Summary of "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy", op, cit.
46. Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, op. cit., p. 5. For further details see also John Burton and Frank Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Tim Jacoby, op. cit, p. 8.
50. Ibid. Also see A. J. R. Groom, Paradigms in conflict: the strategies, the conflict researcher and the peace researcher, Review of International Studies, (1988) 14: 97-115, quoted in Summary of "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy" op.cit.
51. Ibid, pp. 8-9. Also see Groom, op.cit, pp. 105,109.
52. J. Galtung, A. Guha, A. Wirak, S. Sjile , M. Cifuentes, H. Goldstein, "Measuring world development,`1" The Alternatives 1,1975, pp.

International Conflict Resolution

131-58, quoted in Tim Jacoby, *op.cit*, p. 9.

53. Tim Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
54. C. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1981, quoted in Tim Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
55. Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1998, quoted in Tim Jacoby, *op. cit*, p. 19.
56. Tom Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
57. *Ibid*, p, 22.
58. *Ibid*, p. 27.
59. *Ibid*.
60. *Ibid*, p. 37.
61. *Ibid*, p. 43.
62. *Ibid*, p. 49.
63. *Ibid*, p. 52.
64. *Ibid*, p. 101.
65. *Ibid*, p. 123.
66. A. Oberschall, *Theories of social conflict*, *Annual Review of Sociology* 4: 292-315, p. 306, 1978 and A. Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1973, quoted in Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
67. Tom Jacoby, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
68. *Ibid*, p. 144.
69. Professor Tom Woodhouse and Dr. Tamara Duffey, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
70. *Ibid*, p. 33.
71. *Ibid*.
72. *Ibid*.
73. *Ibid*, p. 36.
74. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, Prentice-

Hall, New Jersey, 1978, p. 133.

75. Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid*, p. 8.
78. Dean Pruitt and Rubin Jaffrey, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Settlement and Resolution*, Random House, New York, 1986, referred in Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
79. Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. C. R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981, p. 17, quoted in Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
83. Bradford P. Johnson and Catherine Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Chapter 2

1. Mark R. Amstutz, *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*, McGraw-Hill College, Boston, 1999, p. 53.
2. *Ibid*, p. 55.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid*, pp. 60, 61.
7. *Ibid*, p. 61.
8. *Ibid*, p. 52.
9. *Ibid.*

International Conflict Resolution

10. Ibid, p. 53.
11. Ibid, p. 77.
12. Ibid.
13. Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, p. 22, quoted in Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
14. Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Antoine A. Bouvier, *International Humanitarian Law and Law of Armed Conflict*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000, p. 52.
19. Article 2, Common to All Geneva Conventions.
20. Ibid.
21. Professor Tom Woodhouse and Dr. Tamara Duffy, *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000, p. 67.
22. Shahid Ahmad Hashmat, *Pakistan Foreign Policy and National Security*, Pakistan Defence Review, Winter 2006, Central Army Press, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, p. 2.
23. Ibid, pp. 3-4.
24. Thierry Meyssan, *A Plan to Expand American Supremacy: The Clash of Civilizations*, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article30037.html>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
25. Thierry Meyssan, *op.cit.* Also see Bernard Lewis, *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, quoted in Thierry Meyssan, *op.cit.*
26. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?*, Foreign Affairs, 1993; *The West Unique, Not Universal*, Foreign Affairs 1996; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, *op.cit.*, quoted in Thierry Meyssan, *op.cit.*

27. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, op. cit., p. 13.
28. Ibid, p. 20.
29. Ibid, p. 21.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, p. 28.
32. Ibid, p. 29.
33. Ibid, p. 33.
34. Ibid, p. 41.
35. Ibid. p. 42. Also see Herodotus, *The Persian Wars*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1972, pp. 543-544, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* op. cit., p. 42.
36. Ibid, 47.
37. Ibid, p. 46.
38. Ibid, 51. Also see D.K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire-1830-1904*, McMillan, London, 1984, p. 3; F.J.C. Hearnshaw, *Sea Power and Empire*, George Harrap and Co, London, 1940, p. 179, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, op. cit., p. 327.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Parker Geoffrey, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and Rise of the West*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 4; Howard Michael, *The Military Factor in European Expansion*, in Hadley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984, pp. 33 ff, quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* op.cit, p. 51.
43. Ibid.

International Conflict Resolution

44. Ibid, p. 56.
45. Ibid
46. Ibid
47. Ibid, p. 68.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid, p. 70.
51. Ibid, p. 73.
52. Ibid, p. 76.
53. Ibid, p. 78.
54. Ibid, p. 81.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid, p. 84.
59. Ibid, p. 94.
60. Ibid, p. 98.
61. Ibid, p. 121.
62. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?: Summary*, Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
63. Ibid.
64. Huntington P. Samuel, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, op.cit, p. 125.
65. Ibid, p. 126.
66. Ibid.

67. Ibid, p. 134.
68. Ibid, p. 135
69. Ibid, p. 177.
70. Ibid, p. 183.
71. Ibid, p. 184.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid, p. 185.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid, p. 190.
76. Ibid, p. 207.
77. Ibid, p. 268.
78. Ibid, p. 312.
79. Ibid, p. 102.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, p. 104.
82. Sato Seizaburo, A Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan, Asia Pacific Review, October 1997, <http://www.sbpark.com/inn60.html>. Accessed on 25 February 2010.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Edward W. Said, The Clash of Ignorance, The Nation, October 22, 2001, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>. Accessed

International Conflict Resolution

on 25 February 2010.

91. Ibid.
92. Thierry Messyan, A Plan to Expand American Supremacy: The Clash of Civilizations, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article30037.html> . Accessed on 30 August 2009.
93. Hisham Bustani, The Delusion of the Clash of Civilizations and the War on Islam, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/bustani290508.html>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
94. Asadi Muhammad, A Critique of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, <http://www.selvesandothers.org/article15618.html>. Accessed on 25 February 2010.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Thompson Scott and Steinberg Jeffrey, British Svengali Behind Clash of Civilizations, Executive Intelligence Review, November 30, 2002, http://larouchepub.com/other/2001/2846b_lewis_profile.html. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
98. Shafak Elif, There is No Clash of Civilizations, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-459/i.html. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
99. Tristram Pierre, Obama Declares an End to Clash of Civilizations, <http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/clash-of-civilizations.htm> . Accessed on 30 August 2009.

Chapter 3

1. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, October 1997, p. 3.
2. Ibid, Chapter I, Purposes and Principles, p. 5.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, Chapter IV, The General Assembly, p. 12.
5. Ibid.

6. <http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml>. Accessed on 9 September 2009.
7. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html. Accessed on 9 September 2009.
8. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>. Accessed on 9 September 2009. Information based on A/61/100 (Annex IV).
9. Ibid.
10. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_function.html. Accessed on 9 September 2009.
11. Article 33.2, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
12. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, *op. cit.*
13. Article 33.2, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
14. Ibid, pp. 25, 26.
15. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, *op. cit.*
16. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, (Chapter VII, Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breach of Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 39), *op. cit.*, p. 27.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, p. 28.
19. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, *op. cit.*
20. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
21. UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, *op. cit.*
22. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
23. Ibid, Chapter XV, The Secretariat, Article 97, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
24. Ibid, Chapter XV, The Secretariat, Article 99, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

International Conflict Resolution

25. <http://www.un.org/sg/sgrole.shtml>. Accessed on 11 Sep 2009.
26. Kofi A. Annan, *Walking the International Tightrope*, The New York Times, 19 January 1999.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/United Nations Peacekeeping>, p. 1.
30. Ibid. Also see Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey, *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000, p. 122.
31. Ibid.
32. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/United Nations Peace-keeping>, p. 1. Accessed on January 1, 2013.
33. Report of the UN Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.
34. Ibid.
35. Lt. Col. Phillip R. Wilkinson, MBE and Richard J. Rinaldo, *Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 1996, p. 34.
36. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op.cit.*, pp, 34,35.
37. Ibid, p. 53.
38. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml> Appendix-1. Accessed 1 January 2013.
39. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml>. Accessed 1 January 2013.
40. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *op. cit.*, pp 24-33.
41. Ibid, pp 34-36.
42. Derived from ROE of various UN Peacekeeping Operations.

43. Joshua, S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, Harper Collins College Publishers, New York, USA, 1994, p. 225.
44. *International Law: An Overview*, Cornell University Law School, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/International_law. Accessed on 5 February 2010.
45. Theodore A. Coulumbis and James H. Wolf, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood, New Jersey, 1982, p. 240.
46. Mark R. Amstutz, *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*, McGraw-Hill College, Boston, 1999, p 306.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 6.
50. Ibid, p. 32.
51. Mark R. Amstutz, pp 324.
52. What is International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet-law>. Accessed 24 September 2009.
53. Treaties and customary international humanitarian law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_treaties_and_customary_law. Accessed 24 September 2009.
54. Protected Persons and Property and International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_protected_persons_and_property. Accessed 24 September 2009.
55. National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the ICRC Advisory Service, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/advisory_service_ihl. Accessed 24 September 2009.
56. United Nations, Secretary General's Bulletin, ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, UN Secretariat New York.
57. Ibid.
58. Mark R. Amstutz, p 314.

International Conflict Resolution

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, p. 315.
61. International Criminal Court, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About>. Accessed on 23 September 2009.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. Chambers. Also see Article 36 of the Rome Statute,
64. Ibid.
65. Article 17 and 20 of the Rome Statue and International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor. <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About>. Accessed on 9 February 2010.
66. Ibid.

Chapter 4

1. Hameed Mehdi, Organization of The Islamic Conference, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, Pakistan, 1988, p. 4.
2. Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of International Organization: A Synthesis, in George Abi-Saab, (ed.), The Concept of International Organization, UNESCO, Paris, 1981, pp. 20-21, quoted in Hameed Mehdi, p. 4.
3. Bernard Lewis, The Return of Islam, in Michael Curtis, (ed), Religion and politics in The Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, pp 9-22, quoted in Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 11.
4. Al-Quran, (III/103). English translation of The Holy Quran, meanings and commentary, King Fahad Holy Quran Printing Complex, P.O.Box 3561, Al-Madinah Al-Munawara, p.170.
5. Al-Quran, (IXL/10). Ibid, p.1591.
6. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 12.
7. Ibid.
8. Najam A. Bezergan, Islam and Arab Nationalism, in Michael Curtis, (ed.), Religion and politics in the Middle East, op. cit., p 14. quoted in Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 13.

9. <http://www.motarmaralalamislami.org/history.html>
Accessed on 26 October 2009.
10. Ibid.
11. Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of Revolution*, Cairo, pp 67-68, quoted in Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 13.
12. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 14.
13. <http://www.themwl.org/profile>. Accessed on 26 October 2009.
14. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 14.
15. Ibid., p. 15.
16. Aslam Abdullah, (ed.), *OIC: a Survey and Assessment*, Arabia: The Islamic World Review, No. 2, Islamic Press Agency, Bucks, England, December, 1983, p. 34, quoted in Hameed Mehdi, p. 15.
17. Habib Chatty, *Islamic Conference*, Official Publication of the General Secretariat of the OIC, Jeddah, quoted by Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 15.
18. *Arabia: The Islamic World Review*, p. 35, quoted in Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 15.
19. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 17.
20. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 18. Also see "Resolution of the Islamic Summit Conference, Rabat, 1969.
21. <http://www.oic-oic.org/home.asp>
22. ITAR-TASS News Agency, <http://www.itar-tass.com/en/>. Accessed 25 October, 2011. The Saudi Gazette, <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=20110629104067>. Accessed 25 October, 2011. Hurriyet Daily News, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=oic-changes-name-to-stress-cooperation-2011-06-28>. Accessed 25 October, 2011. The OIC Resolution No. 4/38-Org, OIC/CFM-38/ORG/RES .
23. Hameed Mehdi, op. cit., p. 19. Also see "The Communiqué of the Third CFM, Jeddah, March, 1972".
24. Ibid.
25. See Article II of OIC Charter 1972. <http://www.oic-oic.org/is11/english/Cahrter-en.pdf>. Accessed 25 on September 2009.

International Conflict Resolution

26. See Article III of OIC Charter 1972, op.cit.
27. See Article VIII of OIC Charter 1972,. op.cit
28. Ibid.
29. See Article XI of OIC Charter 1972, op.cit.
30. Article XII of OIC Charter 1972, op.cit.
31. New OIC Charter, <http://www.islamonline.net>. Accessed 9 November 2009.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Charter of the OIC 1972, op.cit.
37. Article 1 of the Charter of the OIC 1972, op.cit. Also see <http://www.oic-oic.org/home.asp>. Accessed on 25 September 2009.
38. Article 2.3 of the Charter of the OIC 1972, op. cit.
39. Article 2.4 and 2.5 of the Charter of the OIC 1972, op.cit.
40. http://www.oic-oic.org/page_details.asp
41. Article 6 of Chapter V of the OIC Charter 2008, <http://www.oic-oci.org/is11/english/Charter-en.pdf> . Accessed on 25 September 2009.
42. Article 8 and 9 of Chapter V of the OIC Charter 2008, op.cit.
43. Article III and V of the OIC Charter 1978, <http://www3.ircica.org/metinler>. Accessed on 9 November 2009.
44. Article 10 of the OIC Charter 2008, op.cit.
45. See Preamble of the OIC Charter 1972, op.cit..
46. See Preamble of OIC Charter 2008.
47. Chapter 1, Article 1 of OIC Charter 2008.
48. Chapter XIV, Article 26 of the OIC Charter 2008.

49. Hameed Mehdi, p. 19
50. Article II (Objectives and Principles) of 1972 Charter.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Preamble of the OIC Charter 2008.
54. Chapter 1 (Objectives and Principles), Article 1 (Objectives), The OIC Charter 2008.
55. Chapter 1 (Objectives and Principles), Article 2 (Principles), The OIC Charter 2008.
56. Chapter XV (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes), Article 27 of the OIC Charter 2008.
57. Chapter XV (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes), Article 28 of the OIC Charter 2008.

Chapter 5

1. Question of Palestine, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html>. Accessed 3 January 2010.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Background Paper Related to Palestine Status, Status of Palestine

International Conflict Resolution

- at the United Nations, <http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/11550>. Accessed 2 January 2013.
- 12 . THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1-17, 1968, <http://www.iris.org.il/plochart.htm>. Accessed 6 January 2013.
 - 13 . Ibid.
 - 14 . Ibid.
 - 15 . Ibid.
 - 16 . Ibid.
 - 17 . Background Paper Related to Palestine Status, Status of Palestine at the United Nations, Ibid, op.cit.
 - 18 .Kim Murphy. Israel and PLO, in Historic Bid for Peace, Agree to Mutual Recognition, Los Angeles Times, 10 September 1993.
 - 19 .Background Paper Related to Palestine Status, Status of Palestine at the United Nations, Ibid, op.cit.
 - 20 .Ibid.
 21. <http://www.palestine-australia.com/content.php/category/id/33/title/permanent-observer-of-palestine-to-the-un>. Accessed 5 January 2013, and Background Paper Related to Palestine Status, Status of Palestine at the United Nations, Ibid, op.cit.
 22. What is the 1968 Palestinian National Charter (PLO Charter)?, <http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000387>. Accessed 6 January 2013.
 23. Abbas: Palestinians to continue efforts to seek full UN membership, 12 November 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defence/abbas-palestinians-to-continue-efforts-to-seek-full-un-membership-1.395143>. Accessed 2 January 2013.
 24. UN Upgrades Palestine to Non-Member Observer State, <http://www.procon.org/headline.php?headlineID=005132>. Accessed 2 January 2013.
 25. Abbas: Palestinians to continue efforts to seek full UN membership, op., cit.
 26. Palestine to seek UN non-Member State status, Abbas tells General Assembly debate, UN News Centre, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43083&Cr=general+debate&Cr1#>.

UOP0CmcS0Rs. Accessed 2 January 2013.

- 27 . Ibid.
- 28 . U.N. Assembly, in Blow to U.S., Elevates Status of Palestine, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/Palestinian-Authority-United-Nations-Israel.html?_r=0. Accessed 2 January 2013.
29. Q&A: Palestinians" upgraded UN status, BBC, 30 November 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13701636>, Accessed 8 January 2013.
30. Tim Hume and Ashley Fantz, Palestinian United Nations bid explained, Palestine status upgraded at U.N., CNN, November 30, 2012 , <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/28/world/meast/un-palestinian-bid/index.html>. Accessed 8 January 2013.
31. Robert McMahon and Jonathan Masters, Palestinian Statehood at the UN, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/>. Accessed 2 January 2013.
32. Brett D. Schaefer and James Phillips, The U.S. Must Oppose the Palestinian Statehood Effort at the U.N., The Heritage Foundation, 28 September,2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/palestinian-statehood-effort-at-the-un-us-must-take-a-strong-stance-against>. Accessed 8 January 2013.
33. Robert McMahon and Jonathan Masters, Palestinian Statehood at the UN, Council on Foreign Relations, op.cit.
34. David Ariosto and Michael Pearson, U.N. approves Palestinian "observer state" bid , CNN, 30 November, 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/29/world/meast/palestinian-united-nations/index.html>. Accessed 8 January 2013.
35. Adiv Sterman, After UN status upgrade, Palestinians seek to join other international organizations, Times of Israel, 26 December, 2012, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/after-un-upgrade-palestinians-seek-to-join-other-international-organizations>. Accessed 8 January 2013.
36. Hameed Mehdi, p. 17.
37. Article II (Objectives), the OIC Charter 1972.
38. The OIC Charter 2008.
39. Article I (Objectives), the OIC Charter 2008.
40. Article 11, the OIC Charter 2008.

International Conflict Resolution

41. Hameed Mehdi, p. 46.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 52. Also see Report of the Political Committee, the 9th Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Dakar, 1978.
44. Ibid., p. 67. Also see Resolution 7/11 of the 11th Conference of the Foreign Ministers.
45. Ibid. Also see Resolution 9/11 of the 11th Conference of the Foreign Ministers.
46. See Final Declaration of the Second Extra Ordinary Session of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Amman , July 1980.
47. Declaration of the Rabat Islamic Summit Conference, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/1/DecReport-1st%20IS.htm>. Accessed on 2 March 2010.
48. Declaration of Lahore, Second Islamic Summit Conference, September 1974, [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm# Declaration of Lahore](http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration%20of%20Lahore). Accessed on 2 March 2010.
49. Resolution 1/2/IS of Second Islamic Summit Conference, Lahore, 1974 [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration of Lahore](http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration%20of%20Lahore). Accessed on 2 March 2010.
50. Makkah Declaration of the Third Islamic Summit Conference held at Makkah Al Mukkarama from 25-28 January 1981. <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum.htm>. Accessed on 14 January 2010.
51. Hameed Mehdi, op.cit, p. 71.
52. Ibid, p. 72.
53. Resolution No. 1/3-P (IS), "The Islamic Program Of Action Against The Zionist Enemy, [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum\(political\).htm#01](http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum(political).htm#01). Accessed on 2 March 2010.
54. Final Communiqué of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, 16-19 January 1984, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/4/4th-is-sum.htm> . Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
55. Final Communiqué of the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/5/5th-is-sum.htm>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
56. Resolution No. L / 5-P (Is), On the Palestine Question and the

- Situation in The Middle East, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/5/5th-is-sumpolitical.htm>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
57. Ibid.
58. Final Communiqué of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, 13-15 December 1994, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-is-summit.htm#FINALCOMMUNIQUE>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
59. Ibid.
60. Casablanca Declaration, the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, 13-15 December, 1994, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-ssummit.htm#CASABLANCADECLARATION>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
61. Ibid.
62. See Final Communiqué of the Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, 9-11 December, 1997, op.cit.
63. Final Communiqué of the Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, 9-11 December, 1997, op.cit. Also see Tehran Declaration, The Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, 9-11 December, 1997, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-is-summits.htm#TehranDeclaration>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
64. Final Communiqué of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, Doha, 12-13 November 2000, http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/9/9th-is-sum-final_communique.htm. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Final Communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Knowledge and Morality for the Progress of Ummah), 16-17 October 2003, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/10/10is-fc-en.htm>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010. Also see Declaration on Al Qudas al-Sharif and Palestine, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/10/declaration.htm>. Accessed on 2 Mar 2010.
69. Final Communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Summit Conference (Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, Solidarity in Action), <http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/fc-exsumm-en.htm>. Accessed on 2 Mar 10.

70. Secretary General's Report, New Vision for the Muslim World: Solidarity in Action, The Third Extraordinary Session Of The Islamic Summit Conference, Makkah-tul-Mukarramah, 7-8 December 2005, <http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/sg-report.htm>. Accessed on 2 March 2010.
71. Final Communiqué of the Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century), OIC / SUMMIT-11/2008/FC/Final, www.oic-oci.org/is11/english/FC-11-SUMMIT-en.pdf. Accessed on 2 February 2010.
72. Final Communiqué of Extraordinary Islamic Solidarity Summit, Arab News, 17 August 2012, <http://www.arabnews.com/node/421129>. Accessed 8 January 2013.
73. Final Communiqué adopted by the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference Promotion of Islamic Solidarity Makkah-tul-Mukarramah, 14-15 August 2012, OIC / EX-SUM-4/2012/FC/FINAL.
74. Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Eighth Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session Of Peace And Development – Intifada Al-Aqsa), Bamako, Republic Of Mali, 25-27 June 2001, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/28/28-ICFM-FC-en.htm>. Accessed on 4 Mar 2010.
75. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 2000/11/15, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/dqzzywt/2633/2634/t15538.htm>. Accessed on 27 January 2010.
76. Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Khartoum, 25-27 June, 2002, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/29/29icfm-final-e.htm>. Accessed on 4 March 2010.
77. See Declaration issued by The 29th Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on The Dangerous Situation In Palestine", <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/29/29%20icfm-dec-pal-e.htm>. Accessed on 4 Mar 2010.
78. Final Communiqué of the Thirtieth Session of the Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Tehran, 28-30 May, 2003, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/30/30icfm-fc-en.htm>. Accessed on 4 Mar 2010.
79. See Final Communiqué of The Thirty-first Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Progress and Global Harmony), Istanbul, 14-16 June 2004, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/31/31icfm-fc-en.htm>. Accessed on 4 Mar 2010.
80. Ibid.

- 81 . Final Communiqué of the Thirty-second Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Integration and Development), ICFM/32-2005/FC/FINAL.
- 82 . Final Communiqué of the Thirty-third Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, <http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/fc.htm>. Accessed on 29 January 2010.
- 83 . Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Progress and Harmony), OIC/34-ICFM/2007/FC/FINAL.
- 84 . See Kampala Declaration, <http://www.oic-oci.org/35cfm/english/res/KampalaDeclaration.pdf>. Accessed on 4 Mar 2010.
- 85 . Damascus Declaration adopted by The Thirty-Sixth Session of The OIC Council of Foreign Ministers Session (Enhancing Islamic Solidarity) Damascus , 23-25 May 2009. <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/8893B3013A655B6E852575C2006363A5>. Accessed on 30 March 2010.
- 86 . Resolution No.1/37-IBO on The Islamic Office For The Boycott of Israel, OIC/CFM-37/2010/IBO/FINAL.
- 87 . Ibid.
- 88 . Resolution No. 1/37-PAL on the Cause of Palestine, OIC/CFM-37/2010/PAL/RES/FINAL.
- 89 . Resolutions on the Cause of Palestine, the City of Al-Qudas Al-Sharif, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict adopted by The Thirty-Eighth Session of The Council of Foreign Ministers (Session Of Peace, Cooperation and Development) Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan , 28 – 30 JUNE 2011 (26 – 28 RAJAB 1432H), OIC/CFM-38/2011/PAL/RESOLUTION/FINAL.
- 90 . Resolution No. 1/39-Pal on The Cause Of Palestine, OIC/CFM-39/2012/PAL/RES/FINAL
- 91 . Ibid.
- 92 . The Mecca Declaration of the Third Islamic Summit Conference, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum.htm>. Accessed On 2 March 2010.
- 93 . Rizwan Asghar, Gaza Blockade, The News International, Pakistan, 16 January 2010.
- 94 . Abbas calls for settlement freeze “for a fixed period, The News International, Pakistan, 13 January, 2010.

International Conflict Resolution

95. Ibid
96. At least nine activists killed: Israeli commandos stormed aid fleet, Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan, 1 June 2010.
97. Ibid.
98. Nine die as Israel stormed aid ship, The News International, Karachi, 1 June 2010.
99. Turkey wants US condemnation of Israeli raid, Associated Press, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5infX-83Qg20idVFtW3FcluMFJNncgD9G2ING00>. Accessed 1 June 2010.
100. Israel is isolated by world condemnation after attack on the aid flotilla, News, Scotsman.com, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/Israel-is-isolated-by-world.6331462.jp>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.
101. Israel under pressure after flotilla attack, Guardian Daily, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/audio/2010/jun/01/guardian-daily-podcast>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.
102. Demands Grow on Israel to Open Gaza Border After Aid Ship Clash, Bloomberg Businessweek, 1 June 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-01/demands-grow-on-israel-to-open-gaza-border-after-aid-ship-clash.html>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.
103. Ibid.
104. UN stops short of condemning naval attack, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/un-stops-short-of-condemning-naval-attack-20100601-wvgj.html>. Accessed on 2 June 2010.
105. Lieberman to UN Chief: International community is two-faced for condemning Israel, Haaretz.com, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defence/liberman-to-un-chief-international-community-is-two-faced-for-condemning-israel-1.293299>. Accessed on 1 June 2010. Also see "Security Council calls for prompt, impartial probe into deadly Gaza convoy incident", UN News Center, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34892&Cr=palestin&Cr1=>. Accessed on 3 June 2010.
106. Israel should lead investigation into attack on Gaza flotilla, says US, guardian.co.uk, 1 June 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/israel-investigation-attack-gaza-flotilla-us>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.

107. Erdogan to Israel: Do not test our patience, Ynetnews, 1 June 2010, Ynet.com, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3897404,00.html>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.
108. The Gaza Disaster, National Interest online, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23458>. Accessed on 1 June 2010. The same was reported by Haartz.com. Mossad chief: Israel gradually becoming burden on U.S., Haartz.com, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defence/mossad-chief-israel-gradually-becoming-burden-on-u-s-1.293540>. Accessed on 1 June 2010.
109. UN rights body votes to dispatch independent probe into “attack” on Gaza aid convoy, UN News Center, op. cit., Accessed on 3 June 2010.
110. Israeli govt. treats international law with disdain: UN, Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan, 2 June 2010.
111. Kashmir – The History, <http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php>. Accessed 18 January 2010.
112. Ibid.
113. Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 352.
114. Ibid, p. 356.
115. Sibtain Tahir, *Kashmir and the United Nations*, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid –I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1990, p. 20. Also see K. Sarwar Hasan, (ed.), *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question*, The Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966, p. 43.
116. Kashmir – The History, <http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php>. Accessed on 18 January 2010.
117. Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, p. 357.
118. Wajahat Ahmad, *Kashmir and the United Nations*, Countercurrent.org, 27 August 2008, <http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmad270808.htm>. Accessed on 25 April 2010.
119. Resolution of the Security Council of January 5, 1949, http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/UN_Resolution.ht. Accessed on 18 January 2010.
120. Sibtain Tahir, op. cit., pp 89-90. Also see Reports on Kashmir by United Nations Representatives, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 1962, pp 20-21.

121. Ibid, p. 93. Also see Year Book of the United Nations, 1951, p. 340.
122. Ibid, p. 92.
123. Syed Noorul Hassan Rafai (Retd) IFS and Abdul Kabeer Karipak (Retd) IFS (Editors), Kashmir Bleeds, The Human Rights Commission Srinagar, Kashmir, December 1990, reproduces by Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1991, p. 9.
124. Ibid.
125. Final Communiqué of The Sixth Islamic Summit Conference (Session Of Al-Qudas Al-Sharif, Concord And Unity) Dakar, Republic, 9-11 December 1991, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/6/6th-is-sumfinalCom.htm>. Accessed on 2 March 2010.
126. The Seventh Islamic Summit Conference Casablanca, 13-15 December 1994, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-is-summit.htm#SPECIALDECLARATIONONJAMMUANDKASHMIR>. Accessed on 2 March 2010.
127. See Final Communiqué of the Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, op. cit.
128. Final Communiqué of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, op.cit.
129. Final Communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Summit Conference, op.,cit.
130. Final Communiqué of the Third Extra-ordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, op.,cit.
131. Final Communiqué of the Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Centaury), OIC/SUM-MIT-11/2008/FC/Final, op.,cit.
132. Final Communiqué of the Twenty-seventh Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, 27-30 June, 2000, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/27/final27.htm>. Accessed on 31 March 2010.
133. Ibid.
134. Final Communiqué of the Twenty-ninth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Khartoum, June 2002, op., cit.
135. Final Communiqué of the Thirtieth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Tehran, May 2003, op., cit.
136. Final Communiqués of the Thirty-first, Thirty-second, Thirty-third

and Thirty-fourth Sessions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, op.,cit.

137. Final Communiqué of the Thirty-third Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, op. cit.
138. Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, op. cit.
139. Ibid.
140. Press Statement by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on the Conclusion of 34th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/PressStatementbytheFM.htm. Accessed on 27 January 2010.
141. Resolution No. 2/35-P adopted by the 35th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC, Kampala, June 2008, OIC/CFM-35/2008/POL/RES/FINAL.
142. Ibid.
143. Resolution No. 2/36-P adopted by the 36th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC, Damascus, May 2009, OIC/CFM-35/2009/POL/RES/FINAL.
144. Resolution No.2/38-POL on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute, Resolution on Political Affairs adopted by The Thirty –Eighth Session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers (Session of the Peace, Cooperation and Development), Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan, 28 – 30 JUNE 2011, OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL.
145. Ibid.
146. Resolution NO.3/38-POL on Peace Process Between India and Pakistan, OIC/CFM-38/2011/POL/FINAL.
147. Resolutions on Political Affairs Adopted by The Thirty-ninth Session Of The Council Of Foreign Ministers, (Session Of Solidarity For Sustainable Development) Djibouti, Republic Of Djibouti 01-03 Muharram1434 H (15 – 17 November 2012), OIC/CFM-39/2012/POL/RES.
148. Ibid.
149. Final Communiqué of the Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Centaury), OIC/SUM-MIT-11/2008/FC/Final, op.,cit.
150. Ibid.

International Conflict Resolution

151. Uncertainty and war mar Pakistan's progress: WB, Dawn, Karachi, Pakistan, 26 April, 2010, p. 12.
152. Final Communiqué of the Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century), OIC/SUM-MIT-11/2008/FC/Final, op. cit.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid.

Chapter 6

1. http://www.china-rofile.com/data/fig_WPP2008_TotPop_Top20.htm. Also see www.unpopulation.org. Accessed on 25 May 2010.
 2. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Ed., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1978, p. 29, quoted in Mark R. Amstutz, *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*, McGraw-Hill College, Boston, 1999, op. cit., p. 127
 3. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 2nd Ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey 1978, p. 23.
 4. Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, Harper Collin College Publishers, New York, 1994, p. 50.
 5. Mark R. Amstutz., op. cit., p. 127. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 93-94, quoted in Amstutz, op.cit.
 6. Mark R. Amstutz, op. cit., p. 128.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Ibid, p. 130.
 11. Ibid.
- 252

12. Arthur Sharplin, *Strategic Management*, McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1985, p. 141.
13. Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.* p. 132.
14. http://oicvet.org/imgs/news/Image/SWG2-OpeningStatement_Dr.AbdullateefBello.IDB.Chief.of.Data.Resource.Centre.pdf. Accessed on 9 May 2010. Also see IDB-Statistical Data Capacity Building (IDB-SATRAP) initiative, Guidelines and Procedures, <http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Cooperation/StatisticalCapacity-Building/IDB-STATCAP.pdf>. Accessed on 9 May 2010.
15. For details visit <http://www.sesrtcic.org>. Accessed on 9 May 2010.
16. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.
17. <http://www.muslimindex.net/dir>.
18. Joshua Goldstein, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
19. Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
20. Theodore A. Coulumbis, and James H. Wolf, *Introduction to International Relations – Power and Justice*, Prentice-Hall, Inc, Englewood, New Jersey, USA, 1982, p. 74.
21. World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html. Accessed on 11 May 2010.
22. Waylan Johnson, *Oil and Gas: An Investment Always in Demand*, <http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/501/1/Oil-and-Gas-An-Investment-Always-in-Demand/Page1.html>. Accessed on 11 May 2010.
23. World Oil Transit Chokepoints, *op. cit.*
24. World Oil Transit Chokepoints, *op. cit.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. Mark R. Amstutz, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
27. Mapping The Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Washington D.C., October 2009, p. 1, www.pewforum.org. Accessed on 28 April 2010.

28. Ibid.
29. World Top 10-Most Populated Countries, <http://www.mapsof-world.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-most-populated-countries-map.html>. Accessed on 12 May 2010.
30. World's 50 Most Populous Countries: 2010, <http://www.info-please.com/world/statistics/most-populous-countries.html> . Accessed on 12 May 2010.
31. For further details see Appendix 8 and Appendix 13.
32. Mapping The Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population, op.cit, p. 7.
33. Ibid, p. 21.
34. Ibid, p. 24.
35. Ibid.
36. Goldstein, Joshua S., op. cit., p. 55.
37. Amstutz, op. cit., p. 135,137.
38. Ibid., p. 135.
39. Ibid., p. 137
40. Ibid.
41. Joshua S. Goldstein, op. cit., p. 51.
42. Ishtiaq Ahmad , OIC Summit: Preparing for Twenty-First Century, The Nation, March 23, 1997. Also available at http://www.ishtiaqahmad.com/item_display.aspx?listing_id=674&listing_type=1.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Article 8 of the OIC Charter 2008. .
46. Article 9 of the OIC Charter 2008.
47. Article 10 of the OIC Charter 2008.
48. Article 1 &2 of the OIC Charter 2008.
49. Article 1 (serial 4) of the OIC Charter 2008.

50. Article 1 (serial 3) of the OIC Charter 2008.
51. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz and His Works, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm> Accessed on 27 May 2010.
52. Military Capability, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Department of Defence 2005. <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossaryterm/m/g/m3958.htm> Accessed on 29 May 2010

Chapter 7

1. A collective security organization settles disputes among its members. In contrast, a collective defence organization assists a member state under attack by an outside country. For further details see Paul E. Gallis, Nato: article V and Collective Defence – CRS Report for Congress, Congress Research Service, The Library of Congress, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/97-717f.htm>. Accessed on 27 May 2010. NATO is a collective defence organization whereas United Nations is a collective security organization.
2. Mark R. Amstutz, International Conflict and Cooperation- An Introduction to World Politics, McGraw-Hill College, 1999, Boston, p. 83.
3. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report 6: Pakistan and the OIC, September 2005, Senate of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2005. http://www.foreignaffairscommittee.org/includes/content_files/PAKISTANANDTHEOIC.pdf . Accessed on 12 June 2010.
4. Ten-year Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in The 21st Century, <http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/10-years-plan.htm>. Accessed 12 June 2010.

Conclusion

1. OIC welcomes Malaysia's contribution to conflict resolution, <http://www.iacad.gov.ae/venglish/detailnewspage.jsp?articleID=4517&pageFlag=0&newsType=4>. Accessed 5 June 2011.

International Conflict Resolution

2. Call Made in Org. of Islamic Conference (OIC) for a Peace and Security Council, <http://guineaoye.wordpress.com/2010/01/25/call-made-in-org-of-islamic-conference-oic-for-a-peace-and-security-council/>. Accessed 5 June 2011.
3. Saban Kardas, Turkey Calls for OIC Involvement in Conflict Resolution, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 6 Issue: 102, May 28, 2009, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=35051](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35051). Accessed 5 June 2011.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books (Theory / Concept)

- Al-Qur'an.
- Abi-Saab, George, (ed.). *The Concept of International Organization*. UNESCO. Paris, 1981.
- Buzan, Barry, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations*. The Macmillan Press Ltd, Houndmills. London, 1987.
- Coulumbis, Theodore A. and Wolf, James H. *Introduction to International Relations – Power and Justice*. Prentice-Hall. Inc. New Jersey, 1982.
- Curtis, Michael, (ed.), *Religion and politics in The Middle East*. Westview Press. Boulder. Colorado, 1981.
- Deutsch, Karl W, *The Analysis of International Relations*. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey, 1978.
- Dougherty James E. and Pfaltzgraff Robert L., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. 3rd Ed. Hopper & Row. New York, 1990.
- Fieldhouse, D.K., *Economics and Empire: 1830-1904*, McMillan. London 1984.
- Gaddis, John Lewis, *The United States and the End of Cold War*. Oxford University Press. New York, 1992.
- Gallagher, James J., *Low Intensity Conflict: A Guide for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*. Reprinted by Services Book Club. GHQ. Rawalpindi, 2002.
- Geoffrey, Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and Rise of the West*. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Gilpin Robert, *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1987.
- Goldstein, Joshua S., *International Relations*. Harper Collins College Publishers. New York, 1994.
- Hearnshaw, F.J.C., *Sea Power and Empire*, George Harrap and Co. London, 1940.
- Herodotus, *The Persian Wars*. Penguin Books. Harmondsworth, 1972.
- Holsti, Kelive, J., *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1996.
- Hornby, S. A., *Oxford Advance Learner's Dictionary*. Oxford University Press. London, 2005.
- Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for 21st Century*. Random House. New York, 1993.
- Krasner, Stephen D., *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. University of California Press. Berkeley, 1985.
- Lewis, Bernard and Curtis, Michael, (eds.), *The Return of Islam in Religion and Politics in the Middle East*. Westview Press. Boulder, 1981.

International Conflict Resolution

- Mandel, R. *Irrationality in Confrontation*. Greenwood Press. Westport Connecticut, 1987.
- Michael, Howard, 'The Military Factor in European Expansion'. in Hadley Bull and Adam Watson. (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*. Clarendon Press. Oxford 1984.
- Michel Fortmann, (eds.), *Multilateralism and Regional Security*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press. Clementsport, 1997.
- Morgenthau. Hans J., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th Ed., New York, 1978.
- Najam, A. Bezergan. "Islam and Arab Nationalism". in Michael Curtis. (ed.), *Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, Westview Press. Boulder, 1981.
- Nasser. Gamal Abdel. *The Philosophy of Revolution*. Cairo, 1959.
- Neufeldt. Victoria. *Webster's New World*. Macmillan Company. New York, 1997.
- Segal. Gerald. *The Simon and Schuster Guide to the World Today*. Simon and Schuster Ltd. London, 1987. Reprinted by PAF Book Club. Combined Printers (pvt) Ltd. Lahore, 1988.
- Sharplin. Arthur. *Strategic Management*. McGraw Hill Book Company. New York, 1985.
- Smith. Stephen A.. *Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey. California, December 2002.
- Waltz. Kuttle. *Theory of International Politics*. Random House. New York, 1979.
- Woodford. Kate and Jackson Guy. *Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 2003.
- World Religions: Universal Peace - Global Ethic*. Global Ethic Foundation. Deili, 2000.

B. Books (Subject Matter)

- Amstutz. Mark R.. *International Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to World Politics*. Mc Graw-Hill. Boston, 1999.
- Azar. Edward. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. Dartmouth Publishing Co., Hampshire, 1990.
- Azar, Edward and Burton. John, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex 1984.
- Bartos, Otomar J. and Wehr. Paul. *Using conflict Theory*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 2002.
- Bouvier, Antoine A.. *International Humanitarian Law and Law of Armed Conflict*. United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000.
- Bradford, Johnson P. and Catherine, Barnes, *Conflict Resolution and Negotiation*, Institute of World Affairs, Washington DC, 1995.
- Burton, John and Dukes, Frank, *Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement and Resolution*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990.

- Chatty, Habib, *Islamic Conference*, Official Publication of the General Secretariat of the OIC, Jeddah.
- Coalition Operations Handbook: The American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Program, Primary Standardization Office, Arlington, 1999.
- Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Department of Defense, 2005, <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsm/g/m3958.htm>.
- Accessed on 29 May 2010.
- Hamson, F. and Mandell, B. (eds.), *Managing Regional Conflict*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990.
- Gareth, Evans. *Cooperating for Peace: A Global Agenda for 1990s and Beyond*, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993.
- Grieco, Joseph M., *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990.
- Hog, Lund, B. and Ulrich, J. W., (eds.), *Conflict Control and Conflict Resolution*, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1972.
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996.
- Jacoby, Tim, *Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and interdisciplinary approach*, Routledge, New York, 2008.
- Krasner. Stephen D., *Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.
- Kriesberg, Louis, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1998.
- Last David, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1997.
- Lewis, Bernard, "The Return of Islam", in Michael Curtis, (ed), *Religion and politics in The Middle East*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981
- MacFarlane S. Neil and Ehrhart Hans-George (eds.), *Peacekeeping at a Crossroads*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1997.
- Mackinlay, John, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, 1996.
- Mapping The Global Muslim Population: *A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Washington D.C., October 2009
- Mehdi, Hameed Dr., *Organisation of The Islamic Conference*, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1988.
- Mitchell, C. R., *The Structure of International Conflict*, Macmillan Basingstoke, 1981.
- Morrison, Alex (ed.), *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War: International Security Enforcement*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1994.
- Morrison, Alex, (ed.), *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1995.

International Conflict Resolution

- Morrison, Alex, (ed.), *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1997.
- Oberschall, A., *Social Conflict and Social Movements*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1973.
- Palin, Roger, H., *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.
- Pruitt, Dean and Jaffrey, Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Settlement and Resolution*, Random House, New York, 1986.
- Pacific Regional Security: The 1985 Pacific Symposium*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1988.
- Rafai, Syed Noorul Hassan and Karipak, Abdul Kabeer (eds.), *Kashmir Bleeds* [The Human Rights Commission Srinagar, Kashmir, December 1990], Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1991.
- Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom, Miall, Hugh, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008.
- Ronald, Fisher, "The Potential for Peace Building: Forming a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking", *Peace and Change*, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1993.
- Schelling, Thomas, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960.
- Schmidl, Erwin A., *Police in Peace Operations*, Informationen, Zur Sicherheitspolitik, Vienna, 1998.
- Sibtain, Tahir, *Kashmir and the United Nations*, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid -I-Azam University, Islamabad, 1990.
- Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, Sixth Ed., Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.
- Thakur, Ramesh, *International Conflict Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex, 1986.
- Understanding Humanitarian Law, Basic Rules Of The Geneva Conventions And Their Additional Protocols*, International Committee of The Red Cross, Switzerland, 1983.
- Wilkinson, Phillip R., MBE and Rinaldo Richard J., *Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 1996.
- Woodhouse, Tom Professor and Duffey, Tamara Dr., *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000.

C. UN Publications

- A Review of Research Activities of United Nations University*, Public Affairs Section, UN University, Tokyo, 1999.
- Basic Facts About the United Nations*, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1998.
- Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*,

- Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1997.
- Harleman, Christian, *United Nations Military Observer: Methods and Techniques of Serving on a UN Observer Mission*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 1997.
- Command and Control of Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, October 2001.
- Cooperation between United Nations and Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations: Suggested Principles and Mechanism*, Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 1999.
- Abi-Saab, Georges (ed.), *The Concept of International Organisation*, UNESCO, Paris, 1981.
- Ghali, Boutros Boutros, *An Agenda for Development 1995*, United Nations, New York, 1995.
- Michel, Faure Jean, *Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 1996.
- Peacekeeping Training: United Nations Military Observer Course*, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, 1995.
- Woodhouse, Tom and Duffey, Tamara Dr., *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, United Nations Institute of Training and Research, New York, 2000.
- The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1996.
- Reports of the Secretary General's on Implementation of the Panel on UN Peace Keeping Operations*, UN General Assembly, New York, 2000.
- United Nations Peace Keeping from 1991 to 2000: Statistical Data and Charts*, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 2000.
- United Nations Peace Keeping*, UN Department of Public Information, New York 1996.
- United Nations System*, UNDP, Copenhagen, 1995.
- United Nations, Secretary-General's Bulletin*, ST/SGB/1999/13, UN Secretariat, August 1999, New York, 1999.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1998.

D. UN Security Council Resolutions

- Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992.
- Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948, http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/UN_Resolution.htm. Accessed on 18 January 2010.
- Resolution of the Security Council of January 5, 1949, http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/UN_Resolution.htm. Accessed on 18 January 2010.
- UNSC Resolution 38 (Document No. S/651, dated the 17th January,

International Conflict Resolution

1948), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun38.htm>. Accessed on 24 January, 2010.

UNSC Resolution 39 (Document No. S/654, dated the 20th January, 1948), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun38.htm>. Accessed on 24 January, 2010.

E. Government Publications / Official Documents

Auswartiges, Amt, *25 Years of German Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Foreign Office Public Relations Division, Adenauereile, Bonn, June 1998.

David, Cox and Albert, Legault (eds.), *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1995.

Durch, William, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Nova Scotia, 1993.

Pakistan Army in Service of Peace – 50 Years of Peacekeeping, Inter Services Public Relations, The Army Press, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 2000.

Peace Support Operations, Joint Military Doctrine, Swedish Armed Forces, Stockholm, 1997.

Roper, John, Masashi, Nishihara, Otunnu, Olara A. and Schoettle, Enid C.B. *'Keeping the Peace in The Post-Cold War Era'*, A Report to The Trilateral Commission, 1993.

F. The OIC Documents

The Organization of the Islamic Conference, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/dqzzywt/2633/2634/t15538.htm>.

The OIC Charter 1972, <http://www3.ircica.org/metinler>.

The OIC Charter 2008, <http://www.islamonline.net>.

Final Communiqué of the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, 16-19 January 1984, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/4/4th-is-sum.htm>.

Final Communiqué of the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/5/5th-is-sum.htm>.

Final Communiqué of The Sixth Islamic Summit Conference, Dakar, 9-11 December 1991.

Final Communiqué of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, 13-15 December, 1994, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-is-summit.htm#FINALCOMMUNIQUE>.

Final Communiqué of the Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, 9-11 December, 1997, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-is-summits.htm>.

Final Communiqué of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference, Doha, 12-13 November 2000, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/9/9th-is>

- sum-final_communique.htm.
- Final Communiqué of the Tenth Islamic Summit Conference, 16-17 October, 2003, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/10/10is-fc-en.htm>.
- Final Communiqué of the Eleventh Islamic Summit Conference, OIC/SUMMIT-11/2008/FC/Final, www.oic-oci.org/is11/english/FC-11-SUMMIT-en.pdf.
- Final Declaration of the Second Extra Ordinary Session of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Amman, July 1980.
- Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Eighth Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Bamako, 25-27 June 2001, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/28/28-ICFM-FC-en.htm>.
- Final Communiqué of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Khartoum, 25-27 June, 2002, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/29/29icfm-final-e.htm>.
- Final Communiqué of the Thirtieth Session of the Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers, Tehran, 28-30 May, 2003, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/30/30icfm-fc-en.htm>. Final Communiqué of The Thirty-First Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Istanbul, 14-16 June 2004, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/31/31icfm-fc-en.htm>.
- Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Second Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers ICFM/32-2005/FC/FINAL.
- Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Third Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, <http://www.oic-oci.org/baku2006/english/fc.htm>.
- Final Communiqué of the Thirty-Fourth Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, OIC/34-ICFM/2007/FC/FINAL.
- Declaration of Lahore, Second Islamic Summit Conference, September 1974, [http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration of Lahore](http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration%20of%20Lahore).
- Kampala Declaration, <http://www.oic-oci.org/35cfm/english/res/KampalaDeclaration.pdf>.
- Makkah Declaration of the Third Islamic Summit Conference, 25-28 January, 1981, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-is-sum.htm>.
- Casablanca Declaration, the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, 13-15 December, 1994, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/7/7th-ssummit.htm#CASABLANCADECLARATION>.
- Damascus Declaration adopted by The Thirty-Sixth Session of The OIC Council of Foreign Ministers Session, 23-25 May 2009. <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/8893B3013A655B6E852575C2006363A5>.
- Tehran Declaration, The Eighth Islamic Summit Conference, Tehran, 9-11 December, 1997, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-is-summits.htm#TehranDeclaration>.
- Declaration on Al Quds al-Sharif and Palestine, <http://www.oic-oci.org/>

International Conflict Resolution

- english/conf/is/10/declaration.htm.
- Declaration issued by The 29th Session of The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on The Dangerous Situation in Palestine, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/29/29%20icfm-dec-pal-e.htm> .
- Resolution 1/2/IS of Second Islamic Summit Conference, Lahore, 1974 <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/2/2nd-is-sum.htm#Declaration of Lahore>.
- Resolution No. L / 5-P (Is), On the Palestine Question and the Situation in The Middle East, <http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/5/5th-is-sumpolitical.htm>.
- Resolution No. 1 /4-ORG (IS) On Lifting the Suspension of the Arab Republic of Egypt's Membership to the OIC.
- Secretary General's Report, New Vision for the Muslim World: Solidarity in Action ,The Third Extraordinary Session Of The Islamic Summit Conference, Makkah Al-Mukarramah, 7-8 December 2005, <http://www.oic-oci.org/ex-summit/english/sg-report.htm>

G. Periodicals / Journals

- A Dozen Good Reasons to Get United States Out of the United Nations*, The John Birch Society, Appleton.
- Abdullah, Aslam, (ed.), "OIC: A Survey and Assessment in Arabia", *The Islamic World Review*, December No. 2, Islamic Press Agency, Bucks, 1983.
- Fisher, Ronald J., "Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse", *Journal of Peace Research*; Vol. 38, No. 3, 2001.
- Galtung, J., Guha, A., Wirak, A., Sjile, S., Cifuentes, M., Golstein, H., 'Measuring world development', *The Alternatives* 1, 1975.
- Groom, A. J. R., "Paradigms in conflict: the strategies, the conflict researcher and the peace researcher", *Review of International Studies*, 14, 1988.
- Hashmat, Shahid Ahmad, Pakistan Foreign Policy and National Security, *Pakistan Defence Review*, Winter 2006, Central Army Press, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
- Huntington, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 1993.
- Huntington, Samuel P., "The West Unique, Not Universal", *Foreign Affairs*, 1996.
- Krauthammer, Charles, "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs* 70, (1990/91).
- Lewis, Bernard, "The Roots of Muslim Rage", *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990.
- Michael, Howard, "The Military Factor in European Expansion", in Hadley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society* , Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984

- Oberschall, A., "Theories of social conflict", *Annual Review of Sociology* 4, 1978.
- Seizaburo Sato, "A Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan", *Asia Pacific Review*, October 1997.
- National Development and Security*, Foundation for International Environment National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
- Nye Joseph, S., "What New world Order?", *Foreign Affairs* 71, Spring 1992.
- Regional Studies, The Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.
- RUSI, Royal United Services Institute, UK.
- Strategic Studies, The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
- War and Peace Digest, The War and Peace Foundation, United Nations, New York.

H. Internet / News Paper Articles

- Abbas Calls for Settlement Freeze 'for a fixed period', *The News International*, Pakistan, 13 January, 2010.
- Aggression: Problems with Definitions, http://www.psy.gla.ac.uk/~paddy/level_2/L7_aggrobio.pdf. Accessed on 4 April 2010.
- Ahmad, Wajahat, Kashmir and the United Nations, *Countercurrent .org*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.countercurrents.org/ahmad270808.htm>. Accessed on 25 April 2010.
- Annan Kofi A, Walking the International Tightrope, *The New York Times*, 19 January 1999.
- Asadi, Muhammad, *A Critique of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations*, <http://www.selvesandothers.org/article15618.html> . Accessed on 25 February 2010.
- Asghar Rizwan, Gaza Blockade, *The News International*, Pakistan, 16 January, 2010.
- Bassford, Christopher, *Clausewitz and His Works*, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm>. Accessed on 27 May 2010
- Burton John W, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy", <http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10086/>.
- Burton John W, "Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension", http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm.
- Bustani, Hisham, *The Delusion of the Clash of Civilizations and the War on Islam*, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/mrzine/bustani290508.html> . Accessed on 30 August, 2009.
- Cunningham, William G. Jnr., *Conflict Theory and the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/conflict>. Accessed on 2 April 2009.
- Elif, Shafak, *There is No Clash of Civilizations*, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-459/i.html. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?: Summary",

International Conflict Resolution

- Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
- Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume 15. 1908. *Kashmir: History*, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir>. Accessed on 18 January 2010.
- International Law: An Overview*, Cornell University Law School, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/International_law. Accessed on 5 February 2010.
- International Criminal Court, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About>. Accessed 23 September 2009.
- Johnson, Waylan, Oil and Gas: An Investment Always in Demand, <http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/501/1/Oil-and-Gas-An-Investment-Always-in-Demand/Page1.html>.
- Meyssan, Thierry "A Plan to Expand American Supremacy: The Clash of Civilizations", <http://www.voltairenet.org/article30037.html>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
- National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the ICRC Advisory Service, <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/advisoryservice/ihl>. Accessed 24 September 2009.
- OIC Charter 1972. <http://www.oic-oic.org/is11/english/Cahrter-en.pdf> Accessed on 25 September 2009.
- Pierre, Tristram, Obama Declares an End to Clash of Civilizations, <http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/clash-of-civilizations.htm>. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
- Protected Persons and Property and International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_protected_persons_and_property. Accessed 24 September 2009,
- Said, Edward W., The Clash of Ignorance, *The Nation*, 22 October, 2001, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>. Accessed on 25 February 2010.
- Scott, Thompson and Jeffrey, Steinberg, "British Svengali Behind Clash of Civilizations", *Executive Intelligence Review*, November 30, 2002, http://larouchepub.com/other/2001/2846b_lewis_profile.html. Accessed on 30 August 2009.
- Seizaburo, Sato, A Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan, 'Asia Pacific Review' October 1997, <http://www.sbpark.com/inn60.html>. Accessed on 25 February 2010.
- Summary of 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy' - an article by John W. Burton, <http://www.beyondintractability.org/articlesummary/10086>. Accessed on 10 May 2009.
- The Rome Statute and International Criminal Court, <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About>. Accessed on 9 February 2010.
- Treaties and customary international humanitarian law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_treaties_and_customary_law. Accessed 24 September 2009.
- UN Security Council: Functions and Powers, <http://www.un.org/Docs/>

sc/unsc_function.html . Accessed on 14 March 2010.

What is International Humanitarian Law, ICRC,
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet-law>. Accessed 24 September 2009.

World Oil Transit Chokepoints, U.S. Energy Information
Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html.

I. Newspapers

Daily Times, Pakistan.

Dawn, Pakistan.

Foreign Affairs.

International Organization.

International Security.

Newsweek.

The Economist.

The Guardian.

The Nation.

The National Interest.

The New York Times.

The News International.

Times.

Washington Post.

J. Websites / Web Links

http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/Subjects_of_international_law.

<http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About>.

http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_protectedpersons_and_propery

http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_treaties_and_customary_law.

http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/advisory_service_ihl

<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet-law>.

<http://www.ictt.org/default.htm>.

<http://www.islamonline.net>

<http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/3/3rd-issum.htm>

<http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php>.

<http://www.themwl.org/profilr>.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html>.

[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/United Nations Peacekeeping](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/United_Nations_Peacekeeping).

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html.

<http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml>.

<http://www.un.org/icc/part1.htm>.

<http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>.

International Conflict Resolution

<http://www.un.org/sg/sgrole.shtml>.

<http://www.oic-oic.org/home.asp>

<http://www.oic-oic.org/is11/english/Cahrter-en.pdf>

<http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm>

<http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-most-populated-countries-map.html>.

<http://www.infoplease.com/world/statistics/most-populous-countries.html> .

<http://www.themwl.org/profile>

<http://www.pewforum.org>

http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.

<http://www.oilgasarticles.com/articles/501/1/Oil-and-Gas-An-Investment-Always-in-Demand/Page1.html>.

Index

A

Abbasids 65
 Abdul Rehman Tenku, Prime Minister of Malaysia 70
 Afghani 68
 Africa 30, 34, 50, 52, 54, 66, 83, 132, 134, 155, 181, 182, 183, 191
 African Union (AU) 49, 77, 183
 Aggression 7, 8, 9, 13, 37, 39, 42, 44, 56, 62, 75, 85, 95, 96, 98, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 115, 120, 122, 123, 142, 178
 Aggressor 45, 46, 157
 Ahmed Soekarno, President of Indonesia 69
 Ahmedo Bello 70
 Al-Fatah Movement /Al-Fatah 86, 90
 Al-Quds Committee 96
 Alhaj Aminul Hussaini, Grand Mufti of Palestine 68
 Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Dr 69
 Al-Quds Al-Sharif 75, 76, 86, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107
 Amstutz, 22, 128, 135, 137, 142, 179
 Arab Spring 83, 124, 125
 Arab Summit Conference 99
 Arab-Israel War 70
 Arab-Israel Peace Process 86
 Ariel Sharon 85
 Argument/Arguments 5, 14
 Armed conflict 18, 25, 46, 60,

123, 126,
 Armed struggle 88, 89, 90
 Arthur Sharplin 130
 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 49
 Astana (Kazakhstan) 72, 106, 119
 Auchinleck, Field Marshal 113
 Authority 12, 21, 22, 26, 42, 43, 45, 47, 50, 51, 56, 62, 78, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 120, 128, 156, 158, 176
 Azar, Edward E. 10, 11

B

Baitul Maqdas (Jerusalem) 69
 Balance of Power 1, 8, 9, 32, 99
 Balfour Declaration 83
 Behaviour approach 6
 Behaviourist/Behaviourist School 6, 7
 Bernard Lewis 29, 33, 38, 67
 Bezigan, Najam A. 68
 British East India Company 67, 109
 Buddhism 37
 Burton, John, Prof Dr. 12, 13, 34

C

Caliphate (Khilafat) 95, 155
 Camps of Sabra and Shatila 85
 Catholicism 31

International Conflict Resolution

Caucasia 66
Central Asia 65, 66, 145, 181
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) 45
China 19, 32, 35, 43, 55, 62, 125, 136, 139
Christianity 30, 31, 37, 39
Clash of Civilizations 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39
Classical approach 6
CNN 94
Cold War 1, 9, 29, 33, 37, 39, 63, 90
Collateral Damage 52, 55, 57
Collective Response Mechanism 2
Collective security 9, 157, 158, 166, 167, 172, 173
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 49, 158, 173
Colonization 31, 98, 102
Commando action 88
Commonwealth 71, 158
Comprehensive Security Concept 178
Conflict and Violence 14, 15
Conflict 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13
Conflict prevention 12, 13, 17, 54, 167
Conflict regulation 17
Conflict resolution 5
Conflict settlement 17
Conflict theories 6
Conflict transformation 17, 18
Conflict zone 51
Conflicts 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 25
Confucianism 37

Cooperation 7, 8, 21, 23, 24, 36, 49, 56, 65, 68, 70,
Core States 32, 33, 34
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) 105, 117, 119
Credibility 48, 50, 51, 59, 61, 167
Cultural Reconfiguration 33

D

Dag Hammarskjöld 46
Deterrence 8, 9, 101 129
Deutsch, Karl W 128
Disaster Management 24, 175, 176
Dispute (s) 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 54, 56, 58, 81, 86, 113
Dixon, Owen Sir 113, 114
Dougherty 6, 8

E

Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS) 49, 173
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 49, 77, 167, 178
Economic sanctions 17, 44
Edward W. Said, Professor 37
Egypt 18, 65, 69, 84, 108, 109, 121, 123, 132, 138, 152, 159, 181
Elif, Shafak 38
Emerging Order Civilizations 33
Eminent Persons 179
European Union (EU) 1, 49, 103, 105, 110, 158

F

Fatimid 65
 Fault Line Conflicts 35
 Fault Line States 35
 Federation 43, 77, 90, 105
 Foreign forces 1, 2, 52, 125, 170
 Foreign policy 28, 29, 135, 165
 France 32, 34, 43, 73, 93, 97,
 125, 147
 Fredrick L. Schuman 128
 Free world 35

G

Gaza/ Gaza Strip 84, 87, 90,
 102, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
 111
 General Assembly 42, 54, 61,
 84, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 120
 Geneva Conventions of 1949
 25, 60
 Geo-economic 1
 Geo-political 1, 38, 135
 Global order 21
 Global peace and security 41,
 46, 122
 Global society 23
 Global system 21
 Goldstein, Joshua 128, 135
 Gracey, General 113
 Great Game 136, 149
 Gross National Product (GNP)
 145
 Gulab Singh of Jammu 111
 Gulf Cooperation Council
 (GCC) 49
 Gulf War-1 83

H

Hajj (Pilgrimage) 69, 150
 Hamas 86, 90

Hans J. Morgenthau 127
 Hari Singh, Maharaja 112
 Hegemonic stability 9
 Hinduism 37
 Hisham Bustani 37
 Hobbs, Thomas 126
 Human conflict 6, 7, 8
 Humanitarian assistance 39,
 46, 47, 55, 95, 109, 120, 167,
 174, 175, 176
 Huntington, Samuel Paul 29

I

ICFM 103, 104, 105, 117, 118
 Idealism 23
 Independence of Indian
 Subcontinent 112
 Indian atrocities in Kashmir
 114
 Indian military forces 114
 Influence 1, 9, 12, 22, 27, 32,
 51, 53, 67, 79, 90, 95, 114,
 128, 129, 130, 142, 145, 157
 Instable states 22, 27
 Instinct Theories of Aggression 7
 Instruments of Conflict
 Resolution 17
 Interest, general interests 28
 Interest, permanent interests
 28
 Internal Conflict (s) 2, 12, 25,
 26, 123, 160, 163
 Internally Displaced Persons
 (IDPs) 126, 175
 International Armed Conflict
 25, 46
 International Committee of
 Red Cross and Red
 Crescent (ICRC) 53, 60
 International community 1, 8,
 22, 23, 27, 28, 41, 42, 55, 59,

International Conflict Resolution

61, 62, 80, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91,
92, 97, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106,
108, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119,
123, 124, 128, 129, 152, 171,
173

International conflict
resolution 2, 3, 42, 45, 46, 50,
79, 83, 131, 158, 163, 169, 172

International Cooperation 23,
24, 67, 79

International Court of Justice
(ICJ) 44, 59, 61, 87, 102

International Criminal Court
(ICC) 53, 59, 61, 62

International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
59

International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) 59, 63

International disputes 1, 23, 42,
45, 50, 55, 58, 59, 156, 162,
166

International friction 43

International Governmental
Organizations (IGOs) 22, 175

International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) 25, 53, 56, 60, 61,
77, 81

International institutions 22, 34

International Monetary Fund
(IMF) 34, 129

International organizations 41,
58, 67

International peace and
security 2, 24, 41, 42, 43, 44,
45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 59, 74, 77,
79, 80, 81, 151, 152, 159, 160,
165, 173, 182

International politics 1, 22, 66,
80, 127, 128, 131, 115, 151

International Tribunals for
War Crimes 61, 63

Internationalism 23

Inter-state conflicts 2, 3, 81,
120, 121

Intifada 85, 86, 100, 103

Intra-state conflicts and
disputes 123

Invasion of Kuwait 83

Islam 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 57,
65, 67, 70, 76, 86, 97, 100,
149, 176

Islamic Civilization 34, 36,
37, 39

Islamic community (Ummah)
68

Islamic Conference of the
Foreign Ministers 78, 103

Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) 130

Islamic ideology 67

Islamic institutions 77, 120,
127

Islamic Summit/ Islamic
Summit Conference 70, 77,
78, 79, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 107, 115, 123, 125, 150,
153, 172, 179

Israel 18, 66, 70, 83, 84, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89, 90

Israel's right to exist 89

Israeli aggression 85, 104, 106

J

Jamal Abdul Nasser 69

Jacoby 9, 15, 15, 16

Afghani, Jamal ud Din 68

Jeffrey, Steinberg 38

Jerusalem (Al-Quds Al-
Sharif) 67

K

Kashmir Dispute 111, 113, 114,
115, 117, 121, 163, 166, 170
Kashmir Legislative Assembly
112
Kashmir- The End State 120
Khanates 65
Khilafat Movement 68
King Abdul Aziz 68
King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz 70
King Hassan of Morocco 71
King Hussain of Jordan 69
Kofi Anan 45
Kriesberg, Louis 15

L

Law of Armed Conflict (LAC)
53, 56, 60
Leadership 151
League of Nations 67, 83
Legitimacy 11, 27, 34, 39, 48,
50, 86, 93

M

Machiavelli, Niccolo 128
Macro Theory 8
Madrid Principle 101
Makkah 68, 70, 98, 102, 116, 179
Makkah Declaration 79, 98
Mandate/Ambiguous
Mandate, Palestine Mandate
48, 49, 51, 52, 83, 84, 87
Mandates System 83
Masjid Al-Aqsa 85, 95, 97
Mehdi, Dr. Heider 79, 96
Membership of the OIC 72, 77
Micro Theory 7
Middle East 2, 29, 30, 34, 38, 50,
66, 71, 83, 86, 87, 95, 96, 97,
98, 99, 101, 110, 121, 131, 136
Military 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16,

27, 29, 30, 34, 35
Military action 45, 103
Military capability of the
OIC Member States/
Member State of the OIC
142
Minorities 13, 75, 76, 120, 126,
139, 170, 179,
Mitchell 15
Modernization 31, 32, 158
Mogadishu, Abdullah Osman
70
Moguls 65
Mountbatten 112
Muhammad Asadi 38
Multinational forces (MNF)
53
Muslim (s) 1, 23, 29, 32, 33, 34,
36, 39, 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69,
70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 83,
84, 87, 95, 97, 99
Muslim communities 69, 76,
120, 121, 126
Muslim countries 2, 35, 39,
63, 64, 68, 70, 85, 93, 95, 119,
125, 129, 130, 133, 134, 148
Muslim minorities 75, 120,
126, 139, 170
Muslim States 66, 71, 76, 79,
95, 102, 121
Muslim Ummah 66, 68, 127,
150, 168, 179
Muslim World 1, 2, 3, 32, 33,
34, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 78, 83,
85, 95, 96, 109, 121, 12, 148,
149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 158
Muslims in Europe and
Americas 137

N

National interests 1, 21, 23,

International Conflict Resolution

- 28, 29, 52, 54, 79, 98, 145, 151, 165, 178
- National law 56
- Natural resources 1, 2, 28, 36, 39, 52, 65, 71, 98, 124, 127, 130, 135, 144, 145, 159
- Non-Member Observer 89
- Non-Member Observer State 91, 92, 93, 94
- Non-Governmental
 - Organizations (NGOs) 22, 69, 109
- Non-International Armed
 - Conflicts 25
- Non-state actors 1, 22, 24
- Non-vital Interests 28
- North Africa 2, 65, 83, 132, 138
- North America 1
- North Atlantic Treaty
 - Organisation (NATO) 49, 158

O

- Occupation of Iraq and
 - Afghanistan 83, 145, 163
- Office of Coordinator for the Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) 46
- OIC Member States 3, 77, 78, 79, 80, 103, 104, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 140, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 178, 151, 152, 154, 158, 161, 171
- OIC Summit 70, 98, 117, 170, 176
- OIC Charter 72, 96
- Organization of American State (OAS) 49
- Organization of Security and cooperation in a Europe (OSCE) 49, 158
- Organization of the Islamic

- Conference (OIC) 71
- Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 2, 65, 166
- Organs of the OIC 77
- Ottoman Caliphate (Khilafat-e-Usmania) 68

P

- Palestine 18, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 103, 105, 121
- Palestine Authority (PA) 90, 91, 93
- Palestine conflict 95, 166, 169
- Palestine Liberation
 - Organization (PLO) 84, 86, 87, 92, 98
- Palestine Mandate 84
- Palestine National Authority (PNA) 90
- Palestine Problem 83, 95, 121
- Palestine–The End State 107
- Pan Islamic Movement 68
- Partab Singh 112
- Peacebuilding 47, 160
- Peace Conference 58, 86
- Peace enforcement 47, 48
- Peace Support Operations 48
- Peaceful Settlement of
 - Disputes 8, 81, 115, 118, 123
- Peacekeeping 3, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 61, 152, 154, 160, 161, 164, 167, 171, 173, 174, 181
- Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 46, 48, 49, 50, 56, 150, 164, 167, 169, 173, 183
- Peacemaking 47, 173
- Pfaltzgraff 6, 8

Pierr, Tristam 39
 Plebiscite Commissioner 113
 PLO Chairman 89
 PLO-Israel Accord 89
 Political will 2, 48, 96, 107, 130,
 149, 162, 167, 168, 170
 Post-Westphalia order 22
 Power 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16,
 21, 22, 25, 28, 32, 35, 43, 55,
 66, 69, 90, 95, 99, 106, 107,
 121, 124, 125, 127, 128, 137
 Preponderance of Power 8, 9
 Preventive deployment 54
 Preventive diplomacy 47
 Primary parties 19
 Problem solving 12, 13, 14, 19
 Protected persons 60
 Protracted Social Conflict 10,
 11, 12, 26

Q

Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad
 Ali Jinnah 113
 Qura'n 67

R

Rambir Singh 112
 Rapid Response and High
 Readiness Force 175
 Realism 23
 Refugees 85, 94, 107, 122, 126,
 169, 175
 Regional organizations 41, 46,
 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 81, 127,
 150, 178
 Resurgence of Islam 33, 34
 Revival of the Islamic
 civilization 34
 Right to self-determination 86,
 96, 115, 116, 117, 118
 Rules of engagement (ROE) 50,

51, 52, 56
 Russian Federation 77, 90, 105
 Russia 19, 32, 34, 39, 55, 62,
 66, 77, 87, 105, 110, 125, 136,
 139

S

Sato, Seizauro 37
 Second World War 16, 18, 41,
 63, 66, 87
 Secondary Party (ies) 20
 Secretariat 42, 46, 54, 70, 72,
 77, 106, 157, 164, 167, 173,
 174, 182
 Self-defence 46, 48, 51, 56, 57,
 58, 60, 83
 Self-determination 67, 74, 75,
 76, 80, 81, 88, 89, 96, 115,
 116, 117, 118, 120, 170
 Shanghai Cooperation
 Organization (SCO) 49
 Significance 135, 136
 Sinic (Chinese) Civilization
 39
 South Asian Association
 for Regional Cooperation
 (SAARC) 49
 Soviet Union 1, 9, 10, 19, 29,
 38
 Specific Interests 28
 State Sovereignty/
 Sovereignty 21, 22
 Sultanate of Delhi 65
 Summit Conference (See
 Islamic Summit
 Conference) 70, 78, 79, 96,
 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107,
 115

T

Terrorism 2, 38, 39, 76, 85, 89,

International Conflict Resolution

1147, 119, 169, 176, 182
The British Crown 112
The OIC 2, 3, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73,
76, 77, 78, 81, 93, 96, 98, 102,
103
Theories of conflict 5
Thierry Meyssan 38
Third party (ies) 15, 17, 19
Thompson, Scott 38
Transnational influence 27
Troop Contributing Nations
(TCN) 53

U

Umayyad/ Umayyads 65
Ummah (See Islamic Council)
34, 66, 68, 70, 78, 81, 101, 103,
105, 151, 157, 168, 178, 179
UN Charter 41, 43, 44, 46, 54,
59, 76, 81, 113, 173
UN General Assembly
(UNGA) 42, 89, 93, 120
UN Membership of Palestine
87
UN Peacekeeping Operations
49, 50, 55, 56, 152, 169
UN Secretariat 46, 54
UN Security Council 42, 50, 51,
52, 53, 55, 56, 89, 91, 93, 100,
103, 104, 110, 116, 120, 125,
143, 181
Unilateral declaration of
independence of Palestine 90
United Kingdom 43, 48, 97
United Nations Department
of Peacekeeping Operation
(DPKO) 42, 46
United Nations Scientific
and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) 91, 102
United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) 46, 175
United Nations Development
Fund (UNDP) 46
United Nations Commission
for Indian and Pakistan
(UNCIP) 113
United Nations Department
of Economic and Social
Affairs (DESA) 127
United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) 42, 101
United Nations Scientific
and Culture Organisation
(UNESCO) 91, 102
United Nations/ UN 41, 43,
45, 47, 59, 62, 67, 70, 75, 83,
92, 93
United States of America/US/
USA 1, 97
Use of force 8, 25, 33, 44, 45,
52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 80,
86, 115, 119, 156

V

Variable interests (see
Interest) 28
Violence 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, 26,
58, 89
Vital Interests (See Interest) 1,
28, 128

W

Waltz, Kenneth 128
West Bank 84, 87, 90, 106, 108
Western allies 1
Western Christianity 31, 37,
38, 39
Western colonial powers 30
Western Europe 1, 19
Western expansion 31

Western imperialism 30
Westernization 32
Westphalian order 21
World Food Programme
(WFP) 46
World Muslim Congress
(Mo'tamar Al-alam Al-
Islami) 68
World Muslim League (Rabita
Al-Alam Al-Islami) 69, 70
World politics 9, 21, 23, 29, 33,
37, 73, 128, 129
World Trade Organization 16
World War-I 58, 83
World War-II 9, 16, 18, 22, 41,
84, 95, 155

Y

Yasser Arafat, Chairman PLO
89, 90

Z

Zionist entity 98, 99
Zionist occupation 70, 107



Dr Shahid Ahmad Hashmat is a retired Major General of the Pakistan Army. Besides serving on various command, staff and instructional assignments, he commanded a Pakistan Army contingent as a part of UN Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti. He also served as Military Planning Officer and Officer In-charge Generic Planning Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Secretariat, New York. He holds Masters in Military Sciences, War Studies and International Relations and a PhD in International Relations. He has contributed many articles on national security and international conflict resolution to prestigious journals. Presently, he is working as Principal and Dean at NUST Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad.

Price: Rs 500/-

A unique contribution to our understanding of the politics of international conflicts and cooperation, and succinct review of the role of the UN in this regard. Dr Shahid Hashmat's research also offers a valuable tool of understanding the nature, functioning and weaknesses of the OIC and recommendations for further improvement of the Organization.

Dr Lutfullah Mangi

Pro Vice Chancellor

Shah Abdul Latif University (Shikarpur Campus)

Former Head of Department of International Relations &

Director Area Study Centre Far East and South East Asia

University of Sindh

This work of Dr Shahid Hashmat is a very constructive attempt to fill a grave knowledge gap, in the field of conflict resolution and international relations, by shedding light on the functions and limitations of the OIC as a collective mechanism for conflict resolution. It presents a comprehensive review of the field of conflict resolution, the OIC and other relevant issues. In particular, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 serve as key contributions to the academic field, exploring issues that have not received adequate attention from other scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution. Hence, the book, which is based on Dr Hashmat's PhD dissertation, which I had the privilege to evaluate as External Examiner, is considered a good addition to the body of existing knowledge on "International Conflict Resolution".

Dr Yuji Uesugi

Professor, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University, Japan

A significant contribution to examine in depth the dynamics of conflict resolution in the context of the uphill task of global peace and stability undertaken by the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in the historical, current and future perspectives. Indeed, the author has made a valuable effort to critically evaluate the role of two major international organizations and has given useful recommendations to improve their functioning in the realm of peace making and peace-keeping.

Dr Moonis Ahmar

Meritorious Professor &

Dean Faculty of Arts,

University of Karachi